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1.1 Deficiencies in Critical Approaches to Finnegans Wake 
 
In the buginning is the woid (FW 378.29).1 
 
When speaking at the ‘Finnegans Wake Contexts’ symposium in 1987, 
Fritz Senn gave voice to what he termed his “linguistic dissatisfaction” with the 
state of Wake studies.2 Despite many decades of scholarly explication,3 Senn 
protested, “we do not understand Finnegans Wake.” The critical community 
most committed to making sense of Joyce’s enigmatic final work had, in 
Senn’s eyes, “collectively [...] not done [its] most basic homework, the sort of 
perhaps pedestrian semantic rummaging that would make all the further, 
superior, exertions that depend upon it remotely possible” (Inductive 
Scrutinies, 226).  
Sharing Senn’s contention that there is “something premature” in this 
regard about much critical analysis of Finnegans Wake (Inductive Scrutinies, 
236), it shall be this study’s objective to engage in just such “rummaging” at 
the textual level of the Wake’s linguistic and semantic modes. Indeed, it is 
contended that the deficiencies in Wake studies result not only from the 
general theoretical disinterest in the “preliminary, humble, philological, spade 
work and low-level curiosity” that Senn perceives (Inductive Scrutinies, 227), 
but also, to perhaps an even greater degree, from the deficit of a candid and 
thoroughgoing exploration of the semiotic processes at play in the Wakean 
text. If we “do not understand Finnegans Wake,” then, this is because too 
often interpretation is attempted without first asking the fundamental question 
of how exactly this unusual text works. 
That such a linguistic analysis of the language of Finnegans Wake is 
largely absent in the critical canon may be observed by reference to Finn 
                                            
1 As is convention in Joyce studies, all references to the Wake will be to page and line 
number, so that (FW 378.29), for example, refers to Finnegans Wake page 378, line 29. 
2 This talk, orignially delivered in Leeds, England, was later revised as the paper “Linguistic 
Dissatisfaction at the Wake”, collected in Inductive Scrutinies, pp. 226-237. 
3 Finnegans Wake was first published on 4 May 1939 by Faber and Faber. 
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Fordham’s recent, and comprehensive, survey of the many critical 
approaches “that Finnegans Wake has invited from readers and critics,” which 
he enumerates as the structural, narrational, theoretical, inspirational, 
philological, genetic and exegetical (Fun at FW, 7). The largely linguistic 
approach to be undertaken in this study is conspicuous by its absence, 
particularly for such a linguistically non-orthodox text, and it is hoped that by 
rectifying this critical blind spot a new basis for future analysis might be 
established.4 Fordham’s critical overview serves as a more exhaustive point 
of reference than space could possibly allow here; however, as this study 
shall largely refrain from analysing the work’s novelistic features in order to 
focus more fully on its semiotic processes, a brief summary of the general 
critical stance on such issues may provide beneficial context for the analysis 
to come, and highlight why such an approach is so sorely needed.  
For critics who attempt an analysis of the work’s novelistic features, the 
Wake concerns the fortunes of the Earwicker family, composed of embattled 
father HCE, his loyal wife ALP, their rival twin sons Shaun the Post and Shem 
the Penman and coquettish daughter Issy. The ‘plot’, as usually summarised, 
treats the fall of the father figure by virtue of a rumour of some unconfirmed 
transgression, the attempts of his wife to exonerate him in a letter, and the 
battle of the sons to replace him. Pioneering studies of these issues include 
Campbell and Robinson’s mythological approach to the Wake’s plot in A 
Skeleton Key to Finnegans Wake, William York Tindall’s symbolic approach in 
A Reader's Guide to Finnegans Wake, and John Gordon’s plot- and 
character-based study Finnegans Wake: A Plot Summary. The work to best 
marry the close textual readings favoured here with a summary of the ‘events’ 
that constitute the Wake’s ‘plot’ is Luca Crispi and Sam Slote’s How Joyce 
Wrote Finnegans Wake, a chapter-by-chapter genetic examination of Joyce’s 
notebooks, and of the evolution of the Wake through its many drafts and 
publications. Once again we find Senn largely sceptical of the general trend of 
such approaches, arguing that these “traditional summaries” are “most 
unsatisfactory and unhelpful, [as] they usually leave out the hard parts and 
recirculate what we already think we know” (Fritz Senn and FW). Indeed, 
                                            
4 However a number of the approaches outlined by Fordham – specifically the narrational, 
philological and exegetical – shall also be incorporated in this study. 
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despite the many significant steps towards a working understanding of 
Finnegans Wake afforded us by these and other critical works, this present 
study largely shares Bernard Benstock’s wariness of the tendency towards 
generalised statements about the book’s content and themes. The inherent 
trap, too often succumbed to, is essentially “boiling down” Finnegans Wake 
into “insipid pap, and leaving the lazy reader with a predigested mess of 
[generalisations] and catchphrases” (Benstock, Joyce-Again's Wake, 4). 5 
Confronted with the inherently intractable difficulty of discerning a ‘plot’ 
from the Wake’s mutable language and novelistic modes, critics often attempt 
analysis by formulating structural, allusive or thematic codes. Once 
established by the critic, these codes are intended to tame the Wake’s wild 
plurality of signification, reduce its language to stable coherent ‘meanings’, 
and streamline its content to a system of stable characters and cohesive 
events. Once such a codifying force has been selected, it is made to centre 
the indefinitely interconnecting heterogeneous contexts provided by the 
Wake’s allusive complex within one supra-context, and, consequently, a unit 
of Wakean text is typically afforded ‘meaning’ by the manner in which it yields 
to the themes and structure of the chosen codifying text. Many such codes 
have been suggested, such as ‘Irish History’ (Boldereff iii & xi), the ‘third 
chapter of Genesis’ (Burrell 7), Vico’s La Scienza Nouva (Verene 85), ‘sleep’ 
(Bishop, Joyce’s Book of the Dark, passim); as well as attempts to construct a 
unified narrative concerning the “real” Earwickers, external to the “dream” (or 
experiential reality of the Wakean text) such as John Gordon’s Plot Summary. 
It would appear that such endeavours to discover a ‘matrix code’ through 
which the Wake’s language may be decoded stem from the perceived 
absence of a meaningful or stable engagement between the Wakean text and 
the English linguistic code.6 By thus circumventing the effect of the text’s 
                                            
5 As the novelistic features of the Wake shall be largely avoided in a preference for a closer 
examination of these semiotic processes, for matters of character and plot summary any 
number of these secondary sources may be consulted. 
6 The ‘English linguistic code’ is defined by Lauren B. Resnick as the system which 
constitutes “the sound patterns of [the language’s] lexical elements and the rules for 
combining these elements into grammatical sequences” (262). The employment of the term in 
this study, then, is best understood as referring to the system of probable or potential 
meanings encoded within the language system’s lexical and grammatical features. As 
Resnick argues, however, this system “by itself does not preserve information about events” 
(262), and this issue shall be addressed in full in the second half of ‘Chapter 2’. 
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exploitation of and engagement with a language system, however, the claim 
that such themes or allusions represent or reveal the ‘meaning’ of the text is 
largely problematised, as the question of how such extratextually formulated 
codes are textually signified and enabled remains unanswered. In other 
words, instead of inferring discourse from the discourse trace of the Wake’s 
text, such approaches reverse the process by formulating a discourse and 
then investigating the text for the ways in which it exemplifies the perceived 
code.7 By the same token, the conjectural tendencies and disposition toward 
generalisation of the plot summaries may also be seen as deficiencies 
resulting from the absence in the critical canon of a thoroughgoing linguistic 
analysis of the Wake’s unconventional approach to language use. Finally, on 
a more fundamental level, such narratological or structural studies commonly 
offer little insight into the experiential reality of reading Finnegans Wake, 
where dealing with the opaque manifest forms of its non-lexical items is a 
much more immediate concern for understanding, and even enjoyment, than 
its thematic or allusive features. At the very least, one imagines that to 
investigate the book’s characters, plot and themes without first enquiring into 
how its language operates is a matter of putting the cart before the horse. 
 
1.2 Line of Investigation 
 
Undertaking to address this critical gap in the body of Wake studies, and 
to return to a process of inferring the Wake’s discourse from its text, the 
primary goal of this study shall be to demonstrate that the code which 
provides the Wakean text with pragmatic significance and creative 
implicatures is not primarily a thematic, allusive or narrative-based one, but 
rather the English linguistic code which Joyce, in writing his last work, is so 
often assumed to have abandoned. In order to achieve this goal, the book’s 
                                            
7 There is a distinction to be made between ‘discourse’ in a linguistic sense as “the meaning 
that a first person intends to express in producing a text, and that a second person interprets 
from the text,” and in the social theory sense (from Foucault) as “a set of socio-cultural 
conventions for conceiving of reality in certain ways and controlling it” (Widdowson, Discourse 
Analysis, 129). The majority of this study will be concerned with the former act of “construing 
texts by keying them into contexts so as to [realise] discourse meaning” (Widdowson, 
Discourse Analysis, 27), but the latter sense shall also be utilised when the discussion turns 
to matters of schematic knowledge. 
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extreme experimentations with non-lexical signs and excessively hypotactic 
syntax shall be demonstrated to engage in an exaggerated but ultimately 
adherent way with the English linguistic code, and through this deviant 
adherence both produce ‘meaning’ and undermine language’s claim to 
univocal meaning. That the possibilities for signification embedded within this 
code are insufficient for ‘meaning’ to occur, however, shall also be addressed 
with reference to the influence of extratextual features such as context, 
schemata and discourse domains on the Wakean text. To these ends, the 
processes of signification at work in Finnegans Wake shall be approached 
from three perspectives, namely the text’s adherence to the linguistic code to 
forge equivocal semantic predictability, its motivated deviations from this code 
to create implicatures of meaning, and finally the manner in which the book’s 
cyclical structure creates a tension between prognostic and anagnostic modes 
which defers and alters such signification. 
Concomitant with such a line of investigation is the larger issue of how a 
full analysis of the Wake’s engagement with the English linguistic code may 
help deepen our understanding and definition of ‘language’ itself. As a 
consequence, if the argument digresses from Finnegans Wake for some 
considerable stretches (particularly in chapter 2 of the study), this is because 
the fundamental questions being addressed are not exclusively undertaken 
towards an explication of Joyce’s work, but also as a means of enquiring into 
what experimental literature – of which Finnegans Wake is considered the 
ultimate manifestation – can contribute to our understanding of how language 
itself actually ‘means’. The ultimate motivation in selecting Finnegans Wake 
as the central point of investigation is that, as “one of the great monuments of 
twentieth-century experimental letters” (Bishop, Introduction, vii), Joyce’s final 
work makes entirely manifest and acute the very fundamentals of the complex 









In addressing the semiotic processes at play in Finnegans Wake this 
study’s preference is for an interweaving of linguistic and literary modes of 
analysis. As these approaches constitute inherently different 
conceptualisations of the processes by which meaning is produced and 
received, and of the representative possibilities of language, such an 
approach is favoured in the attempt to counteract their potential for producing 
weighted results. H.G. Widdowson identifies the units of concern to the 
linguist as “those of the abstract system of the language,” and stresses that to 
analyse texts in terms of such units is “to treat such texts primarily as 
exemplification of the system” (Stylistic Analysis, 236). Conversely, while 
linguistics is broadly concerned with the means of signification, literary 
analysis is concerned with “what ends are achieved in terms of the 
communicative effect of the language used” (Widdowson, Stylistic Analysis, 
236). The employment of either approach to the exclusion of the other would 
thus significantly and inevitably influence, even determine, the results of the 
study, resulting in an illustration of how the language of the Wake conforms to 
either a priori assumption. In order to demonstrate that Finnegans Wake does 
not exemplify linguistic or literary codes, but rather exploits them to its own 
pragmatic ends, this study shall begin with a linguistic analysis of the ‘means’ 
of signification in the text (primarily in chapter 2) and gradually incorporate 
more literary analyses of the ends of its language use (in chapters 3 and 4). 
The complications inherent to this dual approach (such as their seemingly 
exclusive allowances of synchronic and diachronic meaning) shall be tackled 
as they arise. To these ends it is also considered preferable to focus primarily 
on an empirical analysis of the artefact of the Wakean text itself, so that 
findings on the means and ends of the semiotic process may be more closely 
aligned.  
One crucial caveat, however, should be offered before proceeding. It 
should be kept in mind at all times that when this study speaks of ‘meaning’ or 
‘meaning making’ it is not in the search for, or belief in the existence of, 
univocal meaning, particularly as regards the text of Finnegans Wake. 
‘Meaning’, as employed in this study, does not refer to the meaning of a text, 
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but simply the absence of meaninglessness, and an understanding of such 
meaning as equivocal in nature shall be acknowledged, and even 
encouraged. While this distinction should become readily apparent from the 
approach undertaken, it is still worth stressing at the offset that what is to be 
investigated is not the meaning of Finnegans Wake, but rather ‘meaning’ in 
Finnegans Wake; in other words, not so much what the text means, but how it 
manages to do so, despite the odds. 
 
1.4 Secondary Sources 
 
A handful of investigations into the Wake’s semiotic processes have 
been conducted, although none from a predominantly linguistic perspective 
(with the exception, perhaps, of Katie Wales’ writings on the work). Of these 
semiotic probings into the language of Finnegans Wake, this study is most 
beholden to the work of Derek Attridge. The approach undertaken shall be to 
build upon Attridge’s treatment of Finnegans Wake’s as “paradigmatic [...] of 
the literary corpus” (Peculiar Language, 234) by investigating the ways in 
which the Wake’s processes of signification are also paradigmatic of the 
processes by which any text exploits the English linguistic code in order to 
create ‘meaning’. In establishing a theoretical groundwork for the analysis of 
the semiotics of ‘experimental language’ in particular, and of the formation of 
neologisms, the works of French philosopher and literary theorist Jean-
Jacques Lecercle have proven indispensable. The more linguistics-related 
portions of this study are most indebted to the writings of H.G. Widdowson, 
whose treatment of text as a ‘discourse trace’ is considered the most 
exhaustive and accurate analysis of how ‘meaning’ is forged from text. With 
respect to the Wake’s modes of creativity the insights supplied by philosopher 
Jean-François Lyotard’s conceptualisation of the ‘postmodern’ as the 
representation of the unrepresentable, and by linguists Paul Grice and Dell 
Hymes’ explorations into ‘creativity’ as the process of forging implicature 
through motivated violations of linguistic and communicative norms, have 
been invaluable. Finally Fritz Senn’s pragmatic approach to this most 
unpragmatic of texts has influenced most every aspect of this study, and 
without his writings on the anagnostic processes at play in Joyce’s works, 
 8 







2 ‘Wakese’ and the English Linguistic Code 
 
2.1 Introducing ‘Wakese’: Critical Responses to the Language of The 
Wake 
 
          Much ink has been spilled over the vexing subject of the seemingly 
inscrutable language of James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, the author’s final 
and most radically experimental work. Expanding on the linguistic and stylistic 
experimentations of his magnum opus Ulysses, Joyce composed the Wake 
predominantly in neologisms; non-lexical items which take the form of 
portmanteaux, puns, phonetic echoes, idiosyncratic composites of polyglot 
morphemes, and etymological wordplay. Indeed it is this approach to 
language for which Joyce’s Wake is most notorious, and for which it acquires 
its greatest degree of infamy as a work of immeasurable difficulty and even 
meaninglessness. Given that such highly unconventional language use “gives 
the book a forbidding aspect of impenetrability” (Campbell and Robinson 3), 
such presuppositions concerning the work’s semiotic incoherence need hardly 
be surprising, yet often their unfortunate consequence is an unwillingness to 
engage critically with the realities of the Wakean text. Faced with such 
bewildering opacity, many commentators appear to feel a greater urge to 
evaluate than to understand, and, as with all things regarding the book, such 
evaluative criticism proves decidedly divisive.  
On one end of the spectrum critics endeavour to defend, even revere, 
the impenetrability of the book’s contorted language with an appeal to its 
aesthetic and phonetic qualities, rather than to its seemingly unorthodox 
semiotic processes. Representative of such a stance is Paul Rosenfeld’s 
suggestion that in Finnegans Wake “the style, the essential qualities and 
movement of the words, their rhythmic and melodic sequences, and the 
emotional [colour] of the page are the main representatives of the author's 
thought and feeling.” To all of these aspects, Rosenfeld suggests, “the 
accepted significations of the words are secondary” as “the writing is not so 
much about something as it is that something itself” (in Deming 663). 
Unsurprisingly, however, a great many critics find little aesthetic value in a text 
so wilfully obscure; on the contrary, the work’s linguistic experimentations are 
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often demonised as the ultimate travesty of experimental letters gone further 
than good sense or human patience would dictate. As H.G. Wells phrased the 
charge in a personal letter to Joyce, the author of Finnegans Wake had 
“turned [his] back on common men, on their elementary needs and their 
restricted time and intelligence” (qtd. in Ellmann 688).  
Whether defending the aesthetic virtues of such vanguardism or 
decrying its perceived attack on literature and sense, the deficiency in these 
evaluative approaches lies in their evasion of an even partial engagement 
with the language of the Wake itself. By thus substituting appraisal for 
analysis, these critics recycle entirely subjective a priori assumptions about 
what constitutes good literature or language use, such as that the merit of a 
text lies in its sonority, or in its appeal to some abstract notion of the “common 
man”. Whatever “the emotional [colour] of the page” means to Rosenfeld must 
remain his personal response to the “rhythmic and melodic” quality he 
perceives and not an empirical observation, as for every critic for whom the 
Wake’s language is melodious, there is surely another for whom it is the worst 
cacophony of Western letters. By the same token, Wells’ qualification to 
legislate how these ‘common men’ may choose to spend their time, or the 
appropriateness of the book’s level of ‘difficulty’, is equally subjective. In any 
case the point is debatable, as the argument has also been proffered by 
Joycean critic John Bishop for considering Finnegans Wake a book “very 
much for the ‘common reader’ – provided that one [modernises] one’s 
understanding of that term.” In the “multi-culturally diverse late twentieth 
century” in which the canon has been largely deconstructed, Bishop argues, 
“only a book like Finnegans Wake could possibly appeal to a ‘common reader’ 
– by including between its covers something in common for everybody, even if 
that something doesn’t appear on the same page, or in the same place on the 
same page” (Introduction, viii). Be that as it may, the point to be made is that 
the subjectivity of such standards of measurement and judgement highlights 
that a text’s perceived value or quality ultimately yields less insight into what 
that text is than into the individual critic’s preconceptions about literature and 
language. Such evaluative approaches thus circumvent the most significant 
question for, and greatest obstacle to, forging a basis of academic enquiry 
into the Wake; not as to whether the work is good or bad (by whoever’s 
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standards), or whether it is inappropriately difficult, but rather whether its 
language bears interpretation and comprehension, or is little more than 
nonsense. Indeed, if close examination of the text of Finnegans Wake may 
yield both signification and significance, however ambiguous, then the more 
pertinent question becomes how meaning can occur in such an obviously and 
wilfully deviant text, despite our intuitive notions concerning the relation 
between language and meaning? 
 
2.1.1 Nonsense or Polysemy? Meaning and the Wake 
 
With the firmly held conviction that the “rub” of Joyce’s last work lies in 
an inquiry into if and how its text forges meaning, this study shall address 
Louise Bogan’s non-evaluative proposal that “before one starts hating or 
loving or floating off upon [the language of Finnegans Wake], the attention 
might be bent toward discovering what it is, and how it works” (in Deming, 
665). One might expect literary critics, hardened experts in this field, to have a 
better handle on the nature of such language use, and on the operations of its 
semiotic processes. On this matter of the Wakean text, however, we find 
critical opinion decidedly split.  
Edwin Muir, reviewing the work in the Listener, gave voice to the 
fundamental uncertainty felt by many with the head-scratching assertion that 
“as a whole the book is so elusive that there is no judging it; I cannot tell 
whether it is winding into deeper and deeper worlds of meaning or lapsing into 
meaninglessness” (in Deming 677). The question of whether the Wakean text 
permits or denies meaning is such a divisive issue, in fact, that Russian 
political and literary historian D.S. Mirsky could proclaim that “this is pure 
nonsense, the work of a master of language writing nothing [...] smearing up 
language and sense into a kind of formless, meaningless mass” (in Deming 
591), and in stark contrast Joyceans Margot Norris and Fritz Senn could 
argue, respectively, that the Wake “uses words and images which can mean 
several, often contradictory, things at once" (Norris 120), and is 
“polysemantic” (Fritz Senn and FW). It is clearly not overstating the matter to 
observe that there is a problematic critical chasm between condemning a text 
as infuriatingly meaningless and praising it for its great proliferation of 
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meaning. This broad spectrum of reactions to the text, with respect to its 
quidditas and haecceitas, may, by and large, be divided into three broad 
critical categories, and the disparity between their findings may prove 
surprising. 
 
2.1.2 The Wake as Non-Linguistic ‘Nonsense’ 
 
You will say it is most unenglish and I shall hope to hear that you will not be wrong     
about it. (FW 160.22-23) 
 
The first critical reaction to the Wake is that its strange language 
conveys no meaning and does not, in fact, constitute language at all. This 
view was especially prevalent in early reviews of the Wake in its serialised 
and final forms,8 although admittedly it holds slightly less sway in the current 
critical climate. Sean O’Faolain for example, writing in 1928 on the language 
of “Anna Livia Plurabelle”,9 accuses Joyce of having “rejected valid English,” 
and contends that these “meaningless scrawls” cannot be understood “as 
language for they are as near nothing as anything can be on this earth” (in 
Deming 391-2). The Wake as a whole is treated in less condemnatory terms 
in B. Ifor Evans’ 1939 review for the Manchester Guardian, yet the assertion 
remains that the book “is not written in English, or in any other language, as 
language is commonly known” (in Deming 678). Many in Joyce’s inner circle 
of friends and family similarly grumbled that the work, over which the author 
toiled for approximately half of his literary career, was “usylessly unreadable” 
(FW 179.26-17). Biographer Richard Ellmann relates that Stanislaus Joyce 
“rebuked [his brother] for writing an incomprehensible nightbook” (603), and 
Joyce’s patron Harriett Weaver informed the author in a 1927 letter that she 
did not care much for “the darknesses and unintelligibilities of [his] deliberately 
entangled language system,” and that to her mind Joyce was wasting his 
                                            
8 Various sections and chapters of the work were published throughout its seventeen-year 
gestation period under the title Work in Progress, most prominently in the Parisian literary 
journals Transatlantic Review and transition. The final text published, and the only one done 
so under the title Finnegans Wake, was the novel form, on 4 May 1939, and it is exclusively 
to this text (Finnegans Wake, and not its various manifestations as Work in Progress) to 
which this study will refer. 
9 A chapter of Finnegans Wake published in a separate volume in 1928 when the full work 
was still known to the public as Work in Progress. The chapter occurs in the final 1939 text as 
the eighth and final chapter of Book I (pp. 196-216), and as untitled in the final book, is often 
referred to critically as I.8, although the title of the separate publication is also still used. 
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genius (qtd. in Parrinder 205). Indeed, the Wake’s characters often appear to 
echo such sentiments, as when Issy, in a footnote to the ‘Nightstudies’ 
chapter, declares that there is “none of your cumpohlstery English here” (FW 
271.F4). One of the Wake’s shadowy narrators10 at one point even appears to 
concur with the charges of Joyce’s critics and closest peers, contending, “this 
is nat language at any sinse of the world” (FW 83.12), or ‘not language in any 
sense of the word.’  
This charge that the Wakean text is little more than non-linguistic 
“nonsense” is necessarily predicated upon a lexical, even logocentric, model 
of how ‘meaning’ is created. ‘Meaning’ is thus determined as a process in 
which the producer of a text encodes a ‘message’, which is then decoded by 
its receiver. These en/decodings, although relative to context, are considered 
possible only if both users use the same fixed and socially determined code. 
Lexical items are thus believed to operate as carriers of meaning so that “the 
signifieds [...] are recoverable from the signifiers” (Frawley 7),11 implying a 
transparent relation between a text and its intended meaning. Non-lexical 
language use, by severing this connection between signifier and signified, is 
thus regarded as synonymous with ‘meaninglessness’. As a consequence a 
text is defined as meaningful or meaningless in relation to its level of 
adherence to established lexical and grammatical forms. 
If one concurs that language is a socially arbitrated and fixed series of 
encodings and decodings then it is entirely rational to consider the Wake 
“nonsense”, as its text clearly does not conform to such standard lexical and 
grammatical forms as found in dictionaries or Chomskyan summaries of 
grammar.12 As a result, the Wake appears to void both meaning and context 
by virtue of its non-referential nature, and thus create a semantic incoherence 
                                            
10 The Wake contains a great number of different narrative voices, marked by shifts in tone, 
vocabulary, and accent. Some are recognisable, such as the Four Masters, whose voices 
weave in and out of the text (for example in II.4), and their donkey, who appears to narrate 
III.1. A great many, however, remain unidentifiable. 
11 The terms ‘signifier’ and ‘signied ‘ were most famously employed by from Swiss linguist and 
father of ‘semiotics’ Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure defines the ‘sign’ as “a two-sided 
psychological entity,” comprising both the ‘signifier' (or “signal”) – the ‘material’ form the sign 
takes – and the 'signified' (“signification”) - the concept it represents (66). We will return to 
Saussure’s contentions about the ‘sign’ again, but for now it may suffice to highlight that for 
unde rthis model  Saussure, the signifier and signified are inseperable. 
12 Linguist and author Noam Chomsky emphasises that there is an innate set of linguistic 
principles shared by all language users, which he refers to as ‘Universal Grammar’ (see 
Chomsky passim).  
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that defies understanding or interpretation. As this view of language is so 
widely attested in the minds of many language users by its compliance with 
their intuitions as to how language works, any analysis of ‘meaning’ in 
Finnegans Wake shall have to address this integral question: as Finnegans 
Wake largely comprises non-lexical signifiers which possess no socially 
agreed upon signifieds, then how can the text mean anything at all?  
 
2.1.3 The Wake as a New Language 
 
Are we speachin d’anglas landadge or are you sprakin sea Djoytsch? (FW 485.12-13) 
 
The second critical response has been to contend that such language 
use may yield meaning under scrutiny, but that this meaning occurs with great 
difficulty to the reader because the Wakean text is, in fact, written in a new 
language that must be learned through familiarity and inference. Illustrative of 
this view is Arnold Bennett’s assertion that the work is “written in James 
Joyce’s new language, invented by himself” (in Deming 404). This supposed 
language has most often been referred to by its proponents as ‘Wakese’, and 
is sometimes conceived of as a ‘dream language’ representative of the 
nocturnal subconscious. Joseph Campbell, for example, claims that “when 
Joyce moves to the dream world of Finnegans Wake [...] Joyce writes in 
dream language so that the words carry multiple meanings” (Campbell, Mythic 
Worlds, 16).  
The other prevalent stance inherent to this conceptualisation is that this 
‘Wakese’ is a new language because it is all languages, a view outlined (if not 
endorsed) by Derek Attridge as the belief in the work as Joyce’s “tower of 
anti-Babel”; an attempt to reverse God’s confusion of languages “by making 
out of the kaleidoscope of languages a new tongue” (Joyce Effects, 158). This 
charge is most usually rooted in the observation that the Wake’s neologisms 
borrow so heavily from so many world languages that all linguistic borders are 
erased and thus the Wake cannot belong to the English language. The 
Wake’s narrators appear as divided on this issue as the book’s critics, as the 
Wakean text is also referred to as “polygluttural” (‘polyglottal’) and 
“anythongue athall” (‘any tongue/thing at all’) (FW 117.13,15). The question 
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becomes particularly vexed when Luke13 asks the non-compliant Shaun in 
III.3 “Are we speachin d’anglas landadge or are you sprakin sea Djoytsch?” 
(FW 485.12-13). Luke’s query, most likely aligning himself with the Wake’s 
perplexed readership, is as to whether ‘we’ (narrators, characters, etc.) are 
speaking English, Deutsch, a mix of languages, or quite simply speaking 
‘Joyce’ (“Djoytsch”)? 
 
2.1.4 The Wake as English 
 
Here English might be seen. Royally? (FW 13.1-2) 
 
The final claim regarding the Wakean text is that, however odd or 
seemingly impenetrable, it is at its core essentially English. Katie Wales, still 
adhering, in part, to the ‘Babelian’ conceptualisation, deems the book’s 
language “a universal language based on English” (The Language of Joyce, 
136).14 Sam Slote makes a similar assertion that Wakean peregrinism (its 
incorporation of features of other languages) “operates upon an (apparently) 
English syntax and lexicon” (Derrida’s War at FW, 196). Yet again, 
contradicting previous claims that the Wake’s text is either “nat language” or 
“anythongue athall,” a Wakean narrator contends (in lexically and 
grammatically non-deviant English, no less) that “here English might be seen” 
(FW 13.1). If this contention that the Wake is written in English were to be 
verified, then close linguistic inspection of the text would have to demonstrate 
that it engages with and exploits the syntactic, phonotactic and morphotactic 
possibilities of the English linguistic code in a meaningful and exclusive 
fashion, and that its polyglottal impulses could somehow be shown to be 
paradigmatic of lexical English word-formations. 
This final proposition would appear to offer the most empirically 
assessable and verifiable approach to testing whether the Wake’s language 
use constitutes nonsense, ‘Wakese’ or ‘English’. As such, if this study is to 
                                            
13 Luke is one of the Four Masters, who play alternating roles in the Wake as both narrators of 
the text, and characters within it. 
14 Wales’s vacillations in this regard are characteristic of the general tendency of critics to 
hedge their bets on the issue of what exactly the Wake’s text is. In another work Wales 
describes the Wake’s language as “a universalised Hiberno-English that is also not English, 
but a unique ‘lingua franca’” (Lexicology, 1473). 
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systematically address what the Wakean text is, and if and how it signifies, 
then such an investigation into whether, and to what degree, the work exploits 
the possible significations encoded within the English language system would 
appear the most attractive line of investigation.  
 
2.2 The Syntax and Morphology of English 
 
From gramma's grammar she has it that if there is a third person, mascarine, phelinine  
or nuder, being spoken abad it moods prosodes from a person speaking to her second  
which is the direct object that has been spoken to, with and at. (FW 268.16-22) 
 
Having defined the central undertaking of this chapter as an exploration 
of the concept of ‘meaning’ as it relates to the influence of the English 
linguistic code on the Wake’s coinages and syntactic structures (and vice 
versa), it shall be necessary to set the Wake aside temporarily so that a 
theoretical groundwork for such an analysis may be established. The most 
pragmatic point of entry into this debate would seem to be a definition of what, 
exactly, distinguishes ‘English’ from other linguistic systems syntactically and 
morphologically, so that a series of principles may be established by which a 
text may be considered as exploiting its particular code. Before returning to 
the Wake these principles shall be tested upon Lewis Carroll’s “Jabberwocky”, 
so that their mechanics may be most clearly demonstrated. 
 
2.2.1 Identifying English Syntax 
 
Have your little sintalks in the dunk of subjunctions. (FW 269.2-3) 
 
Languages are most commonly differentiated by appeal to their distinct 
grammars – namely the different sets of logical and structural rules that 
preside over the composition of sentences and words – and by their individual 
lexicons, which are considered to be unique and individual from each other. 
Thus, as the first step in this journey of testing whether the Wakean text 
exploits the English linguistic code to create meaning, a number of decidedly 
elementary definitions of the distinctiveness of English syntax shall be 
considered. If such observations appear largely banal initially, they shall 
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ultimately prove beneficial in the necessary shift away from the perceived 
importance of lexicons for distinguishing between language systems towards 
a distinction predicated upon their grammatical features and morphotactic 
possibilities. As we shall soon see, this correction is not only desirable to the 
ends of this study, but also necessitated by the significantly problematic 
aspects inherent to lexical approaches to language distinction. 
As a predominantly analytic language, English uses syntax to convey 
subject-object distinction, and as such its Subject-Verb-Object (SVO) word 
order is relatively crucial for distinguishing meaning, to the point that “the dog 
bites the man” bears a decidedly different ‘meaning’ to “the man bites the 
dog,” and “bites the man the dog” has no syntactically encoded significance. 
This is not the case in predominantly synthetic languages such as German or 
Czech, where the subject-object distinction is encoded through inflection, so 
that word order possesses little or no semantic significance (although the 
pragmatic significance of syntax remains a feature). Thus, in contrast with a 
highly synthetic language such as Latin – where an intelligible sentence is 
formed morphologically so that items may be placed in a largely arbitrary 
order – semantic meaning in English is predominantly married to its syntax, 
and, as a consequence, ‘English’ sentences and texts may be defined as 
such by virtue of their adherence to the SVO word order. Other such 
distinguishing syntactic features include its pre-noun adjectives (contrasted 
with, for example, the post-noun adjectives of Spanish or Italian), or the 
distinction made between modal and main verbs. These factors result in a 
significant degree of syntactic predictability in English sentences, so that the 
opening word by necessity determines what is to follow, as according to 
Bolinger’s notion of ‘linear modification’, 
before a speaker begins, the possibilities of what he will communicate 
are practically infinite, or, if his utterance is bound within a discourse, 
they are at least enormously large. When the first word appears, the 
possibilities are vastly reduced. (281) 
 
By the logic of this theory, if the opening word of an utterance is a subject 
noun phrase, for example, a verb shall have to follow at some point, 
regardless of how many hypotactic sub-clauses succeed it. As such, one of 
the grounds upon which the language of Finnegans Wake might be 
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determined as operating within the English linguistic code is whether it may be 
demonstrated as conforming to the analytical syntax of English – SVO word 
order, pre-noun adjectives, etc. If this were indeed to be the case, then the 
Wake’s sentences would lose their apparently random and digressive quality 
and be shown to be syntactically predictable. 
 
2.2.2 Approaches to Defining Words 
 
     While these syntactic features are by no means followed consistently and 
uniformly in all instances of English utterance, they form a very loose set of 
principles upon which the English code can be distinguished from other 
language systems. The question of what constitutes a ‘word’, on the other 
hand, is a significantly more controversial issue, and, as we shall see, the 
definition of a language by virtue of the items in its lexicon proves to be highly 
problematic. 
There are two main lexicological approaches to the questions of how 
‘words’ should be defined, and of what the criteria is for their ‘legitimate’ 
inclusion in the lexicon. As we shall see, however, a number of conflicting 
definitions and criteria arise from their application. The onomasiological 
approach begins with a particular semantic concept and asks which word or 
words refer to it, while the semasiological begins with the formal word and 
enquires as to which semantic concept it refers. As we shall be primarily 
concerned with an analysis of the Wakean text the latter approach is clearly 
the more relevant to our purpose, although for the present question of defining 
the concept of a ‘word’, both approaches shall be considered.  
As Ingo Plag underlines, the definition of a ‘word’ is much more 
problematic than it may at first seem, regardless of the direction from which 
one chooses to approach the matter. The orthographic definition, for example, 
designates a word as “an uninterrupted string of letters,” however this view 
does not accommodate different orthographic versions of the same lexical 
item (4). Plag points to the variants ‘word formation’, ‘word-formation’ and 
‘wordformation’, which are all attested to, and highlights that it is clearly not 
desirable to consider these semantically unified but orthographically different 
items as alternately constituting one or two words (5). Homographs pose an 
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even more significant complication for the orthographic definition of words, as 
the question arises whether ‘head’, for example, should be considered one 
word in all instances of its use, or if its nounal, adjectival and verbal 
applications (and the many semantically different uses possible for each 
category) should be considered as different words.  
In an attempt to rectify this problem, a semantic definition designates a 
‘word’ as a lexical item expressing “a unified semantic concept” (7). As to 
what might constitute such unified semantic concepts, it seems there is a 
human cognitive bias towards reducing complex phenomena and processes 
so that they may be conceptually considered as a single and knowable entity. 
‘The Renaissance’, for example, may be allowed the status of a ‘word’ in so 
far as it is considered as a unified concept, despite the fact that it refers not 
only to a cultural movement, but to its many different manifestations and 
evolutions over a period of three centuries, among many different 
geographies, peoples, cultures, political circumstances, as well any number of 
individuals (politicians, artists, religious leaders), works of art, events, and so 
on. On a smaller scale people may customarily conceptualise ‘electricity’ as a 
unified ‘thing’ that powers their household appliances, despite the fact that 
what is actually being referenced is a number of different processes, 
properties and phenomena. As it is convenient to particular communicative 
ends to conceive of ‘electricity’ in this way, however, the conceptualisation 
becomes eligible to be assigned a ‘word’. In the scientific community, 
however, where specificity is required, ‘electricity’ is no longer deemed to be a 
“unified semantic concept”, and is thus replaced by a number of ‘words’ 
corresponding to what scientists rather consider to be more exact and 
individual unified concepts, such as ‘electric charge, ‘electric current’, ‘electric 
field’, ‘electric potential’ and ‘electromagnetism’. It would appear, then, that 
there is a ‘least effort principle’ involved in the conceptualisation of words, 
where ‘words’ and ‘concepts’ are aligned only if it is useful to do so.15 The 
alignment of unified semantic concepts and words is then a subjective rather 
than an objective enterprise. 
                                            
15 Or if it adheres to your schematic view of the the world. The issue of schematic knowledge 
will be addressed in section 2.6 of this study. 
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Further complications arise for this definition. Newspaper headlines, for 
example, often employ extremely long compound nouns to refer to a highly 
specific unified semantic concept, such as the use of “helicopter pilot death 
crash fears” to refer to fears that a specific helicopter pilot may have perished 
in a crash. While orthographically this headline would comprise five words, 
semantically it is considered a single compound noun, as it refers to one 
semantic concept, demonstrating that “not every unified semantic concept 
corresponds to one word in a given language” (Plag 7). This definition is also 
problematic in so far as there are a great many semantic concepts which are 
not referred to by any existing sign, whether compound nouns or not, and can 
only be referenced by appeal to circumlocutory sentences. For obvious 
reasons, such a collapsing of the distinction between words and sentences is 
also not desirable.  
A humorous but illustrative example of the deficiencies in these models 
is offered by Douglas Adams and John Lloyd’s pseudo-dictionary The Deeper 
Meaning of Liff, the foreword of which states that “in Life, there are many 
hundreds of common experiences, feelings, situations and even objects which 
we all know and [recognise], but for which no words exist” (vii). The stated 
purpose of this humorous dictionary, then, is to address such gaps in the 
lexicon from an onomasiological perspective and assign ‘words’ to these 
unified semantic concepts, such as ‘abilene’ – “the pleasing coolness on the 
reverse side of the pillow” (2) – or ‘shoeburyness’ – “the vague uncomfortable 
feeling you get when sitting on a seat which is still warm from somebody 
else's bottom” (90). Here we can see the problematic notion of having to 
define both “the pleasing coolness on the reverse side of the pillow” and 
“abilene” as bearing the same status of ‘word’. The more relevant issue raised 
by this humorous dictionary for the matter of Finnegans Wake, however, is the 
necessity of word coinage to rectify deficiencies in the lexicon’s ability to 
economically denote recognisable and unified semantic concepts. As such, 
we might say that the semantic definition of words is preferable to the 
orthographic, although due to deficiencies of taxonomy this definition often 
may result in a blurring of the distinction between sentence and word, as a 
result of which neologisms are not only rendered desirable, but also have a 
legitimate claim to the status of words. 
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This definition of words as conceptual, rather than orthographic, units of 
language which denote recognisable and unified (but subjective) semantic 
concepts stands in direct opposition to the criteria by which ‘words’ are most 
usually defined – namely their inclusion (or not) in a comprehensive 
dictionary. Indeed, along these lines, one often hears reference made to units 
which are ‘real words’ and those which are not, a hierarchisation that 
constitutes a modern and relatively arbitrary distinction. 
 The first instance of an English dictionary as it is known today – Samuel 
Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language, published in 1755 – marks 
the moment of the conception of this modern model of a unified and 
standardised language which defines its constituent parts by their inclusion in 
its dictionaries, rather than by their ability (by social agreement or by their 
exploitation of the linguistic code) to manifest recognisable semantic 
concepts.16 However, even at the moment of this imposed shift to the 
hierarchisation and standardisation of lexical items, Alvin B. Kernan describes 
Johnson’s dilemma in his endeavour to follow John Locke’s “clear world of 
words, ideas and things,” as he found himself  
unable to escape from [...] a scene of speaking and writing where 
people make and change language from moment to moment to suit 
their particular purposes, where Vanity affects peculiar pronunciations 
and meanings, where the diction of labourers is “casual and mutable 
[...] formed for some temporary or local convenience,” [...where...] 
fashion and convenience [...] create terms which flourish briefly and die 
easily, science amplifies language “with words deflected from their 
original sense,” [and] translation from other languages changes 
grammar itself. (192-3)  
 
George Steiner expands on these deficiencies in the dictionary’s ability to 
define and contain words when he argues for language as “the most salient 
model of Heraclitean flux,” describing it as a system which “alters at every 
moment in perceived time” because “if they occur in temporal sequence, no 
two statements are perfectly identical” (18). Steiner continues to describe the 
“Heraclitean flux” of language thus: 
                                            
16 While Johnson’s work was the first to systematically follow the approach and format of the 
modern dictionary, it was by no means the first attempt to collect ‘English’ words. The earliest 
known instance of such a collection, Robert Cawdrey’s A Table Alphibeticall in 1604, was 
only 120 pages long with 2,543 definitions, mostly in the form of one-word synonyms. For a 
comprehensive list of the various forms of English dictionary between Cawdrey’s and 
Johnsons’ see Jones 274. 
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new words enter as old words elapse. Grammatical conventions are 
changed under pressure of idiomatic use or by cultural ordinance. The 
spectrum of permissible expression as against that which is taboo 
shifts perpetually. At a deeper level, the relative dimensions and 
intensities of the spoken and the unspoken alter [...] So far as language 
is mirror or counterstatement to the world, or most plausibly an 
interpretation of the reflective with the creative along an ‘interface’ of 
which we have no adequate formal model, it changes as rapidly and in 
as many ways as human experience itself. (19) 
 
Thus we may start to see that a language is not inherited as a fixed, unified 
and stable entity, but as a malleable and mutable system which attempts to 
allow reference, through adaptation and invention, to an almost infinite 
number of conceivable concepts, far outnumbering those covered by the 
words collected in even the most comprehensive dictionaries. Word coinage 
once again becomes the norm, rather than a perversion of a perfectly 
complete system. 
 Thus allowing for an understanding of words as not only constituting 
probable occurrences as attested in dictionaries but also possible 
constructions which allow reference to semantic concepts for which no lexical 
item presently exists,17 goes some way to legitimising the Wake’s word-
formations, if not, as yet, outlining how they may be considered meaningful or 
‘English’. To test whether the Wake’s neologisms may be legitimately 
considered meaningful their semantic predictability shall have to be 
uncovered, and to these ends an appeal to the synthetic qualities of the 
English code is necessary.  
 
2.2.3 The Semantic Predictability of Words 
 
While the English linguistic code is largely analytic in nature, it does 
possess a number of synthetic qualities, such as the bound stems whose 
purpose it is to indicate plural nouns, adjectives, nouns, and adverbs. Andrew 
Radford highlights that one of the most commonly shared qualities of ‘words’ 
(lexical or not) in the English language is that they are “assigned to 
grammatical categories on the basis of their shared morphological and 
syntactic properties” (28). Beyond such grammatical categorisation, the 
                                            
17 That language users also coin neologisms to reference concepts for which perfectly 
serviceable and probable signifiers already exist shall be treated later in this chapter. 
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synthetic qualities of the code may also determine the semantic predictability 
of non-lexical words. As Andrew Carstairs-McCarthy highlights, “it must be 
that these unlisted and unlistable words are composed of identifiable smaller 
parts (at least two) put together in a systematic fashion so that the meaning of 
the whole word can be reliably determined” (16). As such, a semasiological 
analysis of the potential meanings encoded in these synthetic qualities and 
their combinations with morphemes should determine whether non-attested 
and non-lexical neologisms manifest a recognisable semantic concept.  
This theory that words might be semantically predictable would seem, on 
the face of things, to contradict Saussure’s assertion of the arbitrariness of the 
sign. Saussure, however, qualifies his principle that signs are “arbitrary” (67) 
and “unmotivated” (69) with the following assertion: 
The fundamental principle of the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign 
does not prevent us from distinguishing in any language between what 
is intrinsically arbitrary - that is, unmotivated - and what is only 
relatively arbitrary. Not all signs are absolutely arbitrary. In some cases, 
there are factors which allow us to recognize different degrees of 
arbitrariness, although never to discard the notion entirely. The sign 
may be motivated to a certain extent. (130) 
 
Consider the following headline from the National Review: “The 
Obamafication of Obamamania.”18 The words ‘Obamafication’ and 
‘Obamamania’ clearly do not signify by an arbitrary connection between 
signifier and signified, but rather constitute motivated exploitations of the 
linguistic code, so that their meanings are predictable to any person with 
knowledge of who American President Barack Obama is, and of the meanings 
encoded within the suffixes (although the connection between the signifiers 
‘Obama’, ‘-fication’ and ‘-mania’ and their signifieds is clearly arbitrary in a 
Sausurrean sense). This issue is a complex one, and shall be treated in much 
greater detail in the discussion of portmanteaux later in this chapter. For now 
we may agree with Saussure that one may distinguish in any language 
“between what is intrinsically arbitrary [...] and what is only relatively arbitrary” 
(130), and assert that there is a clear distinction between unmotivated signs, 
                                            
18 From an article written by Denis Boyles, 23 July 2008.  
< http://article.nationalreview.com/364294/the-obamafication-of-obamamania/denis-boyles>. 
Saussure uses the example of the French words ‘vingt’ (“twenty”), which is “unmotvated”, and 
‘dix-neuf’ (“nineteen”), which is “not unmotivated to the same extent” (130). 
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which are meaningful because their signification is socially agreed upon, and 
motivated signs, which are meaningful because of their exploitation of the 
linguistic code. As such, another concrete basis upon which the language of 
Finnegans Wake might be determined as operating within the English 
linguistic code is to test whether the work’s non-lexical items are both 
grammatically categorised and rendered semantically predictable by virtue of 
their morphological and syntactic exploitation of the English linguistic code.  
Before this issue is tackled in full, however, it is considered 
advantageous for the clarity of the argument being unfolded – and for the 
benefit of placing Finnegans Wake in a larger spectrum of experimental 
English literature – to demonstrate its principles by means of a brief 
morphological and syntactic analysis of the first verse of Lewis Carroll’s 
infamous nonsense poem “Jabberwocky”. After this closer inspection of the 
signification that occurs in Carroll’s poem through the intersection of 
grammaticality and non-lexicality – between deviance from and adherence to 
the English code – we may turn our attention to the Wakean text in order to 
apply our findings more fully, and further investigate the issue of semantic 
predictability. 
 
2.2.4 The English Code and Carroll’s “Jabberwocky” 
 
Tis jest jibberweek's joke. (FW 565.14) 
 
     If the underlying claim that the language of Finnegans Wake might, in fact, 
be entirely English – syntactically and morphologically, as well as in its modes 
of signification – still appears overly ambitious, even perverse, it shall be 
necessary to position Finnegans Wake on a spectrum of realistic to 
experimental texts. While “Jabberwocky” (Carroll 134) is positioned at the 
further end of this spectrum (nearer the Wakean end, so to speak) the poem 
affords us an approximately comparable, yet relatively simpler and more 
accepted (and significantly more anthologised and canonised), experimental 
use of English language. To our present ends, the first verse of this 




‘Twas brillig, and the slithy toves  
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe:  
All mimsy were the borogoves  
And the mome raths outgrabe.  (1-4, emphasis added) 
 
Once the initial confusion over the poem’s apparent semantic 
incoherence is overcome, it may be observed that the lines comprise both 
lexical and non-lexical items. What bears even more significance, however, is 
not only the fact that there are lexically English words employed within the 
poem, but exactly which words may be attested in the English lexicon. At 
second glance, it may be perceived that the verse’s conjunctions (“and”), 
prepositions (“in”), determiners (“the”) and suffixes (the adjectival ‘-y’ and 
plural ‘-s’) are all encoded in standard lexical English (see emphasised items). 
Conversely, the ‘nonsense’ words – such as “brillig”, “toves” and “gimble” – 
exclusively constitute adjectives, nouns, and verbs, indicating that a person 
place or thing, an action or a property is being referenced. As such, the 
‘English’ words and morphemes in the stanza comprise metalinguistic 
‘function words’ that have no referential meaning but express grammatical 
relationships, and the ‘nonsense’ words comprise ‘content words’ which refer 
(ambiguously) to third-person reality. These ‘nonsense’ words may be thus 
defined, despite their non-lexical nature, exactly because the verse’s non-
deviant items serve to determine and confirm their grammatical categories.  
The ultimate result of this clear functional distinction between the poem’s 
lexical and non-lexical items is that even if no exact referent for “the slithy 
toves” is forthcoming, a number of conclusions may still be drawn by virtue of 
both the line’s syntax and the words’ morphological structures. A “tove” may 
be specified as a person, place or thing (i.e. a noun), because it follows a 
lexical determiner (the definite article “the”) and an adjective (“slithy”, 
possessing the adjectival suffix ‘-y’) (Lecercle, Philosophy of Nonsense, 21). 
As the sign is encoded with the English plural suffix (‘-s’), it is also clear that 
we are dealing with more than one “tove”, as the syntax of the line has 
already rendered an interpretation of the ‘-s’ as indicating a third-person 
present verb form highly unlikely. We may say that these “toves” are like 
“slithes”, or have “slithes”, and, by virtue of the line’s adherence to SVO 
syntax, that these “slithy toves” performed a series of actions – they “gyred” 
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and “gimbled” – in a particular place (“in the wabe”). Furthermore, as Jean-
Jacques Lecercle points out, the word “outgrabe” “will under analysis yield 
three constituent morphemes, ‘out’, ‘gribe’ and ‘past’” (Philosophy of 
Nonsense, 39). Such close morphemic analysis thus demonstrates that this 
non-lexical and non-attested item may not only be categorised as a verb, but 
also be conjugated. 19 
This possibility of deriving meaning from the syntax of a sentence, even 
if the referents of its items are entirely unknown or unknowable, is further 
demonstrated by the so-called ‘Gostak principle’, expanded upon by Ogden 
and Richards in their seminal 1923 study The Meaning of Meaning. Quoting 
Andrew Ingraham’s obscure sentence “the gostak distims the goshes,” Ogden 
and Richards demonstrate how the following dialogue may shed light on the 
meaningfulness of this seemingly meaningless utterance: 
Q: What is the gostak? 
A: The gostak is that which distims the doshes. 
Q: What's distimming? 
A: Distimming is that which the gostak does to the doshes. 
Q: Okay, but what are doshes? 
A: The doshes are what the gostak distims. (46) 
 
As Stefan Themerson highlights, with the exception of the determiner “the”, 
the words in Ingraham’s sentence “have no meaning, and yet the sentence is 
not meaningless” in so far as it informs the reader that “something does 
something to something” (3). Consequently it is possible to describe the 
relationships between the terms in the sentence – that the gostak is that 
which distims the doshes and that distimming is what the gostak does to the 
doshes – even though there is no confirmation of what gostaks or doshes 
actually are, because, yet again, the sentence’s syntax and sole lexical item 
allow the non-lexical items to be placed in relatively definitive grammatical 
categories. In other words, the sentence exploits the meanings encoded 
within the English linguistic code. 
     These may seem inauspicious grounds for assigning any pragmatic 
significance to such language use, however such observations do, at the very 
least, determine that “Jabberwocky” and the ‘gostak’ sentence are English in 
                                            
19 For a fuller linguistic reading of the poem, see Lecercle, Philosophy of Nonsense, 21. 
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so far as their non-deviant English morphemes and adherence to English 
syntactic norms allow us to determine and identify the grammatical categories 
of their deviant words with some degree of confidence. It would seem, then, 
that the first verse of “Jabberwocky” is neither strictly nonsensical nor 
polyglottal, but rather an exploitation of syntactic possibilities of the English 
language system, and, as Lecercle observes, “at this level, the stanza is a 
perfectly acceptable, even normal, text” (Philosophy of Nonsense, 21). 
 
2.3 Syntactic and Semantic Predictability in the Wake 
 
Having explored Carroll’s “Jabberwocky” for insight into the ways in 
which experiments in non-lexicality can intersect with the code, a general 
basis has been forged on which to test the thesis that the language of 
Finnegans Wake can be considered English – namely it can be said to be so 
if its text possesses both syntactic and semantic predictability as determined 
by the English linguistic code. If the language of Finnegans Wake is encoded 
not within in a foreign or new code – or in no linguistic code at all – but 
definitively within the English linguistic code, then properties and processes in 
its language similar to those observed in Carroll’s poem should be 
observable. Indeed, critics often compare the approach to language in both 
works, and, as Anthony Burgess representatively argues, “Finnegans Wake is 
merely an expansion of the “Jabberwocky” procedure” (Nonsense, 20).  
 
2.3.1 Syntactical Features of the Wakean Text 
 
In order to explore the syntactic and morphemic adherence of Finnegans 
Wake to the English code – as well as its paradigmatic lexical deviance – the 
remainder of the present chapter will largely focus, with some necessary 







Oftwhile balbulous, mithre ahead, with goodly trowel in grasp and 
ivoroiled overalls which he habitacularly fondseed, like Haroun 
Childeric Eggeberth he would caligulate by multiplicables the alltitude 
and malltitude until he seesaw by neatlight of the liquor wheretwin 
’twas born, his roundhead staple of other days to rise in undress 
maisonry upstanded (joygrantit!), a waalworth of a skyerscape of most 
eyeful hoyth entowerly, erigenating from next to nothing and 
celescalating the himals and all, hierarchitectitiptitoploftical, with a 
burning bush abob off its baubletop and with larrons o’toolers clittering 
up and tombles a’buckets clottering down. (FW 4.30 - 5.4) 
 
Using this line as a means of accessing the text, let us first see what, if 
anything, can be made of such wandering and apparently nonsensical syntax. 
With reference to Bolinger’s principle of linear modification, if the 
sentence is indeed syntactically English then its first word should introduce a 
certain syntactic predictability. The opening item, “Oftwhile”, is a non-lexical 
item to be sure, but one which appears to be an orthographical – if not a 
semantic – compound of the temporal adverb ‘oft’ (or ‘often’) and the 
conjunction ‘while’. As “balbulous” clearly takes the adjectival ‘-ous’ ending, 
we may discount that this blend is a compound noun, as this would constitute 
the usually impossible English syntactic formulation [noun-adjective].20 
Rather, in order to make the sentence cohere grammatically, the reader shall 
have to either discern a phonetic echo of the archaic adverb ‘erstwhile’ – 
indicating that the as yet undisclosed subject was ‘formerly’ “balbulous” – or 
interpret a latent comma separating the adverb from the conjunction 
(“Oft[,]while”), and indeed this presents an acceptable and schematically 
recognisable collocative formulation, a common feature of poetic language 
particularly.21 
     Once this latent punctuation has been inferred from the line’s manifest 
form, the conjunction ‘while’ more clearly denotes the initiation of a 
subordinate clause, after which, if the sentence does indeed exploit the 
English (and not a ‘Wakese’) linguistic code, we will presumably find the 
[subject-verb] phrase to which the opening (inferred) adverb ‘oft’ relates. 
Indeed, after a number of digressive clauses further modifying the subordinate 
                                            
20 Although of course, as will be implicitly argued throughout this study, the rules which 
govern English grammar are by no means hard and fast, as the example of participle 
adjectives demonstrate, or fans of Mission Impossible might attest to. 
21 Examples include Quintus Calaber’s lines “oft, while round my neck thy hands were lock’d, 
from thy sweet lips the half-articulate sound of Father came” (Dyce 88). 
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‘while balbulous’ clause, we find the SVO core structure to which the adverb 





           
 
Next we find the lexical conjunction “until” introducing a new clause that 
likewise follows the SVO syntax, and modifies the previous clause by stating 









This syntactically standard process of couching SVO clauses in modifying 
sub-clauses continues. Importantly, these dependent clauses may be 
recognised by their clear lexical markings, through conjunctions such as 
“while” “like” “until” and “and”. As such, these lexical items not only afford us 
insight into the grammatical categorisation of non-lexical items, but also allow 
us to distinguish clauses, and further separate them into independent and 
dependent clauses, so that the syntactic thrust of the line ultimately can be 
parsed. If such a line of inquiry is continued all the way through, the core 
sentence could be inferred as: 
Oft[...] he would caligulate [...] the alltitude and malltitude until he 
[...]saw [...] his roundhead staple of other days [...] rise [...] with a 
burning bush abob off its baubletop and with larrons o’toolers clittering 
up and tombles a’buckets clottering down. 
 
While still unable to attach semantic or pragmatic significance to the line’s 
non-lexical terms, we may clearly observe that an analytic English syntax 
defines our scheme of interpretation, despite the line’s excessive hypotactic 




he        |  would caligulate | by multiplicables | the alltitude and malltitude  
        [subject]            [verb]                  [means]                        [object(s)] 
 
            he      |     seesaw |     by neatlight of the liquor wheretwin ’twas born | 
         [subject]       [verb]                                          [means] 
             
           his roundhead staple of other days 
                            [object] 
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2.3.2 Morphemic Features of the Wakean Text 
 
the gradual morphological changes [...] which Professor Ebahi-Ahuri of Philadespoinis    
(Ill) [...] neatly names a boîte à surprises. (FW 165.26-30) 
 
Having established the hypotactically extravagant but syntactically 
predictable and coherent thrust of the line, let us now investigate in greater 
detail whether its morphemic elements can help define the grammatical 
categorisation (if not yet the denotative significance) of the non-lexical signs 
through their compliance with the English linguistic code. 
Oftwhile balbulous, mithre ahead, with goodly trowel in grasp and 
ivoroiled overalls which he habitacularly fondseed, like Haroun 
Childeric Eggeberth he would caligulate by multiplicables the alltitude 
and malltitude until he seesaw by neatlight of the liquor wheretwin 
’twas born, his roundhead staple of other days to rise in undress 
maisonry upstanded (joygrantit!), a waalworth of a skyerscape of most 
eyeful hoyth entowerly, erigenating from next to nothing and 
celescalating the himals and all, hierarchitectitiptitoploftical, with a 
burning bush abob off its baubletop and with larrons o’toolers clittering 
up and tombles a’buckets clottering down. [emphasis added] 
 
The emphasised morphemes reveal a consistent observance of the 
morphemic rules of the English linguistic code, with the metalinguistic non-
referential features (such as affixes, prepositions, conjunctions, and 
determiners) all presented in a non-deviant lexical form, as in Carroll’s 
poem.22 For example, the clause “and ivoroiled overalls which he 
habitacularly fondseed” (FW 4.31; emphasis added) contains the following 
words and morphemes serving their standard lexical functions: 
and  = clausal conjunction 
‘-ed’ = adjective (as in ‘ivoroiled’) 
‘-s’   = plural noun (as in ‘overalls’)  
which = relative pronoun 
‘-ly’  = adverb (as in ‘habitacularly’) 
‘-ed’ = regular past tense suffix (as in ‘fondseed’) 
 
Tellingly, due to the clause’s exploitation of the signification encoded within 
the grammatical features of English syntax, the difference between the ‘-ed’ 
suffix determining “ivoroiled” as an adjective (preceding the noun “overalls”, 
which is in turn confirmed as such by its plural noun ‘-s’ suffix) and the ‘-ed’ 
                                            
22 Indeed, as may now be more clearly discerned, a good number of the ‘content words’ are 
also lexical. 
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suffix determining “fondseed” as a verb (preceded as it is by the adverb 
“habitacularly”) can be discerned. 
The non-deviant determiners and adjectives in the passage may also 
determine the grammatical category of deviantly encoded non-lexical terms, 
as in the clause “a waalworth of a skyerscape of most eyeful hoyth entowerly” 
(FW 4.35-36; emphasis added), where “waalworth” and “skyerscape” are 
determined as nouns by virtue of the indefinite articles which precede them. 
“Eyeful” is similarly categorised as an adjective by the preceding lexical item 
“most,” which precedes adjectives in the English code as a modifier of degree 
(e.g. ‘the most terrible’, ‘the most exquisite’, etc.). Furthermore, it may be 
noted that the non-lexical adverb “entowerly” is constructed by the same 
morphological means as a standard lexical adverb, with bound prefixes and 
suffixes around a free stem23: 





Having established that the syntactic, grammatical and morphological 
rules upon which the language in our sample Wakean sentence operates are 
primarily those of the English linguistic code, we may still only claim with any 
certainty that these coinages resemble English words morphologically, but 
that meaning cannot as yet be inferred. If the Wakean text is to be considered 
not only syntactically but also semantically predictable by virtue of its 
exploitation of the English linguistic code, it shall be necessary to turn to the 
non-lexical signs themselves – to how coinages are created, and how they 
forge meaning – as one might well legitimately wonder whether syntactic 
conformity and grammatical categorisation can really designate the Wakean 
text as English when the words themselves are non-lexical, and thus 
seemingly non-referential and ‘meaningless’.  
 
                                            
23 A stem, a form to which affixes can be attached, may be considered ‘free’ when it can 
stand alone as a semantic unit in itself (such as ‘quick’ in ‘quickly’). A ‘bound’ stem, on the 
other hand, cannot occur as a separate word when seperated from other morphemes (such 
as ‘ept’ in ‘inept’). 
 
           en -            tower -          ly                  
         prefix            stem           suffix 
        (bound)         (free)          (bound) 
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2.4 Non-Lexical Modes of Signification 
 
So you need hardly spell me how every word will be bound over to carry three score  
and ten toptypsical readings throughout the book of Doublends Jined. (FW 20.13-16) 
 
Undoubtedly, the greatest barrier to assigning ‘meaning’ to the cited 
passage is the abundance of non-lexical terms. As such, the starting point for 
a first-time reader bombarded with so many new and unknown ‘words’ must 
be to ask what its constituent elements are supposed to ‘mean’. What 
significance might “caligulate by multiplicables” hold? Can any possible 
meaning be derived from the description of something as “balbulous”? What, 
in the name of sound sense, is a “waalworth” supposed to be?  And what 
class of angel, man or beast might “hierarchitectitiptitoploftical” be supposed 
to denote? Given the proliferation of such seeming absurdities throughout this 
single line, the most commonsensical assessment may be to observe soberly 
that it comprises many words which this first-time reader has never before 
encountered, and the most one could say, or could wish to say, about such 
language use is that it is confusing, difficult or even impossible to understand, 
regardless of its syntactic or morphemic qualities. Confronted with such facts, 
one would surely be forgiven for concluding that the line is, indeed, 
“nonsense”. The Wake’s narrators appear prescient of just such a reaction 
when they confront the reader directly in one of the work’s more lucid (but still 
deviant) addresses:  
You is feeling like you was lost in the bush, boy? You says: It is a 
puling sample jungle of woods. You most shouts out: Bethicket me for 
a stump of a beech if I have the poultriest notions what the farest he all 
means. (FW 112.3-6)  
 
This feeling of being “lost” in a ‘jumble of words’, without a notion of what it “all 
means”, is undoubtedly a feeling familiar to anyone intrepid enough to have 
attempted a line, passage or section of Finnegans Wake, and as previously 
indicated, such readers would find themselves in the company of a great 





2.4.1 Non-Lexicality and Meaning 
 
In order to evaluate this readerly response to such a text, let us begin by 
considering the following clause: “this is why quarks attract antiquarks to form 
mesons such as pions, kaons, the J/psi, and the upsilon” (Close, Marten and 
Sutton 169). This line may appear every bit as baffling to the uninitiated as an 
assertion that somebody “would caligulate by multiplicables the alltitude and 
malltitude,” yet that is clearly not to say that the text on particle physics from 
which it is culled constitutes “nonsense”. Joyce’s Ulysses employs a great 
deal of such esoteric discourse-specific words, such as ‘thoracic’ (relating to 
the thorax) or ‘epigastric’ (relating to the part of the upper abdomen), with the 
consequence that specific discourse knowledge is required of the reader for 
“rapid splashing of the face and neck and thoracic and epigastric regions” (U. 
786) to fully signify. However frustrating they may be to particular readers, 
such passages are also clearly not “nonsense”.24 In a non-textual sense, a 
street in London may be considered to be inhabited by a group of 
synchronically united English speakers, yet the particle physicist and the 
linguist living next door to each other might not understand texts written or 
spoken in each other’s discourses.25 It would seem, then, that ‘languages’ are 
not unified stable wholes, but rather loose collections of discourses and 
exclusive vocabularies, which are (or can be) connected by their exploitation 
of a shared linguistic code. This is an important distinction to make, as it 
speaks to the “Heraclitean flux” of language that Steiner observes and 
highlights that perceived word coinage does not account for the ‘nonsense’ of 
a text, as “one can never be certain that the ‘coined’ word [...] does not have 
existence, and conventional meaning, in a larger dictionary or a specialised 
jargon” (Lecercle, Philosophy of Nonsense, 29). The charge remains, 
however, that such terms are meaningful to someone somewhere, while the 
Wake’s nonce-formulations are meaningless to everyone everywhere (except 
by appeal to their aesthetic or emotive qualities). As such, it shall be 
                                            
24 Katie Wales also highlights that the highly technical register of tha “Ithaca” chapter of 
Ulysses alone employs a great number of such esoteric terms, such as “irruent” (U.825), 
“erigible” (U.841), and “incrispated” (U.835) (Lexicology, 1472). 
25 This problem arises even without even taking cultural, ethnic or religious diversity into the 
equation, as well as questions of class, group identification, and so on. 
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necessary to define more rigorously the terms upon which such allegations 
are being made against the supposedly non-discursive sui generis Wakean 
words themselves. 
The stance outlined by O’Faolain, Evans, et al. is, it may be safely 
averred, tantamount to an assertion of the impossibility of ‘sense’ without 
clear and unambiguous ‘reference’. In other words, this implication of the 
synonymity of non-lexicality and ‘nonsense’ suggests that ‘meaning’ can only 
occur if a textual item refers to a known thing or concept in a known way 
through conformity to attested orthographical ‘words’. Such a direct 
relationship of form and content is also inherent to Saussure’s 
conceptualisation of the sign as “a combination of a concept and a sound 
pattern,” a view which endorses an understanding of signifiers and signifieds 
as inseparable (67). The advocates of such a viewpoint might contend that we 
know what the word ‘cow’ means, for example, because we know what a cow 
is. By the same token we cannot know what “waalworth” means because we 
do not know what a “waalworth” is. Rational as an appraisal of the Wakean 
text as incomprehensible “nonsense” might be on these terms, there are two 
fundamental deficiencies inherent to this conceptualisation of ‘meaning’.  
To more clearly discern the first inadequacy of considering that language 
must be both lexical and referential for meaning to occur, we may here 
introduce the ideas of German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege. 
Primarily addressing the subject of proper names, Frege argues for just such 
a distinction between ‘sense’ and ‘reference’ (‘Sinn’ and ‘Bedeutung’ in 
Frege’s terms) as two different aspects of a word’s ‘meaning’ (152). For 
Frege, an item’s ‘reference’ is the object to which it refers and its ‘sense’ the 
manner in which this object is referred to, as well as the resulting cognitive 
significance. To use a somewhat sledgehammer example, ‘the first and only 
female British prime minister’ and ‘Attila the Hen’ share the same ‘reference’ 
in Margaret Thatcher, yet the ‘senses’ of both terms are clearly quite different. 
Clearly, there is something of this effect in the cited Wakean passage. 
However, it might also be observed that a single signifier might manifest many 
completely different or even opposing ‘senses’, and such cases are most 
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usually referred to as ‘floating signifiers’.26 For example the word “America”, 
while always bearing the same geographical referent, might have the ‘senses’ 
of ‘liberty, freedom, and justice’ to one speaker, and ‘oppression, tyranny and 
injustice’ to another. If we might agree that a text is always influenced by and 
dependent upon context, then there is the possibility that, in a meaningful 
sense, every signifier bear the status of ‘floating signifier’. As a consequence, 
Gordon E. Slethaug argues, “no sign or text is transparent but carries within it 
a latent subtext that may change or undermine meaning” (547). 
Even more pertinent to the issue of impossibility of ‘sense’ without 
‘reference’, however, is Frege’s assertion that “in grasping a sense, one is not 
thereby assured of a Bedeutung” (153), in other words that there can be 
‘sense’ without ‘reference’.27 This might be demonstrated by consideration of 
Bertrand Russell’s famous phrase “the present king of France is bald” which, 
since there is no present king of France, does not ‘reference’ anything, yet it 
appears perfectly meaningful (34).28 If it is acknowledged that all fiction is 
non-referential, insofar as the characters and events referenced, like Russell’s 
bald French king, are non-existent then the phenomenon of ‘sense’ without 
‘reference’ can be seen, in fact, as an essential element of all fiction. To the 
matter of the necessity of lexicality for ‘sense’ to occur, let us consider the 
following lines from “The Glunk that Got Thunk” by children’s author Dr. 
Seuss: 
A thing my sister likes to do 
Some evenings after supper, 
Is sit upstairs in her small room 
And use her Thinker-Upper. (1-4) 
 
If the narrator of Dr. Seuss’s poem refers to his sister’s “Thinker-Upper” (135) 
instead of her ‘mind’ or ‘imagination’, the ‘reference’ of both lexical and non-
                                            
26 For a more detailed exploration of the phenomena of ‘floating signifiers’ as considered by 
Saussure, Jakobson, Lacan see Slethaug. 
27 The most common objection to this assertion is that it contradicts Frege’s definition of 
‘sense’ as the way in which a referent is referred to. However we are, of course, not bound by 
Frege’s wording, and the problem is easily disposed of by understanding ‘sense’ as indicating 
cognitive significance. From this perspective, the concept can be seen as approximate – 
although not completely synonymous – to notions of connotation and denotation, or semantic 
and pragmatic significance. 
28 Frege offers the example “the least rapidly convergent series,” which he argues “has a 
sense, but demonstrably there is no Bedeutung, since for every given convergent series, 
another convergent, but less rapidly convergent, series can be found” (153). 
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lexical items is still the same, despite their clearly contrasting ‘senses’. British 
comedian Stanley Unwin is also famous for having using English in a 
particularly non-lexical and suggestive way (an approach to language which 
he termed “Unwinese”) so that, for example, to someone who had eaten too 
much Christmas dinner, Unwin advised “if you’ve done an overstuffy in the 
tumloader, finisht the job with a ladleho of brandy butter, then pukeit all the 
way to the toileybox” (Vay xi). Even if Unwin and Dr. Seuss’s coinages are 
unnecessary in so far as perfectly serviceable lexical items already exist to 
refer to these concepts, the comic implicature of such redundant word 
coinage should be relatively self-evident. 
Three conclusions may be drawn from such a consideration of Frege’s 
conceptualisation of ‘sense’ and ‘reference’. First, different lexical items can 
share ‘references’, but their ‘senses’ will be unavoidably different. 
Furthermore, a single signifier may have a number of different ‘senses’ to 
different speakers, and this might be said of all words and texts. Second, not 
only can there be ‘sense’ without ‘reference’, but this separation is in fact 
essential for literature. Finally, as evidenced by Dr. Seuss’ “Thinker-Upper” or 
Unwin’s “toileybox”, non-lexical items can, in fact, produce a conceivable 
referent, and will, additionally, communicate their own ‘sense’ (comic, 
childlike, etc.). Importantly, each of these points significantly undermines the 
assertion that language must be both lexical and referential to be meaningful, 
and opens up the possibility of considering ‘meaning’ as a play of signification 
between adherence to and deviance from a particular lexicon or code. 
The second problem with the charge that meaning cannot occur without 
reference, which in turn cannot occur without lexicality, is the inseparable 
assertion that meaning is fixed and text-based (i.e. located at the level of the 
sign). From the perspective of literary criticism this model finds its most 
extreme manifestation in the ‘textual determinism’ of the more formalist 
proponents of the ‘New Criticism’ movement. Representative of such a view, 
W.K. Wimsatt and M.C. Beardsley argue that ‘meaning’ lies exclusively within 
a text, and that to allow its receiver a role in the creation of its meaning is to 
fall victim to “a confusion between the poem and its results (what it is and 
what it does)” (21). Largely disregarding Saussure’s assertions of “the role of 
signs as part of social life” (15), this approach thus posits that together a text 
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and its signification form an autonomous entity, knowable to both its producer 
and receiver, but not influenceable by them. Let us, however, consider the 
following case of the Frog-footman in Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass. 
‘Where’s the servant whose business it is to answer the door?’ she 
began angrily.  
‘Which door?’ said the Frog.  
Alice almost stamped with irritation at the slow drawl in which he spoke. 
‘THIS door, of course!’ [...] 
‘To answer the door?’ he said. ‘What’s it been asking of?’ [...] 
‘I don’t know what you mean,’ she said.  
‘I speaks English, doesn’t I?’ the Frog went on. ‘Or are you deaf? What 
did it ask you?’  
  ‘Nothing!’ Alice said impatiently. (231-2) 
Here it seems that the Frog fails to understand what Alice means by “to 
answer the door” exactly because he understands the figurative phrase 
literally, and, as such, seems to possess no contextual or schematic 
competence, thus comically confusing semantic and pragmatic significance. 
This indicates, despite the assertive claims of Wimsatt and Beardsley, that 
there is in actuality a gulf between textually influenced ‘semantic meaning’ 
and extratextually controlled ‘pragmatic meaning’, and indeed this divide is 
often exploited (and best exemplified) in such comic literature. 
The location of meaning is the most debated and problematic issue of its 
definition, as beyond the semantic significance of the items in a text, 
‘meaning’ can at once be considered what the producer of a text intends it to 
mean, what the producer intends his or her audience to infer from its use, 
what the receiver understands the given text to mean, or what the receiver 
believes he or she is supposed to infer from the text. Clearly, these are four 
very different definitions, and the divergence between their results can often 
be striking. For example, if the text “I’m very hot” is produced, the producer 
could intend it to refer to the temperature in the room and expect the receiver 
to infer that he or she should open a window. The receiver, however, may 
understand the text as referring to the physical attractiveness of the text’s 
producer and may infer that a romantic overture is being made, or perhaps 
that a jocular boast is being put forward. Further compounding the problem, 
the intended semantic or pragmatic meaning and the actual denotative 
meaning of a produced text may not align (the same applies to received 
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meanings), and either producer or receiver may be mistaken in their 
assumptions about any of these factors.  
It would seem, then, that ‘meaning’ is an umbrella term for myriad 
different phenomena, which can be sub-categorised, if so desired, by labels 
such as ‘intended meaning’, ‘received meaning’, ‘semantic meaning’, 
‘pragmatic meaning’, ‘denotative meaning’, or ‘connotative meaning’. If, 
however, we can tentatively agree that ‘meaning’ could occur in any and all of 
these locations and still be considered as such, it would then appear that the 
above assertion of the nonsense of the Wakean text is founded in the 
mistaken belief that text and discourse are approximately synonymous. If, 
however, as Widdowson argues, text is merely a “trace” of a discourse which 
constitutes both “what a text producer meant by a text and what a text means 
to the receiver” (Discourse Analysis, 7), then meaning is not entirely contained 
at the level of text and the production and interpretive reception of such a text 
are both motivated by the creation of discourse and the convergence of 
meaning (Discourse Analysis, 54). Possible conceptualisations of the 
‘meaning’ of a given unit of language in these terms would thus include any 
concept manifested by it, any observable referent in third-person reality which 
it denotes, or any propositional element which it expresses (Horwich 3).29 
These three accounts of ‘meaning’ may be unified into the single definition of 
a manifested conceivable reference – in other words, a reference to any 
recognisable or conceivable entity, concept, or proposition. Already we might 
begin to see that this ‘referential realm’ is so vast that meaning may be 
considered as constituting all conceivable cognitive reactions to any motivated 
or unmotivated sign, whether linguistic or non-linguistic, lexical or non-lexical; 
a definition so broad as to become almost meaningless in itself, and which 
suggests that ‘meaning’ may not be dependent on circumstances, but may, in 
fact, be unavoidable. Under such terms, the lexicality of an item can no longer 
be seen to hold absolute sway over what it means, just as the non-lexicality of 
an item does not determine whether or not it can be meaningful.  
These findings suggest not only that “the frontier between coinages and 
normal words is uncertain,” (Lecercle, Philosophy of Nonsense, 29), but also 
                                            
29 However, such definitions are clearly as valid for other semiotic systems beyond language, 
for example regarding the ‘meaning’ of images or sounds. 
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that because there is no necessary connection between ‘reference’ and 
‘sense’, and because ‘meaning’ is not contained within a text but is rather 
relative and negotiated by reference to extratextual factors, the potential for 
non-lexical coinages to be meaningful is an inherent aspect of language.  
Having demonstrated that the Wake’s neologisms have the theoretical 
potential to be meaningful if they can be shown to manifest conceivable 
referents, it is now time to return to the text itself to see if and how this occurs. 
Before proceeding we should, however, be cautious lest we fall victim to an 
analysis of the ‘ends’ of meaning which does not account for the ‘means’. As 
helpful an exegete as Humpty Dumpty can be, we must be equally wary of his 
claim that when he uses a word “it means just what I choose it to mean – 
neither more nor less” (190). It is thus important to define clearly the 
consequences of this openness of ‘meaning’ for this analysis. The argument 
may be made legitimately that if the language in the cited passage can be 
demonstrated to invoke any cognitive response then, indeed, the charges that 
the Wake is ‘nonsense’ are significantly problematised. Such an approach 
would be homologous with the argument that non-mimetic visual art can be 
meaningful, despite contrary charges that its non-referentiality renders it 
meaningless. However, this approach is tantamount to Paul Rosenfeld’s 
appeal to the Wake’s “rhythmic”, “melodic” and the “emotional” aspects, and, 
as already highlighted, such an appeal to the text’s aesthetic or emotive 
qualities is not the concern of this study. Rather, in light of the evidence 
gathered, the following principles for analysing the passage’s non-lexical 
items are proposed: if the Wake’s text can be shown to manifest conceivable 
referents it may be affirmed that it is meaningful. If these semantic ends are 
achieved through close analysis of the words’ requisite parts, then it can be 
said that this meaning has been enabled because the Wake exploits a 
linguistic code. Finally if it can be shown that these non-lexical items explicitly 
exploit the English linguistic code, then the work’s text may be considered not 






2.4.2 Lexical Chains of Signification 
 
a word as cunningly hidden in its maze of confused drapery as a fieldmouse in a nest 
of coloured ribbons. (FW 120.5-6) 
 
Before moving on to a consideration of whether there is meaning 
encoded within the Wake’s neologisms, it is worth digressing briefly to 
address the notion that language must conform to standard grammatical 
forms in order to mean. In fact there is a great deal of meaning in the co-
textual relation of words that actually bear no grammatical relation to each 
other, and this is a feature of language that Finnegans Wake exploits 
significantly.  
In the absence of a Wakean Humpty Dumpty to walk us through the 
explications of its signs, one is compelled to wonder what process, exactly, is 
at play when a reader decides that an unfamiliar sign probably constitutes a 
non-lexical item, and submits it to an act of morphological investigation in 
order to make it cohere. It would appear that if lexical coherence is not 
immediately forthcoming by reference to attested forms, and if the sentence 
does not lend itself to easy and transparent parsing, the reader need not 
admit defeat, but rather may change approach and search the co-text30 for 
recognisable elements whose semantic quality is known. As Katie Wales 
outlines the process:  
one way of reading [Finnegans Wake] is by recognising ‘chains’ of 
collocations, sequences of lexical items drawn from the same lexical 
set, which frequently build up into lexical motifs, to signal a particular 
scene or ‘character’ (e.g. plants for the ‘daughter’ Issy). (Wales, 
Lexicology, 1473) 
 
Such lexical chains are not unique to the Wakean text but are present as a 
system of almost invisible cohesive markers in all cohesive texts, from news 
articles to instruction manuals. Natalia Loukachevitch summarises ‘lexical 
chaining’ as the creation of coherence in texts through “the presence of 
multiple lexical repetitions and closely related words” which are selected on 
the basis of “some kind of cohesive relationship to a word that is already in 
the chain” (1). A particularly distinctive feature of Joyce’s texts, one which 
                                            
30 ‘Co-text’, as distinct from ‘context’ (an extratextual feature) is defined by Widdowson as “the 
internal linkage of linguistic elements within a text” (Discourse Analysis, 128). 
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marks even the author’s earliest works, is their intensified employment of 
contextually determined lexical chains not only for cohesive effect, but also for 
thematic amplification. For example in “The Dead”, the final story of Dubliners, 
the language is peppered with word choices related to death and ghosts. 
These words are in no way grammatically related, but have an accumulative 
effect upon each other to amplify the story’s theme of the influence that the 
dead hold over the living. So one reads, for example, Gabriel Conroy’s charge 
that his wife Gretta “takes three mortal hours to dress herself” (151, emphasis 
added), the Morkan sisters’ concern that Gretta “must be perished alive” (151, 
emphasis added), Miss Ivors nod her head “gravely” (161), and Aunt Julia’s 
voice attack “with great spirit” the runs of the air she is singing (165). Ulysses 
expands on this principle so that entire chapters are written more strictly 
within a particular lexical set, so that, for example, the “Hades” chapter deals 
with death (Bloom, like Miss Ivors, also casts his glance across a cemetery 
“gravely”), or the “Lestrygonians” chapter largely exploits a food-related lexical 
chain. This process is expanded in Finnegans Wake in two significant ways. 
The first is in the sheer magnification and elaboration of the technique. For 
example the text of “Anna Livia Plurabelle”, which treats the female 
protagonist as the personification of the river Liffey, is woven out of the names 
of “anywhere from eight hundred to one thousand rivernames” (Bishop, Book 
of the Dark, 336). The second Wakean expansion of the technique is even 
more relevant to our purposes here, as the reader is required to key into a 
lexical chain of signification which is not only lexemic, but also morphological. 
In other words, such contextually determined lexical chains no longer 
influence only word choice, but also the individual morphemes of words. 
To demonstrate this principle, and how it might reveal itself to the 
reader, let us return to the morphologically regular but semantically irregular 
sign “entowerly”. Despite its phonetic similarity to the adverbial lexical item 
‘entirely’, the Wakean sign is deviant by virtue of its free stem ‘tower’. As a 
free stem is a denotative semantic unit in itself, one may query the 
significance of this replacement (in the belief that such an alteration does, in 
fact, bear significance). In search of coherence, the clause in which the item 
occurs may be investigated for collocational markers. Thus we find “a 
waalworth of a skyerscape of most eyeful hoyth entowerly” (FW 4.35-36, 
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emphasis added). As the reader scans the other deviant signs in the clause, a 
pattern of approximate synonyms associated with ‘tower’ may be discerned in 
“waalworth” (wall), “skyerscape” (skyscraper), and “hoyth” (height).31 These 
synonymous or related terms – some homophonically latent, each bearing 
features of this ‘structure/domicile/height’ chain – serve, accumulatively, to 
influence and confirm each other. The signification which arises from this 
associative lexical chain, however, is not a one-way process, as the 
recognition of the deviantly embedded ‘tower’ in “entowerly” does not simply 
change or ‘translate’ “skyerscape” into ‘skyscraper’. Rather a multi-directional 
process of mutual adaptation is initiated, so that even if a latent ‘wall’ in 
“waalworth” is unearthed, the inference of ‘skyscraper’ in “skyerscape” 
retroactively allows for the re-designation of “waalworth” as “Woolworth”, 
denoting the Woolworth skyscraper in New York, the world’s tallest building at 
the time of the passage’s composition. Similarly, “eyeful” can at any point of 
this process be adapted beyond associations of ‘visually striking’ and its 
approximate homophone ‘awful’, to ‘Eiffel’ in conjunction with the lexeme 
‘tower’. The sentence would seem, then, to be concerned with visually striking 
and imposing structures, and its non-lexical terms are synonymously united in 
a lexical chain that collocationally communicates this point. 
The identified lexical chain spreads throughout the Wakean passage, 
and other related or synonymous phrases can be discovered, such as a 
mason’s tools and clothing (mitre in “mithre”, “trowel”, “overalls”), building 
material (undressed masonry in “undress maisonry”), and notions of height 
and mass (“alltitude and malltitude”). Thus the passage’s lexical chain can be 
demonstrated to cohesively and coherently signify a conceivable referent in 
the form of a man dressed and equipped like a mason who is constructing tall 
structures. This is clearly not the full story, but the lexical chain of signification 
as embedded within the line creates a central thematic unit from which the 
process of meaning convergence can begin.  
Thus the presence of lexical chains in the passage demonstrates that 
even without recourse to considering the line’s grammar, signification may be 
                                            
31 That such signification is enabled by the non-lexical items approximate phonetic likeness to 
known lexical terms shall have to be accepted on face value for the moment, but this complex 
issue will be touched upon in greater detail later in this chapter. 
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inferred through the linking of lexically and morphologically collocational units. 
Let us now return to the broader question of the problematic aspect of 
categorically and systematically recognising non-lexical word-formations and 
determining whether they may manifest conceivable referents. 
 
2.5 Categorising Non-Lexical Items 
 
probable words, possibly said (FW 52.32). 
 
Jean-Jacques Lecercle makes an important distinction between two 
types of ‘nonsense’ word-formations relevant to our present purposes; namely 
the coinage of possible words, known as charabia, and the phonetic 
approximation of foreign lexical items, known as baragouin (Violence of 
Language, 4).32 Charabia are words which exploit the possibilities offered by 
the phonotactics and morphotactics of a given language – for our purposes 
here English.33 As Lecercle stresses, “the meaningful combinations of 
phonemes [...] do not exhaust the possibilities of lawful combinations” 
(Philosophy of Nonsense, 33). In our cited passage, it would appear already 
that the greater majority of the work’s neologisms constitute charabia in so far 
as they conform to the phono- and morphotactics of the English language, 
and explore the possibilities of other “lawful combinations”. For example, the 
previously cited “entowerly”, while non-lexical, conforms to phonetic sounds 
and morphological rules permissible in the English language. However, a 
number of foreign elements may be discerned in words such as “maisonry” 
(suggestive of the French ‘maison’, “house”), “himals” (the German ‘Himmel’, 
“sky” or “heaven”), or “erigenating” (the Greek êrigeneia, “early-born” or 
“Dawn”). These words, through their imitation and adaptation of  phonemes, 
words and word-formations from foreign languages, constitute baragouin, 
which are thus clearly also present in the passage. 
                                            
32 Lecercle’s terms are adapted from French philosopher Étienne Souriau’s seminal 1965 
essay “Sur l'esthétique des mots et des langages forgés.” While Lecercle indicates his 
indebtedness to Souriau’s work, he expands and develops the definitions to the point that this 
study is based, primarily, upon Lecercle’s later updating and expansion of their definitions. 
33 ‘Phonotactics’ refers to the branch of phonology which deals with restrictions placed upon a 
language by virtue of the permissible combinations of its constituent phonemes – in other 
words, which sound combinations are permissible within a language. ‘Morphotactics’, 
similarly, refers to the study of the restrictions on the ordering of morphemes. 
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What should one make, however, of a word such as “caligulate” which 
adds a morphotactically standard verb suffix to the non-lexical stem “calig”? 
The same pertains to “ivoroiled”, “fondseed” and “clottering” (emphasis 
added). Confronted with the presence of words for which morphological 
analysis yields neither pragmatic significance nor semantic predictability 
beyond grammatical categorisation, we shall have to investigate forms of 
word-formation beyond the strictly morphological to see if these neologisms 
can be accommodated within the English linguistic code. After the 
morphotactic charabia thus far investigated, the most common form of such 
word-formation is frequently, if often loosely and unspecifically, referred to as 
a portmanteau. 
 
2.5.1 Charabia: Portmanteau Words 
 
Plag defines such portmanteaux (known in linguistics as ‘blends’) as 
“words that combine two (rarely three or more) words into one, deleting 
material from one or both of the source words” (Plag 122). In other words, the 
process is one of encoding more than one semantic concept in a single 
orthographic form, as a new non-lexical item is constructed out of the clash of 
two more standard lexical forms. The coinage ‘portmanteaux’ for such 
linguistic phenomena is, in fact, Lewis Carroll’s, and, indeed, the most 
infamous use of the portmanteau is in Carroll’s “Jabberwocky”, such as the 
previously cited word “slithy”. The pseudo-analyst Humpty Dumpty explicates 
this non-lexical sign as being just such a portmanteau word, with his assertion 
that “‘slithy’ means ‘lithe and slimy’” and that as a result if this blend, ‘slithy’ is 
“like a portmanteau—there are two meanings packed up into one word 
(Carroll 192). Of course, Humpty Dumpty’s exegeses include a number of 
comically dubious interpretations, due to the fact that he misunderstands his 
own theory, as a number of his explications are purely semantic – such as his 
definition of ‘toves’ as “something like badgers [...] something like lizards, and 
[...] something like corkscrews” (192) – a deviant interpretation because, as 
Lecercle points out, “the rules for the formation of portmanteau-words are 
morphological” and never semantic (Philosophy of Nonsense, 44). Thus a 
clear distinction may be made between semantically predictable neologisms, 
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such as portmanteaux, which morphemically encode relevant information, and 
semantically unpredictable neologisms, such as Woody Allen’s phantom 
creature “the Frean”, which is semantically defined as “a sea monster with the 
body of a crab and the head of a certified accountant” (95). Clearly there is no 
aspect of the word “Frean” which indicates crabs or certified accountants, and 
as a consequence, the word’s meaning is entirely unpredictable (this, clearly, 
is the intended comic purpose). As a consequence, Saussure’s argument for 
the arbitrariness of signs may be seen to be problematised by the semantic 
predictability of such portmanteaux. As Lecercle emphasises, the 
portmanteau word, in both lexical and non-lexical terms, serves to “deny the 
arbitrary character of signs by introducing motivation everywhere, and the 
linearity of the signifier by compelling the interpreter to find ‘words beneath 
words’” (The Violence of Language, 91). With the recognition of the potential 
for motivated signs, the contention that the Wake’s neologisms are 
meaningful by virtue of their engagement with the English linguistic code may 
be verified if they can be shown to possess a certain degree of semantic 
predictability. Indeed, such portmanteaux are everywhere discoverable 
throughout the Wake, their proliferation evidenced by even a cursory view of 
the text, while the semantic nonce-neologisms of Carroll and Allen are almost 
entirely absent. 
As Ruben Borg points out, the portmanteau, as “a device employed with 
exceptional frequency” in Finnegans Wake, “enjoys an unquestionable pride 
of place” as “easily the book’s most [recognisable] feature” (143). By virtue of 
both the proliferation of the device, and its creative interaction with the code, 
portmanteaux can be seen as “a rhetorical strategy that comes to typify the 
Wake’s linguistic inventiveness at large” (Borg 143). The word “celescelating” 
in our sample passage, for example, can be interpreted as a portmanteau of 
‘celestial’ and ‘escalating’, and thus offers for interpretation the semantic 
concept that the “roundhead staple” which is “ris[ing] in undress maisonry” is 
‘growing’ (escalating) into the ‘heavens’ (caelestis). Anthony Burgess offers 
the example of the Wakean word “cropse” (FW 55.8), which “combines two 
opposites – the corpse which is buried in the earth [and] the crops which its 
decomposition nourishes” (Nonsense, 20). Consequently the item may also 
be defined as a portmanteau. Burgess’ emphasis on the ‘dreamspeak’ 
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element of such portmanteaux, through his assertion that “this is not the way 
waking language works” (Nonsense, 20), is, however, demonstrably 
unsupported by reference to word-formation in everyday language. 
That the possibility of inferring meaning from known components in a 
blended neologism is not exclusive to literary or nonsense texts – let alone to 
Finnegans Wake as Burgess suggests – but is rather a common element of 
everyday English, can be seen by the number of portmanteaux which have 
made the leap from possible to actual words, such as brunch (‘breakfast’ and 
‘lunch’), spork (‘spoon’ and ‘fork’) or dumbfound (a 17th century blend of 
‘dumb’ and ‘confound’). Even “chortle” and “galumph”, two of Carroll’s 
coinages from “Jabberwocky” (134), have entered the lexicon as ‘actual 
words.’ Interestingly, both occur in conjugated forms (“galumphed” and 
“chortling”), yet the compilers of dictionaries have no problem listing their 
lexemes as ‘chortle’ and ‘galumph.’ One might well ask why “chortle,” and not, 
for example, “mimsy”, and the most likely answer is that the former, as an 
ostensible combination of ‘chuckling’ and ‘snorting’, must refer to a 
recognisable unified semantic concept which had previously had no signifier, 
and this concept must create, in the language user’s mind, the impression of 
synthesis. On the other hand, the professed blend of ‘miserable’ and ‘flimsy’ in 
“mimsy” must constitute an unrecognisable and overly disjunctive semantic 
concept, and in the absence of perceived synthesis, did not gain traction in 
regular speech. Regardless of the exact criteria, the point remains that if an 
ostensibly nonsensical portmanteau such as “chortle” can be considered a 
semantic word now, then it must also be considered to have been such before 
its inclusion in the dictionary, and “mimsy” must similarly be considered “as 
presenting a semantic concept,” and, as such, a ‘word’. From the opposite 
perspective, such blends may be widely used and recognised, and possess 
significance to many language users, yet still not be considered actual words 
because they do not appear in a dictionary due to their specificity. Such an 
example would be the recent trend of media-coined portmanteaux intended to 
reference so-called celebrity ‘supercouples’,34 such as “Bennifer” (referring to 
                                            
34 Yet another recent coinage, ‘supercouple’ (‘Supercouple’ and ‘super couple’ are also 
attested) was, according to Martha Nochimson, coined in the early 1980s to refer to fictional 
soap opera couple Luke Spencer and Laura Webber from American daytime drama General 
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Jennifer Lopez and Ben Affleck), “Brangelina” (Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie) or 
“Tomkat” (Tom Cruise and Katie Holmes). That such blending of two referents 
into one conceivable referent presents a possible English construction (as 
portmanteaux), and a unified semantic concept is clear. Nevertheless, due to 
the impossibility of their inclusion in any comprehensive dictionary of the 
English language, these socio-cultural portmanteaux problematise the notion 
of classifying ‘actual words’ as those which are widely used and recognisable. 
Having outlined a working definition of portmanteaux, and demonstrated 
their widespread acceptance in the lexicon – and the troubling consequences 
resulting thereof for formulating a criteria for ‘actual words’ – attention shall be 
focused on two particular cases that represent the varying degrees of 
semantic predictability which the Wakean pun might allow. In the same 
passage as our sample quote we read parenthetically that a character called 
Bygmester Finnegan “sternely struxk his tete in a tub for to watsch the future 
of his fates” (FW 4.21-22). While a number of portmanteaux in the line will 
most likely jump out at the reader immediately, for the present purposes it 
shall be sufficient to focus attention on the word “watsch” (FW 4.22). This non-
lexical item may be considered a portmanteau of the two English lexical items 
‘wash’ and ‘watch’, and in context both may permitted (i.e. both ‘to wash his 
face’ and to ‘watch his future fate(s)’). We shall return to other possible latent 
significations in our discussion of the Wake’s peregrinistic modes of 
signification (as well as to the problematic pseudo-portmanteau presented by 
“fates” in the discussion of conversion as a means of word formation), but for 
now we can summarise that “watsch” presents a portmanteau whose two 
elements find some degree of convergence by virtue of the manipulation of 
context. 
The same cannot be said, however, for the example of “caligulate” in our 
sample sentence, the constituent parts of which McHugh annotates as 
‘calculate’ and ‘Caligula’ (4). While calculating altitude (“alltitudes”) and 
multitudes (“multitudes”) is a schematically recognisable concept, the blended 
element of a tyrannical Roman emperor does not appear to cohere in any 
                                                                                                                             
Hospital, after intense public interest had made the pair a popular culture phenomenon 
(Nochimson 274). Once again we see a recognisable unified semantic concept which was 
perceived to have no relevant signifier necessitating coinage, whose status as an ‘actual 
word’ is considered problematic. 
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schematically recognisable fashion, and the portmanteau appears to fail by 
virtue of its semiotic dissonance. This dissonance, however, more than 
forging a failed portmanteau, rather operates to highlight a common 
misconception; namely that such blends form a single notion or referent out of 
two separate notions or referents, thus forging synthesis out of disjunction. As 
Gilles Deleuze contends, all portmanteaux consist, rather, of “a strict 
disjunctive synthesis” (46).  
Consequently, by coining a neologism to refer to a late morning meal by 
means of portmanteau rather than a strictly semantic unit (a very conceivable 
alternative), ‘brunch’ is condemned to signify disjunctively, its point of 
reference always the space between its constituent parts. Thus, despite its 
reference to a unified and observable event, the process of signification in the 
blend ‘brunch’ is ultimately the same as that of ‘slithy’, which will never signify 
a synthesised referent or quality but always the disjunction between whatever 
elements are believed to be being blended (between both ‘lithe’ and ‘slimy’, if 
Humpty Dumpty is to be believed). This is, of course, not to say that the 
portmanteau quality of a word cannot be lost over time as it assumes the 
synchronic qualities of a straight semantic unit (such as ‘dumbfound’), but the 
more neologistic a coinage, the more foregrounded this inherent disjunctive 
synthesis is. Consequently, if we find the components in the blend “caligulate” 
to be two heterogeneous propositions which cannot be homogenised in any 
non-abstract manner, then this disjunctive synthesis is not only a property of 
the Wakean portmanteau, but also of the “imperfect synchronisation” (Borg 
145) operating in ‘standard’ English blends. The Wakean portmanteau, then, 
can be seen to foreground the disjunction inherent to all blending. 
The point, however, is not to argue that the ‘Caligula’ element in the 
blend is merely introduced as a nonce-cipher with the sole aim of highlighting 
the inherent heterogeneity of blending, but rather that the semantic 
predictability of the word is not attainable without reference to context. 
Returning to our notion of lexical chains as the overriding process through 
which cohesion is created in the Wakean text, the discerned disjunction 
between the blended elements ‘calculate’ and ‘Caligula’ can be made to 
cohere through the previously noted ‘domicile/tower/building’ associative 
lexical chain in the passage, when one knows (or comes to learn) that 
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Caligula embarked on a number of construction projects during his reign, as 
well as transporting the Vatican Obelisk, a tall phallic-shaped steeple, from 
Alexandria to Rome (Barrett 198). By virtue of the activation of this lexical 
chain, the constituent elements of the blend have gained a degree of 
semantic convergence with their surrounding context, albeit it in a way which, 
as the root of “caligulate” may hint, is caliginous: dark and obscure. 
 
2.5.2 Charabia: Conversion 
 
This is all well and good for the words in the passage with identifiable 
morphological or blended elements, but what shall we say of words which are 
not altered in any way from their lexical form, yet still signify in non-lexical 
ways? For example the word “seesaw” as a lexical referent to a noun 
denoting a children’s playground toy would appear to be voided in the 
statement that “he seesaw by neatlight”. As the word is unaltered from its 
lexical form, a proponent of the dominance of semantics for pragmatic 
significance might argue that this denotation is the only one possible. Even 
allowing for creative exploitation of the code, the contention would remain that 
if a word were to be considered as exploiting the English linguistic code to 
create new meaning, then changing the surface form of the word would be 
necessary. As such, if “seesaw” is intended here as a verb, as the line’s 
syntax suggests, it would need to be encoded as either ‘seesaws’ or 
‘seesawed’. Consequently the word’s use here may be considered nonsense 
through the denial of its semantic qualities and by virtue of its grammatical 
inaccuracy. Nevertheless, there is in fact much precedence in English 
language word-formation for what the Wakean text is doing here in its typically 
exaggerated way.  
The means by which Carroll coined his neologism ‘portmanteau’ affords 
us an appropriate insight into how such a phenomenon might occur, as the 
word, rather than a new morphological or blended coinage, assigns new 
significance to an already existing lexical item that denotes ‘a large suitcase 
which opens into two equal parts.’ This would seem a process of ‘metaphoric 
meaning’ becoming ‘semantic meaning’ through social acceptance and 
usage, however it is indicative of the much more common phenomenon of 
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word-formation by ‘conversion’. Plag defines such word-formation as “the 
derivation of a new word without any covert marking” (107). This process is 
observable in the cited passage, for example, in the already highlighted 
syntactic recasting of the lexical noun ‘eyeful’ as an adjective in the phrase “a 
most eyeful hoyth entowerly.” This conversion is further permissible due to the 
fact that “eyeful” already contains within its morphological make-up the 
adjectival ending ‘-ful’. That the phenomenon occurs in standard lexical 
coinages – as exemplified by the manner in which the nouns ‘bottle’, ‘skin’ 
and ‘water’ gave rise to the coinage of the verbs ‘to bottle’, ‘to skin’, and ‘to 
water’ – supports the argument that the Wake’s non-lexical coinages are in 
adherence to so-called lexical coinages. It would seem that yet again English 
syntax, and not semantics, defines our scheme of interpretation in the Wake. 
In the same manner, the noun “seesaw” is recast as a verb by a process of 
conversion. As it most likely indicates a past tense verb, in compliance with 
the “he would” formulation that initiates the clause, it can be interpreted as the 
past tense form ‘saw’. It should be noted, however, that the manifest form of 
the noun cannot be entirely removed from our interpretation of the clause’s 
pragmatic significance, and a number of interpretations of the presence of this 
lexical noun could be offered. There is neither the space nor the need to detail 
them all here, but in the interest of further emphasising the presence of lexical 
chains in the passage it may be noted that “seesaw” collocates with the rising 
and falling movement of the line’s final clause (“larrons o'toolers clittering up 
and tombles a'buckets clottering down” [emphasis added]).35 Furthermore, 
while new formations can be created without any superficial alteration to the 
word, the denotations and connotations of the conversion root present us with 
an added layering of ambiguity. The intersection between meaningfulness and 
ambiguity in new coinages, then, occurs as a result of a disjunctive synthesis 
which is a defining quality of both portmanteaux and conversions, both in the 
Wakean text and in standard lexical language use. 
 
                                            
35 In the interest of concision a number of semantic resonances within this rich passage have 
been glossed over, such as the lexical chain indicating that the sentence’s subject is drunk 
throughout (such as the declaration that he was “oftwhile balbulous” – ‘bibulous’). As such, 
another possible connotation of this conversion in the statement that “he seesaw by neatlight 




Shun the Punman! (FW 93.13) 
 
Thus far it has been argued that the semantic predictability of the 
Wake’s non-lexical items can occur by virtue of their quality as 
morphologically adherent formations, or by their quality as a blend of 
disjunctive elements which are made to converge by keying these elements in 
to the operating lexical chain in a given line or passage. Similarly, when the 
surface form is unaltered by affixation, these Wakean signs can assume the 
quality of neologisms by their syntactic re-positioning, so that such words are 
forced to signify in a different manner by virtue of their newly categorised 
grammatical role. Moreover, all of these processes have been demonstrated 
as paradigmatic of processes of word-formation already present within the 
English lexicon. These observations, however, are not sufficient to summarise 
the divergent ways in which the words in the cited line signify. What, for 
example, shall we say of the word “fates” in “watsch the future of his fates” 
which, in order to allow the polysemantic significations of the blend “watsch”, 
must be made to signify both ‘face’ and ‘fates’, without any manifest alteration 
of the word’s surface form or syntactic alteration of its grammatical function 
(‘face’ and ‘fate’ both function, after all, as nouns)? Surely there is no 
precedent for simply interpreting deviant reference in a word whose 
denotative potential is already fixed within the lexicon without any of the 
alterations already outlined? 
2.5.3.1 Defining Puns and Their Semantic Ambiguity 
 
In fact there is a well-established precedent for such ambiguity of 
meaning existing in a single unaltered and non-converted sign, which 
becomes evident when we move our line of enquiry from morphology to 
phonetics. While we may have no morphological or semantic basis on which 
to make the lexical item “fates” signify the front part of a person’s head, we 
may observe that, at the very least, the words fates and face ‘sound’ like each 
other. While this may seem unpropitious grounds for assigning multiple new 
denotative meanings to an already lexical word, the practice of aligning
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homophonically similar words is also well established in various discourses, 
and is most commonly referred to as ‘punning’. 
For our predominantly linguistics purposes here, it is considered most 
helpful and accurate to understand the act of punning (known technically as 
paronomasia), as Walter Redfern did, as “treat[ing] homonyms as synonyms” 
(3); in other words treating words which sound alike as though they had the 
same meaning, regardless of what the intended or resulting effect upon the 
reader or listener might be. A representative example can once more be taken 
from Carroll, where the effect, unlike “Jabberwocky” is achieved through strict 
adherence to the lexicon: 
“And how many hours a day did you do lessons?” said Alice, in a hurry 
to change the subject. 
“Ten hours the first day,” said the Mock Turtle: “nine the next, and so 
on.” 
“What a curious plan!” exclaimed Alice. 
“That's the reason they're called lessons,” the Gryphon remarked: 
“because they lessen from day to day.” (87) 
 
The Gryphon clearly mistakes the homophones “lessons” and “lessens” for 
synonyms, and as a result a pun has occurred. However, lest one object that 
Carroll’s is a somewhat forced and laboured example, it should be pointed out 
that exploitation of such ambiguity can occur on a spectrum of manifest 
disjunction to (illusory) synthesis. The first piece of information we learn about 
Mr. Bloom in Ulysses, for example, is that he “ate with relish the inner organs 
of beasts and fowls” (U.65). Due to the syntactic positioning of ‘relish’ in the 
sentence, in conjunction with the preposition ‘with’, the word may be 
understood adverbially (relating to how Bloom ate, namely with gusto or great 
enjoyment) or as a noun (relating to the condiment with which Bloom flavours 
these “inner organs”). Both meanings coexist within the sentence syntactically 
and contextually; indeed it is impossible to homogenise them or discover fixed 
univocal meaning. Here the exclusive denotations inherent in the sign “relish” 
– that Bloom ate these organs either with ‘gusto’ and ‘enthusiasm,’ or with a 
condiment – appear less laboured by virtue of both the homographicity of the 
signs and the convergence of context (both denotations are related to the act 
of eating). The phenomenon, however, is exactly the same as in Carroll’s 
usage.  
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Lest one object that such wilfully ambiguous language use would appear 
to be a purely literary phenomenon, it should be noted that such ambiguity 
can, and does, occur in all genres of text, literary and non-literary alike. For 
example, Aronoff and Fudeman point to polysemy arising in newspaper 
headlines as a result of the ambiguities inherent within the homophonic and 
homographic similarities of the signs within the English lexicon. One such 
representative example cited in their work is the headline: 
BRITISH LEFT WAFFLES ON FALKLAND ISLANDS. (33)36  
 
The ambiguity here – as to whether the article to follow will concern British 
liberals equivocating on the matter of the Falklands war, or the British 
abandoning breakfast pastries on the islands – occurs because of the 
homophonicity of different lexical items in the English language. “Left” may 
denote either a noun referring to ‘a person or group favouring liberal, socialist 
or radical views,’ or a past simple form of the verb ‘to leave’. “Waffles”, is 
similarly ambiguous in so far as it can denote either the third-person singular 
form of the verb meaning ‘to speak at great length without saying anything 
important or useful,’ or a plural noun indicating ‘a small crisp butter cake’. 
While this phenomenon may appear superficially similar to conversion, as 
undifferentiated words functioning differently in different grammatical 
categories, the distinction is that for conversion to take place the new word 
formation has to be semantically linked to the base form, so that, for example, 
‘to bottle’ means ‘to put something into a bottle’ or ‘to access’ means ‘to gain 
access.’ The potential significations of ‘left’ and ‘waffles’ are neither 
denotatively nor connotatively related, yet take orthographically identical 
forms. Thus the simultaneously possible but semantically opposing 
significations of “left waffles” result from the equal legitimacy of considering 
the phrase as constituting either a [noun(subject) – verb] or a [verb – 
noun(object)] syntax, an ambiguity resulting not from conversion, but from 
homonymy.  
The consequences of the potential for puns within the English linguistic 
code are numerous. The most obvious of these is the intractable introduction 
                                            
36 Other examples offered include ‘MINERS REFUSE TO WORK AFTER DEATH’, 
‘JUVENILE COURT TO TRY SHOOTING DEFENDANT’ and ‘KIDS MAKE NUTRITIOUS 
SNACKS.’ 
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of ambiguity into the system. Tigges observes that “the polysemy which is 
characteristic of a linguistic ambiguity, and which is ordinarily resolved [...] in a 
special context,” is employed in such puns to “send the reader to the ‘other’ 
meaning” and, as a result, the pun may often “present an anomaly between 
two (or more) semiotic levels” (Anatomy of Literary Nonsense, 63). 
Furthermore, puns, through their exploitation of the ambiguity already present 
in the homonymic confusion inherent to the English language, present the 
greatest hurdle for the Saussurean conceptualisation of signs creating 
meaning by their difference. According to Saussure, the sign may be identified 
only because “a linguistic system is a series of phonetic differences matched 
with a series of conceptual differences” (118, emphasis added). As Attridge 
contends, however, the pun problematises the very notion of language as a 
fixed system which transmits “pre-existing, self-sufficient, unequivocal 
meaning” and because it “undermines the basis on which our assumptions 
about the communicative efficacy of language rest: in Saussure’s terms, that 
for each signifier there is an inseparable signified” (Peculiar Language, 189). 
As a result of the fact that the English language economically re-uses 
the same signifiers for a variety of unrelated signifiers, even the most straight 
forward and “realistically” descriptive prose cannot be a purely transparent 
medium that merely reveals third-person reality. Such instances strongly 
support Derek Attridge’s assertion that puns and punning are “not an 
aberration of language but a direct reflection of its ‘normal’ working” (Peculiar 
Language, 193). Resulting from this revelation of punning as “a product of 
language’s necessary mode of operation” (Peculiar Language, 193) it may be 
concluded that if the text of Finnegans Wake employs puns in its semiotic 
processes, it exploits the fluid productivity of all language use, rather than 








2.5.3.2 Punning in Finnegans Wake 
 
As a consequence of this semantic instability, the ambiguity of language 
exploited in Finnegans Wake should perhaps best be considered a comically 
exaggerated exploitation of the ambiguity inherent to and resulting from the 
very existence of homonyms within the English lexicon. If in “most eyeful 
hoyth entowerly” a homophonically equivalent (and lexical) phrase such as 
‘most awful height entirely’ may be inferred, this is because ‘eyeful – awful’, 
‘hoyth – height’ and ‘entowerly – entirely’ are such homophones being treated 
synonymously. This is a principle employed in works which are categorically 
not experimental or avant-garde in nature, as the ‘eyeful’ Tower pun also 
occurs in Anita Loos’ Gentlemen Prefer Blondes, in which the protagonist 
states “when a girl looks at the Eyefull Tower she really knows she is looking 
at something” (55). The punning of Finnegans Wake, however, is a more 
complicated matter than that of Loos’ work, in so far as it treats lexical items 
and non-lexical neologisms as homophones, so that beyond connecting two 
homophonically related lexical items (as in ‘eyeful’ and ‘Eiffel’), a latent 
homophonic equivalent is related to a neologism whose semantic 
predictability is only accessible by application of the methods already outlined, 
and thus subject to further ambiguating polysemantic processes. In other 
words, instead of merely exploiting two lexical homophones for the purposes 
of punning, Finnegans Wake often forms non-lexical portmanteaux, which it 
then treats also as a pun. For example, on the opening page one reads that 
“Sir Tristram” had not yet “rearrived from North Armorica” to fight “his 
penisolate war” (FW 3.4-6). Here we find alternately ‘pen’ and ‘isolate’ or 
‘penis’ and ‘isolate’ blended together to form “penisolate”. However, by virtue 
of its collocation with “war”, this portmanteau serves also as an approximate 
homophonic echo of the Peninsular War between France and the allied 
powers of Spain, and hence the coinage is both a portmanteau and a pun. 
Such punning ambiguity also exists at the sentence level in Finnegans 
Wake. The homophonic ambiguity recognisable in the cited newspaper 
headline results primarily from the fact that both interpretations are 
syntactically and semantically encoded within the manifest form of the 
sentence. In the Wakean text, however, this phenomenon is often relocated to 
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a latent homophonic exploitation of the words themselves. The line “now eats 
the vintner over these contents” (FW 318.20) presents us with an example of 
such a case. As Senn highlights: 
The sense may be a trifle odd, but not really baffling. If we are familiar 
with the opening line of Shakespeare’s Richard III, however, we can 
hear an entirely different semantic development: “Now is the winter of 
our discontent…” We may not see the thematic connection between 
the two lines (the context would have to provide that). What matters 
here is that both of them can be followed independently, both are 
(syntactically, semantically) self-contained. We can learn to take them 
both in our (one) stride.” (Nichts Gegen Joyce, 190) 
 
Another demonstrative example occurs when the reader learns that drinkers 
in a bar (in chapter II.3) “had been malttreating themselves to their health’s 
contempt” (FW 322.28-29). The sentence can be decoded phonetically as 
either the drinkers ‘treating themselves to malt (whiskey) to their hearts’ 
content,’ or ‘mal-treating themselves to the contempt of their health’ 
(presumably, by consuming too much malt). Neither reading is given primacy, 
and the polysemy of the sentence, as with the polysemy of the above 
headline, cannot be erased. In other words, attributing a univocal ‘meaning’ to 
the line is an impossibilty. The quotation from the Wake is further ambiguated, 
however, by the fact that both possible significances adhere to the reader’s 
schematic knowledge of the types of activities that take place in bars, and 
thus one meaning can be neither schematically nor contextually prioritised 
over the other. As the polysemy of the Wakean sentence remains inerasable, 
even by schematic means, entire sentences are thus endowed with the 
disjunctive synthesis of puns and portmanteaux. 
The other key difference from the examples from Loos et al., is that non-
deviant lexical signs can also be retroactively affected and semantically 
altered in the Wakean chain of signification. While Loos’ character offers an 
immediate elucidation of her pun (that “when a girl looks at the Eyefull Tower 
she really knows she is looking at something”) the process of elucidation in 
the Wakean text is often delayed over many complex hypotactic sub-clauses, 
such as in the clause “until he seesaw [...] his roundhead staple of other days 
to rise in undress maisonry upstanded” (FW 4.33-35, emphasis added). While 
the imagined reader may have semantic knowledge of a ‘staple’ as a noun 
indicating either “a piece of bent metal or wire pushed through something or 
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clipped over it as a fastening” or “a main or important element of something, 
(for example, of a diet)” neither of these definitions allow for any pragmatic 
significance to be assigned to the line. One, it may be argued, has no 
schematic experience of a ‘metal fastening’ or an ‘important element’ “ris[ing]”, 
whether “in undress maisonry” or not. Nevertheless, as a result of the 
upcoming ‘domicile/tower/building’ related lexical chain, the sign can be 
retroactively re-designated as its homophonic echo “steeple”, offering the 
pragmatic significance that the sentence’s subject is seeing a “steeple” rise in 
undressed masonry. This, however, is not a signification made immediately 
apparent in the contiguous co-text, and before we move on to other forms of 
neologistic word formation, this issue shall have to be briefly addressed.  
 
2.5.4 Retroactive Modification 
 
indicating that the words which follow may be taken in any order desired. (FW 121.12- 
13) 
 
This issue of retroactively re-assigning signification raises another form 
of objection to the English-ness of such processes of signification, and one 
important enough that it shall be necessary to digress briefly in order counter 
it before moving on to other forms of non-lexical word coinages identified by 
Lecercle. Such an objection would be that if the line is indeed technically 
English by virtue of its syntax and modes of word-formation, it is still operating 
in decidedly non-English ways, as English is read from left to right and not in a 
process of constant retroactive re-evaluation and re-assignment of 
significance. Indeed, this very notion would appear to contradict Saussure’s 
second principle of the sign, namely that it is “linear” in nature (69). To counter 
this conceptualisation of a strictly sequential and linear view of the 
signification process of English, let us consider a number of non-deviantly 
encoded uses from other texts in which such a process is to be found. For 
example, in Alan Bennett’s play Forty Years On we read (or, if in 
performance, hear) the following description of Lawrence of Arabia: 
Clad in the magnificent white silk robes of an Arab prince, with in his 
belt the short, curved, gold sword of the Ashraf descendants of the 
Prophet, he hopes to pass unnoticed through London. (56) 
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In these lines the immediately assumed significance of the British military 
officer’s environment, inferred through his dress and the tone employed, have 
to be retrospectively re-contextualised and re-designated with the final comic 
revelation that he is not passing through the deserts of Arabia, but rather the 
urban landscape of London. For another literary example, let us consider the 
last lines of the poem “The Right of Way” by William Carlos Williams (50): 
Why bother where I went? 
for I went spinning on the 
 
four wheels of my car 
along the wet road until 
 
I saw a girl with one leg. (23-28) 
 
Once the following line “over the rail of a balcony”(29) is read, it becomes 
necessary to retroactively re-evaluate the assumed referent from that of a 
one-legged girl, to a girl who is dangling one of her legs over a balcony rail, 
and modify the line’s significance accordingly. One final example can be 
offered from Joyce’s Ulysses, in which we read in the opening line to the 
“Wandering Rocks” episode that “the superior, the very reverend John 
Conmee S.J. reset his smooth watch in his interior pocket as he came down 
the presbytery steps” (U.280). Any initial schematic knowledge about the 
significance usually assigned to resetting one’s watch (namely, of changing 
the time) has to be retroactively modified once it is revealed that the watch is 
positioned “in his interior pocket”, with the alternate meaning of “reset” (to re-
position) retroactively becoming more likely, although some degree of 
ambiguity remains. 
This non-linear processing of significance is also prevalent in everyday 
non-deviant language use, such as in so-called ‘garden path sentences’. 
Norbert Schwarz offers the example “the old man the boats,” which is initially 
confusing due to the assumption that the schematically familiar collocation 
“the old man” constitutes a noun phrase, in which case a verb would appear 
to be lacking. Due to the resulting lack of coherence, the reader needs to 
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“back up and reparse the sentence correctly” to discover that “man” is in fact 
the sentence’s verb (207).37 
These examples clearly contradict Saussure’s description of the linear 
order of language. ‘Understanding’, as we may start to see, may more 
accurately be thought of as a process of active interpretation which needs to 
be continually and retroactively updated and emended; a process observable 
in both Finnegans Wake and the larger corpus of English language texts. 
 
2.5.5 Baragouin:  Translinguistic Peregrinism 
 
Borrowing a word and begging the question. (FW 25-26)  
 
Let us now return to Lecercle’s second category of non-lexical word-
formation. Lecercle uses the term baragouin to refer to neologisms which 
imitate, adapt, or generally exploit the phonological, morphological or 
semantic possibilities encoded within a foreign linguistic code. The actual 
process of translinguistic re-appropriation itself is most usually referred to as 
‘peregrinism’, which Dupriez and Halsall similarly define as the act of 
employing “linguistic elements borrowed from a foreign language”, be they 
phonetic, graphic, melodic, grammatical, syntactic, or connotative (332). As 
already noted, a number of coinages in our sample quote appear to exploit 
foreign lexicons, such as French (“maisonry”), German (“himals”), and Greek 
(“erigenating”). It is this exactly this seemingly polyglot aspect of Wakean 
word-formation that offers the strongest support for designating its text as a 
new language of Babel, or as the invented polyglot ‘dream language’ of 
‘Wakese’. Indeed, such baragouin would most usually be considered a 
significantly non-standard (or at least a solely literary) use of language. 
Whatever about associative chains of signification and retroactive 
modification, one might challenge, English does not, by and large, operate 
through a system of translinguistic association. As such, it shall be necessary 
to first define the operations of peregrinism in the Wakean text in greater 
detail, before investigating the literary canon and the English lexicon to see 
whether such baragouin may be considered paradigmatic of non-literary, 
                                            
37 Clearly, this example is analogous with the previously cited newspaper headline. 
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lexical word-formation, or if they are indeed so idiosyncratic as to render the 
Wakean language independent of any one linguistic code. 
2.5.5.1 Peregrinism in the Wake 
 
Returning to the means by which “staple” was retroactively modified so 
as to cohere to the operating lexical chain, if one allows for the presence of 
baragouin in the text an alternate process is enabled by which a similar result 
may be achieved. “Staple” may also take its place in the operating 
‘domicile/tower/building’ lexical chain by virtue of its homophonic 
approximation of the German or Dutch noun ‘stapel’ (“a pile, mound or heap”) 
or verb ‘stapeln’ (“to pile; lay objects on top of each other”). Indeed, such 
translinguistic associations suitable to the operating lexical chain permeate 
the passage, such as the presence of the French ‘maison’ (“house”) in 
“maisonry”. Similarly, the clause “with larrons o’toolers clittering up and 
tombles a’buckets clottering down” – beyond its latent allusions to the 
archbishops of Dublin and Canterbury38 – contains a number of French and 
German baragouin that both adhere to the ‘domicile/tower/building’ lexical 
chain, and allow pragmatic significance to be assigned. In “larrons o’toolers” 
we may discern the French ‘larron’ (“thief”), in “clittering” the German ‘klettern’ 
(“to climb”), and in “tombles a’buckets” the French ‘tomber’ (“to fall down”), 
thus allowing the lines to be assigned the pragmatic significance of ‘with 
thieves of tools climbing up (the builder’s envisioned tower), and buckets 
tumbling/falling down from it.’  
Once such ‘peregrinism’ is activated within the text, words that might 
otherwise be considered English portmanteaux take on additional 
translinguistic significations, such as in the previous example of “watsch” (FW 
4.22). As already outlined, this word can be considered a blend of the two 
English lexical items ‘wash’ and ‘watch’, and indeed, in context both may be 
permitted. The sign’s manifest form, however, constitutes a homograph of the 
German (specifically Austrian or Bavarian dialect) noun ‘Watschen (“a slap in 
the face”), or its verbal form ‘watschen’ (“to slap in the face”). Signification 
                                            
38 St Laurence O’Toole [“larrons o’toolers”] and St. Thomas Becket [“tombles a’buckets”] 
respectively. 
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may thus homophonically transgress “language” borders, and the sign’s 
polysemy is expanded further to allow, in addition to ‘watching his fate’ and 
‘washing his face,’ the signification of ‘slapping his face’. 
Given the evidence that new word-formations in the Wakean text cannot 
be entirely devoid of the connotations of their constituent parts (ambiguity and 
polysemy emerging from the resulting disjunctive synthesis inherent to the 
process) it is pertinent here to touch briefly on the connotative effect of such 
peregrinism. The following passage describes the character of the Ondt in the 
Wakean micro-narrative The Ondt and the Gracehoper, as related by Shaun 
to his inquisitors in chapter III.3 
The Ondt was a weltall fellow, raumybult and abelboobied, bynear saw 
altitudinous wee a schelling in kopfers. He was sair sair sullemn and 
chairmanlooking when he was not making spaces in his psyche [...] 
(FW 416.3-6) 
 
While pragmatic significance can be interpreted by investigating the 
passage’s latent relation to the English code – for example that the Ondt was 
a ‘well (or very) tall fellow’ – an awareness of Germanic elements in the line 
opens up a number of associative translinguistic significations – such as that 
the Ondt was a universal (German ‘Weltall’ meaning ‘universe’) fellow. Once 
(or if) the reader becomes aware of the peregrinistic quality of the passage, a 
number of other German echoes may be intuited, such as ‘Raum’ (“space”, in 
“raumybult”), ‘beinah so [X] wie [Y]’ (“almost as [X] as [Y]” as in “bynear saw 
altitudinous wee”), ‘Kopf’ (“head”, as in “kopfers”), ‘sehr’ (“very”, as in “sair sair 
sullemn”) and ‘Spaß machen’ (“make jokes or have fun”, as in “making 
spaces”). These translinguistic features open up possibilities for signification 
in obvious ways, not so much instead of the lexically English possibilities but 
rather in addition to them.  
To our present question, however, the connotative effect of such 
Germanic peregrinism in the passage may lie in the micro-narrative's allusion 
to the fable “The Ant and the Grasshopper”, attributed to Aesop, in which the 
industrious and frugal ant survives the harsh winter, having spent his summer 
storing food, while the idle and procrastinating grasshopper starves of hunger, 
having spent his summer singing. The employment of German peregrinism to 
describe the Ondt, the Wake’s ‘ant’ cipher, would appear to activate 
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schematic notions of racial stereotyping, in which the Germans are 
considered to be efficient and industrious (fleißig) and frugal or even 
financially tight (geizig). The point is not whether these clichés are true of the 
German people, but rather that they present a schematic mode of 
understanding which can be accessed by the reader to forge significance. 
That the context would appear to make such peregrinism cohere supports the 
assertion that supposedly foreign elements can signify meaning beyond and 
above the semantic qualities of the lexemes themselves. 
It might be contended that the employment of such a proliferation of 
foreign elements into the Wakean text has the dual effect of both expanding 
and obscuring potential signification. Knowledge of these languages would 
seem integral in allowing many of the Wake’s peculiarities to cohere, yet the 
profusion and diversity of languages employed also remains one of the 
greatest obstacles to applying pragmatic significance to much of the Wakean 
text. As a result of the impossibility of the reader knowing all of the sixty or so 
languages utilised in Finnegans Wake, one might argue, great scores of 
potential signification are thus shut off to different readers. This is clearly the 
case, however the principle is theoretically no different than that of the 
esoteric word choices already addressed. to highlight the inherent similarities 
between these practices, let us let us briefly consider the following lines: 
For the boss a coleopter, pondant, partifesswise, blazoned sinister, at 
the slough, proper. In the lower field a terce of lanciers, shaking 
unsheathed shafts, their arms crossed in saltire, embusked, sinople. 
Motto, in letters portent: Hery Crass Evohodie. (FW 546. 7-11) 
 
This short passage may appear to make about as much (non)sense as any 
other in the Wake due to its proliferation of non-lexical terms. However, if one 
possessed a prior knowledge of entomology or heraldry, the case will be quite 
different, for such an imagined reader would most likely be able to activate the 
relevant discourse knowledge and recognise “coleopter” as an entomological 
term for an order of insects that comprises the beetles (including weevils) that, 
rather than referencing some rare phenomenon, in fact refers to the largest 
order of animals on the earth. This imagined reader would also perceive an 
abundance of the passage’s seemingly non-lexical items as lexical references 
to heraldic features, such as ‘fesswise’ (in “partifesswise”, ‘the manner of the 
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broad horizontal stripe across the middle of the shield’), “blazoned” (‘inscribed 
or painted with arms or a name’), “sinister” (‘of, on, or toward the left-hand 
side of the shield, from the bearer’s point of view’), “proper” (‘in the natural 
colours’), “field” (‘the surface of an escutcheon’), “terce” (‘division of ‘field’ in 
three’), “saltire” (‘the division of the ‘field’ in the form of St. Andrew’s Cross’), 
“sinople” (‘dark green’), and of course, the more widely known “motto”. 
However, if a reader has no schematic knowledge of these fields and 
consequently cannot access “saltire” as a lexical heraldic term, he or she 
might very well assume any of the above to be non-lexical signs, and 
consequently be tempted to investigate the relevance of all sorts of 
portmanteaux (such as, perhaps, a particularly salty brand of satire), puns or 
translinguistic borrowings. In other words, if the relevant schema cannot be 
keyed into, the line may be made to signify meaning by other hermeneutic 
means. 
The status of the English language of a loose collection of discourses 
has already been ably demonstrated, however the larger point here is that the 
employment of baragouin is, in its core operations, no different from the 
employment of esoteric or discourse-specific terms which yield meaning to 
some readers and not to others. That such baragouin may be seen to be 
semantically predictable, connotative, to possess the same potential to 
expand and obscure signification as discourse-specific language use, and are 
open to different hermeneutic modes, decisively debunks any claim that they 
are ‘meaningless’. The accusation that they are decidedly non-English, 
however, remains unanswered. Such translinguistic flexibility, while allowing 
signification in the particular case of Wake, may be argued to be operating in 
unique, non-paradigmatic ways. If a person is introduced to a fellow named 
Laurence (or “larrons o’toolers”), it might be argued, they are not generally at 
a loss as to whether this is the man’s proper name or if he is confiding, in 
French, to his profession as a thief (perhaps of building utensils).  
To better appreciate the veracity or otherwise of this claim, it shall be 
necessary to shift focus briefly away from the Wakean text in order to 
ascertain to what extent there is any precedence in literature, and ultimately in 
the English lexicon itself, for word-formation through the exploitation of 
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phonological, morphological or semantic possibilities encoded within foreign 
linguistic codes. 
2.5.5.2 Peregrinism in the Literary Domain 
 
As Lecercle stresses, any word-formation which “imitates, and mocks, 
the borrowing of foreign words” exploits what has generally been “one of the 
quickest ways of increasing the lexicon of a language,” by taking advantage of 
the semantic predictability of foreign words (Philosophy of Nonsense, 42). As 
such, peregrinism has been one of the hallmarks of many invented literary 
languages. For example, Anthony Burgess’s invented language ‘nadsat’ in A 
Clockwork Orange largely constitutes anglicised baragouin from Russian, so 
that one finds, among many examples, “glazzies” referring to ‘eyes’ (from the 
Russian glaz), “horrorshow” signifying ‘good’ (from the Russian khorosho), or 
“baboochka” designating ‘grandmother’ or ‘old lady’ (from the Russian 
babushka).39 Once one accesses the peregrinistic aspects of Burgess’ 
invented language, and possesses a prior knowledge of Russian (or access to 
a glossary), the following neologisms may obtain some degree of semantic 
predictability: 
“I could have chained his glazzies real horrorshow,” said Dim, and the 
baboochkas were still on with their ‘Thanks lads.’” (Clockwork Orange, 
46; emphasis added) 
 
Another modern example is provided by the character Salvatore in Umberto 
Eco's The Name of the Rose, who, according to the author “speaks a 
language made up of fragments of a variety of languages” to achieve a 
“‘Babel’ effect” (Translation, 57). Salvatore’s first typically macaronic words 
(as translated into macaronic ‘English’ by William Weaver from Eco’s 
macaronic ‘Italian’) are “Penitenziagite! Watch out for the draco who cometh 
in futurum to gnaw your anima! Death is super nos! Pray that Santo Pater 
come to liberar nos a malo and all our sin!” (Name of the Rose, 26).  
Lest one think that such “trans-linguistic foolery” is merely the twentieth 
century whim of a handful of modern or postmodern writers, Noel Malcolm 
observes that such language use is rather an established feature of the 
                                            
39 For a more comprehensive list of Russian baragouin in A Clockwork Orange see McDougal 
141-149. 
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heritage of European writing, as observable in various instances of ‘macaronic 
verse’, most usually employed to comic or satirical ends (103). An example of 
such macaronic langauge use in poetry would be the prevalent Latinisation of 
the vernacular (known as ‘dog-Latin’ or ‘kitchen-Latin). Other texts in this 
macaronic tradition include the ‘descort’ in five languages by Raimbaut de 
Vaqueris, or the dedication of Abraham France’s The Arcadian Rhetorike of 
1588, which constitutes a poem in a mixture of Latin, Italian, Spanish, and 
Portuguese (Malcolm 103-4).  
Finnegans Wake, it would seem, rather than a sui generis text, exploits 
and expands upon an established literary tradition. Given, however, the widely 
held sense that literary language use is somehow different from everyday 
‘actual’ English use,40 if such practices are to be deemed paradigmatic of the 
English language then some homologous process shall have to be discovered 
within the English lexicon. However surprising it may be to one’s notion of the 
distinctiveness of lexicons, this may very well actually be the case. 
2.5.5.3 Peregrinism in the English Lexicon 
 
Firstly, it may be argued, with little difficulty, that loanwords constitute 
the very fundamental basis or building blocks of English. This may be 
evidenced by a consideration of loanwords from languages such as Afrikaans 
(aardvark), Arabian (assassin, zero, nadir), Chinese (gung-ho), Yiddish 
(bagel), or Maori (kiwi), which are clearly not alien presences in the English 
lexicon. Even the formulation of contemporary neologisms often adapts lexical 
units from foreign lexicons, such as the recent coinage ‘wiki’, (“a website that 
allows collaborative editing of its content and structure by its users”) which 
computer programmer Ward Cunningham coined from the Hawaiian ‘wiki-wiki’ 
(“quick-quick”). Such translinguistic transferral has historically been one of the 
most integral modes of word coinage to compensate for deficiencies in the 
lexicon’s ability to refer economically to recognisable unified concepts. 
Indeed, Richard Foster Jones points out that in the sixteenth century the 
development of the English language “swelled its vocabulary by at least one-
                                            
40 The ways in which literary language is in fact ‘different’ from texts in other genres will be 
approached in the upcoming section on discourse domains. 
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third with words taken from other languages,” a practice which continued 
throughout subsequent centuries (272). Jones continues to identify a 
difference between the borrowing practices of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, in so far as “the Elizabethans borrowed from necessity, vanity or 
sheer exuberance,” while the seventeenth century borrowings were more 
“metaphysical” in spirit, a “seeking for the strange and out of the way, perhaps 
a striving for certain imaginative or sound effects” (272). The notion that such 
word borrowings are not merely functional and denotative, but rather uniquely 
suggestive and creative, suggest that the previously outlined connotative 
effects of Wakean peregrinism share some effect with these loanwords within 
the English lexicon. 
In order to better understand the consequences of such peregrinistic 
word-formation within the English lexicon, let us consider the specific German 
loanword ‘schadenfreude’ as an exemplary case of the translinguistic flexibility 
of the English code. When Vladimir Nabokov’s biographer Brian Boyd states, 
for example, that  
Edmund Wilson [...] became convinced that Nabokov was a malicious 
practical joker and decided, especially as their relationship 
deteriorated, that schadenfreude was a key to Nabokov’s personality 
(Boyd, 71; emphasis added) 
 
it makes little sense to argue that Boyd is writing in English for the majority of 
the sentence, then switches to German for the word ‘schadenfreude’, and 
then back to English for the sentence’s remaining six words. Such a claim 
becomes even less persuasive when we notice that the loanword is not 
capitalised, as German nouns are. Despite its German origin and 
simultaneously extant German cognate the word not only signifies lexically in 
English (as ‘pleasure derived from the misfortune of another’), but also 
conforms to English, and not German, formal conventions (i.e. the non-
capitalisation of nouns). This process of assimilation exactly corresponds to 
the peregrinism employed in the phrase “with larrons o’toolers clittering up 
and tombles a’buckets clottering down,” in which the translinguistic 
borrowings are also encoded formally and morphemically in English, with the 
French ‘larron’ and ‘tomber’ pluralised with the English ‘-s’ (“larrons” and 
“tombles”).  
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It should also be noted that this loanword ‘schadenfreude’ has suffered 
the fate of being incorporated into portmanteaux, and not only in experimental 
texts such as Joyce’s. Thus we may observe Lincoln Caplan, in Skadden: 
Power, Money, and the Rise of a Legal Empire, describe the delight that 
competitors took in Skadden Arps’s troubles of the early 1990s as 
“Skaddenfreude” (231), or The Economist political magazine refer to the 
delight taken in the fall of New York Governor Eliot Spitzer in March 2008 as 
“Spitzenfreude”.41 That the dialogue and transfer between supposedly 
different ‘languages’ can allow for a word from a foreign lexicon to be 
assimilated formally and lexically into the English lexicon, and then exploited 
in the play of portmanteau in economic and political commentary, should go 
some way to demonstrating a borderless nature to language, of which the 
Wake may in fact appear paradigmatic. Similar cases abound in the English 
lexicon, such as the German loanword ‘festschrift’ (once again, not 
capitalised). ‘Festschriftee’, an exclusively ‘English’ derivation of this German 
loanword, is similarly morphemically encoded according to the rules of the 
English code. Indeed, a closer examination of the processes of word-
formation in our Wakean sample passage demonstrates that exactly such 
adherent morphological acts of linguistic transformation are equally present.  
If, for example, one reads that the subject of our sample sentence was 
“oftwhile balbulous,” the adjective may be interpreted as an approximation of 
the Latin ‘balbulus’ (“stuttering”), with the Latinate suffix ‘–us’ reformulated as 
the English adjectival morpheme ‘–ous’. Conversely, a homophonic reference 
to the English lexical term ‘bibulous’ (excessively fond of drinking alcohol) 
may be inferred. This English lexical term, however, entered the lexicon from 
the Latin ‘bibulus’ (from bibere “to drink”) and had its adjectival suffix altered 
to incorporate the English formal adjectival encoding ‘–ous’. If the Wakean 
text makes the Latin ‘balbulus’ into a morphemically English neologism 
‘balbulous’, it is operating on very much the same lines that caused the Latin 
‘bibulus’ to give us the English lexical item ‘bibulous’.  
                                            
41 The article “The Hypocrites' Club” (Mar 13th 2008), written by an anonymous contributor, 
can be accessed at  
<http://www.economist.com/world/united-states/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10852872>. 
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To believe, then, that the English language is as independent from other 
languages as the island is geographically from the mainland, would seem to 
ignore its essentially polyglot nature, comprising as it does loanwords from 
most world languages to varying degrees. The central misapprehension is the 
belief that a ‘language’ is linguistically defined or designed, while it may, in 
fact, only be linguistically described. In reality English, or any language for 
that matter, is “more the product of socio-political realities than of actual 
linguistic factors,” and as a consequence is often considered little more than 
“a dialect with an army and navy” (Christensen and Levinson 1330). As 
Saussure puts it, “languages have no natural boundaries” and, as a result, “it 
is difficult to say what the difference is between a language and a dialect” 
(202). Christensen and Levinson point to a number of ‘languages’ that are 
mutually intelligible, despite being separated by political borders (such as 
Norwegian and Swedish, or Hindi and Urdu), as well as to ‘dialects’ of one 
‘language’ which are so distinct as to be mutually unintelligible (such as 
Chinese ‘dialect groups’ Mandarin and Cantonese) (1330). There are also 
nations with many languages (such as Switzerland, Nigeria and India) and 
languages with no nation (such as Kurdish). To these problems of 
distinguishing between languages we might add our previous observations 
that ‘languages’ themselves are so internally divided that, rather than a unified 
whole, they constitute a loose collection of discourses and exclusive 
vocabularies, which are only associated by grammatical features. What is 
important to note is that a ‘language’ is defined arbitrarily according to political 
and social factors (including those such as ‘group identity’), and not according 
to its linguistic features. Thus a crucial distinction is to be made between the 
‘English language’ as a political and socio-cultural entity and the ‘English 
linguistic code’ as a particular system of rules which can be exploited to form 
a discourse. While Finnegans Wake may not be considered as belonging to 
the English language for whatever social or political reasons, it would seem 
that it does, in fact, engage in a meaningful way with the English linguistic 
code, even in this regard of its peregrinistic impulses. 
The evidence, then, weighs heavily against a purely lexical, stable and 
unambiguous conceptualisation of a ‘language’ and its rules, and largely 
supports Derek Attridge’s assertion that  
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once a belief in a pure communicative language has been abandoned, 
the sharp difference between monoglot and polyglot discourse 
disappears; any language is many languages – a Babel of registers, 
dialects, older and newer forms, slang and borrowed items, accents 
and idiosyncrasies – and all that the Wake does is to extend this logic 
to its comic extreme. (Joyce Effects, 161) 
 
In other words, once it can be seen that a ‘language’ is not defined on 
linguistic terms (but rather on socio-political ones) and that peregrinism is an 
essential feature of the English linguistic code itself, the distinction between 
the (supposedly) monoglot English ‘language’ and the ‘polyglot’ Wakese 
becomes largely untenable, except by a question of degree. As Slote 
contends, the Wakean language constitutes a space wherein “the English 
language – already a veritable gallimaufry of tongues – is opened out to the 
babelian exterior it already inhabits” (Derrida’s war at Finnegans Wake, 196). 
Thus, Arnold Bennett’s representative contention that Finnegans Wake is 
“written in James Joyce’s new language, invented by himself” (in Deming 404) 
is problematised by the ways in which this supposedly ‘Babelian’ method of 
constructing neologisms in the Wake can be demonstrated to function in ways 
paradigmatic of the norms of observable English word-formation practices. 
Indeed, if Joseph Campbell defines the quality of the Wake’s “dream 
language” as one in which “words carry multiple meanings” (Mythic Worlds, 
16), then it has been demonstrated that this is very much a property of 
‘waking’ language too, and that “Babel is a condition of all language, not just 
that of the Wake” (Attridge, Joyce Effects, 161-2). 
 
2.5.6 Summary: From a Textual to an Extratextual Analysis 
 
The process of investigating whether the Wake’s text exploits the 
English linguistic code has resulted in a gradual accumulation of evidence 
against the conceptualisations of the Wake as nonsense or a new language, 
and for an even greater expansion of its status as ‘English’. The work’s 
seemingly “nonsense” word-formations have been seen to conform to the 
word-formation practices of ‘English’, such as portmanteaux and conversions, 
and these technically adherent coinages have been proven to signify (in a 
disjunctively synthetic way) by exploiting the semantics encoded specifically 
within the English linguistic code. The polyglottal impulse of these coinages 
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has been demonstrated as paradigmatic of the English practice of word-
formation – although adapted for a process of lexical chaining which 
incorporates individual morphemes. The Wakean text has also been found to 
incorporate standard English practices of manipulating the code to comic 
ends, such as puns (treating homophones as synonyms) and retroactive 
modification. As such, the findings thus far ultimately support the assertion, 
made in an unsigned review of Work in Progress in the Times Literary 
Supplement on July 17, 1930, that “by deformation, punning and the 
interpolation of foreign languages [Joyce] has given his English a 
suggestiveness, [and] a capacity for multiple associations such as his theme 
demands (in Deming 411).  
Perhaps the most significant finding, however, has been that the 
semantic ambiguity which results from the Wake’s exploitations of the English 
linguistic code cannot be distinguished from the ambiguity that arises in the 
lexical use of the ‘English language’, or if so, merely by a question of degree. 
As Attridge contends, Finnegans Wake “finds its pleasures in the knowledge 
that language, by its very nature, is unstable and ambiguous” (Joyce Effects, 
161). This understanding of the English language as an inherently ambiguous 
and equivocal system is most commonly challenged by reference to the ability 
of language users to consider a piece of text within its larger co-text, and 
apply contextual and schematic knowledge to determine which ‘meaning’ is 
correct and consequently restore univocality. Consequently, these 
extratextual factors shall have to be considered if we are to achieve a deeper 
understanding of the function of this ambiguity in the Wakean text and in 
everyday English usage. 
 
2.6 Extratextual Factors: Context and Schemata 
 
For pragmatic significance to be inferred from a text the semantic and 
systemic knowledge of what is encoded in the language system itself, which 
has been the focus of our analysis thus far, will not suffice. Indeed, references 
to ‘floating signifiers’ and discursive knowledge have already demonstrated 
that text alone does not bear its own meaning, but signifies only through 
negotiation with its context and the schematic knowledge of the receiver. As 
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these factors are so crucial for ‘meaning’ to occur, they shall be treated here 
in much greater depth so that the Wake’s processes of signification, and their 
similitude with the processes by which discourse is inferred from purely lexical 
texts, may be better understood. 
 
2.6.1 Co-Text, Context and Schemata 
 
The following analysis of extratextual factors on meaning would benefit 
here from a deeper distinction between "co-text" and “context” than has been 
offered thus far. The term “co-text”, as employed here, refers strictly to the 
textual items that surround a word or passage, coming before and after it. The 
notion is roughly equivalent to the term ‘syntagms’ in Saussure, which refer to 
a structural context within which signs gain significance, above and beyond 
their inherent signification, through the intratextual sequential relation of words 
to the others present within the text. As Saussure notes, “normally we do not 
express ourselves by using single linguistic signs, but groups of signs, 
organised in complexes which themselves are signs” (127). Thus all signifiers 
within a syntagm serve to influence each other’s meaning. The “context” of a 
given word or passage, on the other hand, is not a textual but rather an 
extratextual “psychological construction” which does not merely mirror the 
surrounding text, but constitutes a conceptual representation of those features 
which are taken as relevant (Widdowson, Discourse Analysis, 22). In the 
plainest possible terms, “co-text” is the strictly textual context of a text, while 
“context” is “not what is perceived in a particular situation, but what is 
conceived as relevant” (Widdowson, Discourse Analysis, 21). 
However, meaning also cannot occur unless the interpreter possesses a 
schematic knowledge of “the customary and conventional ways in which [a 
person’s] socio-cultural reality is structured” (Widdowson, Discourse Analysis, 
53). In essence each such a schema constitutes a “set of default 
assumptions” (Widdowson, Discourse Analysis, 53) concerning how the world 
is perceived to work. This conceptual system is inevitably extremely powerful 
in influencing and shaping not only how a given person interprets a sign or 
text, but also how he or she assumes a text is supposed or intended to be 
interpreted (Widdowson, Discourse Analysis, 53). As this process of 
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interpretation becomes assimilated (and thus invisible to the receiver of texts), 
‘meaning’ is assumed to be merely the result of a commonsensical 
understanding of how the world works, rather than a culturally shaped but 
objectively arbitrary conceptual system of interpretation. In other words, while 
context constitutes the “aspects of extra-linguistic reality that are taken to be 
relevant” to a given example of text or communication (Widdowson, Discourse 
Analysis, 128), schemata rather embody a learned set of pre-conceived 
ideologies and theories about reality, and a resulting series of assumptions 
concerning the ‘correct’ ways of comprehending this reality. In the previously 
cited newspaper headline, for example, a reader with schematic knowledge of 
the genre of newspaper journalism and the event of the Falklands war, will 
bring to the text a number of expectations and assumptions which will allow 
him or her to know that waffles are not usually included among the weaponry 
of the British military, and that such newspaper articles often discuss the 
views of the political left and right on such issues. The reader will therefore, 
assumedly, overcome the problem presented by the headline’s lexical and 
grammatical ambiguities and assume the correct meaning by keying in to the 
correct schemata. 
 The most important contention to be made for the moment is that a 
text’s meaning cannot be ‘uncovered’ by exclusive attention to the language 
itself, but is rather ‘constructed’ through the relation of this text to its co-text, to 
the ‘context’ inferred therefrom, and to “the conceptual context of our 
knowledge of how such texts are designed to function” resulting from our 
schematic knowledge of the world (Widdowson, Discourse Analysis, 5). 
Before testing the influence of context and schemata as they apply to 
the text of Finnegans Wake let us first of all exemplify it with one everyday 




Presumably, few would have much difficulty decoding the intended meaning 
of the sentence. Be that as it may, there is no indication within the actual text 
“SLOW CHILDREN AT PLAY” as to whether the sentence means “an 
imperative to drivers to drive more slowly or carefully, as there are (or may be) 
children playing in the immediate surroundings” or that the driver should drive 
more carefully because the children who generally play in this area are 
particularly slow (whether the children are then physically slow or slow-witted 
would present another ambiguity). There is no semantic, syntactic or 
grammatical reason for preferring one meaning to the other. Indeed, taking 
the sign purely on its own terms, there is no indication that driving or drivers 
are even referred to or to be inferred. As such, the contention is that 
situational context (the sign’s positioning at the side of the road) will enable 
the meaning as an imperative to drivers, and schematic knowledge of such 
signs will enable the drivers to follow the intended meaning without wondering 
if it is he or she, or the children, who are or should be slow. As this example 
demonstrates, there is an intrinsic ambiguity in language, and to interpret any 
text solely by virtue of the semantic or denotative qualities of its lexical units – 
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without any reference to contextual or schematic factors – is to become lost in 
its inerasable polysemy. 
For a literary example of these extratextual forces on meaning, let us 
return to the ambiguity that arises in Alice’s use of the phrase ‘to answer the 
door’ in her interaction with the Frog-footman. The breakdown in 
communication and ‘meaning’ results not only from the Frog’s dual semantic 
competence and pragmatic incompetence, but also from deficits in contextual 
awareness and schematic knowledge – the awareness of what the phrase 
usually means in such a context. This further demonstrates that the 
“recognition of the extent to which a piece of language keys into context 
appropriately so as to acquire a certain reference, force, and effect requires 
more than linguistic knowledge” (Widdowson, Discourse Analysis, 13). In this 
way it is ably demonstrated, as Widdowson argues, that a text is only the 
trace of the process by which ‘meaning’ is created (Discourse Analysis, 9). 
Thus the search for a text’s meaning solely in the semantic quality of its words 
– as we have seen New Criticists W.K. Wimsatt and M.C. Beardsley advocate 
– constitutes a conflation of meaning and “the perceptible traces of the 
process” of mediating meaning; a conflation which actually contributes to the 
failure of convergence  (Discourse Analysis, 7).  
If this much is true, and it appears that the Wake is composed, textually 
at least, by an exploitation of English linguistic code, then surely context and 
schematic knowledge should equally help to define its meaning? As we shall 
see, however, this argument for the power of such exratextual forces to 
disambiguate signification is problematic, both in terms of everyday English 
and the language of the Wake. 
 
2.6.2 (Dis)ambiguating Contexts in Finnegans Wake 
 
Let us begin by examining the Wakean neologism “ghoat” (FW 51.13), 
which appears in chapter I.3. Clearly as a non-lexical item, appeals to 
semantics will not offer possible meaning. As a pun the item might be argued 
to phonetically echo ‘goat’, or as a portmanteau it may constitute a blending of 
such elements as ‘goat’ and ‘hot’, however out of context it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to infer a meaning with any degree of confidence. It would appear, 
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in fact, that this non-lexical item is not intrinsically meaning-neutral, but rather, 
to the contrary, out of any given context its potential meanings become infinite 
to the point that the sign becomes, to all practical and pragmatic purposes, 
meaningless. This infinitude of potential signification occurs for the very good 
reason that the presence of context is essential for significance to occur, as 
the very identification of any particular use of language as a “text” depends on 
the recognition that it is intended to be related to a context, and as the 
purpose of interpretation is to assign “pragmatic significance” to this encoded 
relationship between semantics and context (Widdowson, Text Context 
Pretext, 36). Indeed, if we place the sign within its co-text, this necessary 
interplay between text and context is elucidated: 
that fishabed ghoatstory of the haardly creditable edventyres of the 
Haberdasher, the two Curchies and the three Enkelchums in their 
Bearskin ghoats! (FW 51.13-15, emphasis added) 
 
As can be seen, the sign appears twice, in “that fishabed ghoatstory” and “in 
their Bearskin ghoats,” and greater consideration of the unit’s co-text allows 
us to discern two mutually exclusive significations of the term, namely ‘ghost’ 
(as in ‘ghost story’) and ‘coats’ (as in ‘bearskin coats’). The reader, with 
reference to their schematic knowledge of the world, will assumedly neither 
imagine that a ‘coat story’ is being told, nor that the “three Enkelchums” are in 
their ‘bearskin ghosts’. Thus context and schematic knowledge have allowed 
the same sign to move from near infinite possibilities of signification to 
possible (though by no means univocal) and exclusive significations. To infer 
from this example a rule that context and schemata fix signification, however, 
would be premature. 
As a contrary example, let us consider the following passage from ALP’s 
one-sided dialogue with her sleeping husband that closes Book IV: 
Rise up, man of the hooths, you have slept so long! Or is it only so 
mesleems? [...] Rise up now and aruse! Norvena’s over. [...] Here is 
your shirt, the day one, come back. The stock, your collar. Also your 
double brogues. A comforter as well.  (FW 619.25-36) 
 
The word “comforter” has the appearance of a non-deviant lexical item, and 
accordingly one may decide to turn to a dictionary for help. Upon doing so, 




1. a warm quilt. 
2. the Holy Spirit. 
3. (dated) a woollen scarf. 
 
In the context of sleeping (“you have slept so long”), references to the Novena 
(“Norvena’s over”) and clothing (“shirt”, “stock”, “collar”, “double brogues”) we 
may find that all three significations are equally possible. Consequently, the 
context does not fix or stabilise the meaning of the word, but is rather 
manipulated in such a way so as to allow for the possibility of all three 
definitions. Once again, the equivocal nature of the “relish” with which Mr. 
Bloom eats “the inner organs of beasts and fowls” (U.65) is exemplary of just 
such a marriage of homonyms and context to create an irreducible plurality of 
meaning. ‘Punning’, then, occurs not only from the treatment of homonyms as 
synonyms, but also from the manipulation of context's capacity to constrict 
signification, yet allow contrary significations to legitimately coexist. 
These observations indicate that despite our intuition concerning the 
clarifying power of context, this extratextual force cannot fix univocal meaning, 
but rather only reduces the potentially infinite significations of 
uncontextualised signs to a finite number of pragmatic interpretations. 
Context, then, cannot actually reduce potential signification to the point that 
equivocality has been erased, and as a result the ambiguity inherent to 
language is left intact. Thus we find ourselves presented with a considerable 
body of support for Attridge’s claim that 
Finnegans Wake may not be an aberration of the literary but an 
unusually thoroughgoing exemplification of the literary, of the very 
conditions of existence of Middlemarch or Sons and Lovers as literary 
texts - namely the impossibility of ever being limited by originating 









2.6.3 Discourse Domains: Schematic Activation in Literary Texts 
 
Words, it may be seen, serve not as purely referential and denotative 
ciphers, but rather as schematic activators that trigger a ‘schematic image’, 
and one of the primary reasons why all literature is so equivocal is because it 
constitutes the space of the greatest number of possible combinations of 
varying schemata. A recipe, for example, will generally constitute and conform 
to a single schema, which a reader with a schematic knowledge of such texts 
can access unproblematically, and should find most such instances of a text 
to be equally transparent. A literary text, however, by virtue of its references to 
varying geographies, histories, cultures and practices – as well as its 
employment of metaphors, references, and intertexts – activates myriad 
schemata. As a result no two readers will key into the exact same 
combination of schematic images when reading the same text. If signification 
may only be enabled when the reader or interlocutor is able to activate the 
schemata relevant to the text, the same must be said for the Wake’s 
peregrinistic appropriation of foreign languages, as well as its employment of 
obscure lexical items, semantically predictable (but only disjunctively 
synthetic) neologisms, quotations, intertextual allusions, and genre-specific 
lexicons. If the problematic question of the known and the unknown for any 
reading of any text, literary or otherwise, is dependent upon an infinitely 
complex net of schematic knowledge, then once more the Wake can be seen 
as exploiting this inherent and unavoidable feature of meaning-making to 
extreme ends. In this sense, the processes of signification in Finnegans Wake 
mirror those inherent to all attempts to infer discourse from text, with the 
principle merely expanded to the point that an absolute convergence of 
meaning becomes something of an impossibility by any practical terms.  
However, while context and schematic knowledge may help to delimit, 
but not fix, potential signification in a given example of text, the issue still 
remains as to why and how the processes of interpretation outlined thus far 
are enabled or even permissible in the first place. Once more, we shall find, 
the reason is schematic. To demonstrate the process let us again move 
temporarily outside the experimental letters of Finnegans Wake to everyday 
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non-deviant discourse and consider the following quote from the Irish Times 
newspaper: 
 
The Germans would seem to be more loving with their children.  
 
Certainly the sentence appears to offer no grammatical or semantic difficulty, 
with its pragmatic significance being that in comparison to other peoples it 
would appear that Germans have a more affectionate relationship with their 
offspring. However, once the sentence is placed in its proper context, this 
meaning changes significantly. As it appeared fully in the paper, the sentence 
was printed thus: 
 
28. The Germans would seem to be more loving with their children (6) 
 
In this new context – not an article on Teutonic parent-child relationships but 
rather the paper’s cryptic crossword Crosaire – the sentence takes on an 
entirely different meaning. In this different domain of discourse the reader is 
expected, even encouraged, not to understand the sentence semantically, but 
by different hermeneutic means entirely. Consequently, once placed within 
this particular discourse domain, the sentence can no longer be thought to 
mean ‘it would appear that Germans have a more affectionate relationship 
with their offspring’ but rather the ‘meaning’ becomes the single English word 
“kinder”, achieved by recognition that the English synonym for ‘more loving’ 
and the German word for ‘children’ are homonyms. The result is somewhat 
like that of the pun, however the hermeneutic means of achieving this similar 
end are significantly different. 
     To take another example from the same crossword, the clue  
 
32. Allow Henry to be so murderous (6) 
 
forges the ‘intended’ meaning through the recognition that a synonym for 
‘allow’ is ‘let’, and a nickname for ‘Henry’ is ‘Hal’, which when combined form 
the synonym for ‘murderous’ ‘lethal’. In this designated domain of discourse, 
the reader is encouraged not only to actively search out translinguistic 
homonyms for meaning creation, but also to break words down into their 
constituent morphemes (‘let’ and ‘Hal’) and treat these morphemes as though 
they were lexemes and as synonymous units in themselves.  
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Perhaps the most elucidatory example of the phenomena of such 
discursively marked alternative hermeneutic modes is the anagram, in which 
the ‘message’ or ‘meaning may still be discerned despite the fact that the 
surface form bears no semantic or denotative relation to the ultimate 
signification of the sign. For example, if one were to be informed in a business 
memo that “delays upset traders” one would most likely understand the 
sentence as a statement of fact concerning traders’ dislike for receiving their 
goods too late, and agree or disagree depending on one’s experience and 
schematic knowledge of the reactions of traders to such hold-ups. However if 
one were to read “15. Delays upset traders (7)”, in order to interpret the 
intended meaning correctly one would have to understand “delays” not as a 
plural noun but as a third-person simple present verb form, understand 
“upset” as meaning ‘re-arrange the letters of’, and divest the word ‘traders’ of 
all semantic and denotative qualities and see it merely as a jumble of letters to 
be rearranged into a synonym of the re-categorised ‘delays’. If the reader 
correctly engages in this unusual hermeneutic act, then he or she will 
successfully interpret the sentence’s meaning – the lexical item ‘retards’. That 
these alternate significations can be successfully interpreted from a single 
non-deviant series of signifiers underscores the fact that the alternate 
meanings occur as a result of the hermeneutics applied, and not within the 
language encoding itself. Consequently, if we can conclude that standard 
English sentences in everyday genres of text may be subjected successfully 
to such alternate hermeneutic practices, then the reading practices outlined 
thus far for Finnegans Wake may be considered to conform to the broader 
phenomena of genre-centred and discursively marked hermeneutics. 
It is important to underline that the distinction here is not that between 
‘sense’ and ‘reference’, especially if we understand ‘sense’ to be additional to 
the literal or primary reference. Keying into schemata may encode pragmatic 
significance within a given sentence that is additional to – or at the very least 
related to – its denotative or semantic meaning. What we are presented with 
in the case of the cryptic crossword is an entirely different mode of 
hermeneutics that elicits results almost entirely unrelated to the denotative 
qualities of the manifest sentence form. Consequently, the notion that 
meaning is created by encoding and decoding messages in fixed and 
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consistent ways is significantly undermined, and the hermeneutic modes 
needed to provide the Wakean text with pragmatic significance (lexical chains, 
retroactive modification, translinguistic analysis, etc.) can once again be 
demonstrated as conforming to ‘standard’, if discursively marked, processes 
of signification. 
This possibility of applying different hermeneutic modes to the same text 
until it coheres brings with it, inherently, perhaps the most fundamental 
argument against a view of Finnegans Wake as nonsense, as it entails the 
ultimate impossibility of meaninglessness of texts marked as belonging to the 
poetic domain of discourse. In this domain, which deals primarily with the 
arbitrary fashioning of “events” into a cause-and-effect teleological story (most 
commonly referred to as a ‘narrative’), the notion of nonsense becomes an 
impossibility because it is the domain of the broadest cross-section of 
hermeneutic tools available to the reader. As Attridge argues,  
a narrative is never made up of anything other than functions: in 
differing degrees, everything in it signifies [...] in the realm of discourse, 
what is noted is by definition noteworthy. Even were a detail to appear 
irretrievably insignificant, resistant to all functionality, it would 
nonetheless end up with precisely the meaning of absurdity or 
uselessness: everything has meaning or nothing has [...] art is a 
system which is pure, no unit ever goes wasted, however long, 
however loose, however tenuous may be the thread connecting it to 
one of the levels of the story. (Peculiar Language, 219-220) 
 
2.6.3.1 The Literary Domain and the Author-Function 
 
As to the matter of how texts become discursively marked, three brief 
examples may be offered of varying complexity, although many more are 
conceivable. Firstly, and most obviously, a discourse domain can be marked 
formally, or even titled, so that the title ‘recipe’ or the clue number and 
bracketed number at the front and end of the above examples (as well as their 
positioning in cookery books or newspapers) would clearly mark these two 
texts as a recipe and a crossword, and the hermeneutic tools with which they 
will be tackled by the reader with schematic knowledge of the discourses will 
be extremely different by necessity. Discourse domains can also be encoded 
grammatically or semantically in texts, so that, for example, if the opening line 
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of this chapter had not been “much ink has been spilled over the vexing 
subject of the seemingly inscrutable language of James Joyce’s Finnegans 
Wake,” but rather “ink spilt over subject of inscrutable language,” or, even 
worse, the five word compound monster “inscrutable language ink spill fears,” 
then any sane reader would be totally at a loss as to what might possibly be 
meant, and might even voice concerns for the writer’s sanity. However, the 
same reader might not bat an eyelash at opening his or her daily paper and 
reading a similar compound noun such as “Maze escaper kidnap case 
collapse.”42  Due to the compound noun occurring in the marked domain of 
newspaper headlines, the reader, provided that he or she can key into the 
relevant schemata, could understand this pseudo-word as referring to the 
specific collapse of a case against a kidnapper who had escaped from the 
Maze prison in Northern Ireland. Thus recognising the discourse domain and 
applying the appropriate hermeneutic model (as well as keying into the 
relevant schemata) renders this seeming grammatical nightmare 
understandable.  
As for literary texts, the issue is rather more complex, but this study 
posits that these texts are marked by the very author figure which literary 
theory of the last fifty years (in particular the work of Barthes, Foucault and 
Derrida) has been trying so hard to expunge. French literary theorist and 
semiotician Roland Barthes sets the charge of the death of the author with the 
assertion that a text “is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ 
meaning (the message of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in 
which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and crash” (Barthes, 
170). Clearly Barthes is justified in his endeavours to deflate the myth that the 
reader of a text passively receives a meaning which is actively created by the 
author alone. Despite this important repudiation of authorial intention as the 
sole domain in which meaning can be created, a crucial caveat is offered by 
philosopher Michel Foucault in his assertion that the author cannot simply be 
removed so that the ‘work’ itself can be focussed on solely (as Barthes 
suggests) because a text can only be defined as a work if it has an author. 
Consequently, “in a [civilisation] like our own there are a number of discourses 
                                            
42 This headline is from an actual article on the BBC website, published on 26 June 2008, 
which can be found at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/7475724.stm>. 
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that are endowed with the ‘author-function,’ while others are deprived of it” 
(Foucault 202). A recipe, for example, is not a ‘work’ only by virtue of the fact 
that it is not considered to have an author. The appropriateness of 
hermeneutic approaches to discursively marked texts is so apparent to the 
reader, that many writer have intentionally inverted these practices for comic 
purposes. Woody Allen, for example, in his short story “The Metterling Lists” 
critically analyses the laundry lists of a supposed ‘author’, the humour arising 
from treating such clearly referential texts as though they were inscribed with 
the ‘author-function’ and applying the ‘wrong’ hermeneutic tools for 
understanding the text. As such, when the narrator maintains, in a pseudo-
literary register, that “the fifth list [...] had always puzzled scholars, principally 
because of the total absence of socks” (147), the comic implicature of 
applying the wrong hermeneutics to an incorrectly marked domain of 
discourse should be clear to all readers. 
It is suggested, then, that while the identity of a text’s author has no 
bearing on its meaning (James Joyce, for example, is merely a name, not a 
code of meaning; and even this name, and its various connotations, should 
most accurately be thought of as a biographically constructed alter-ego of a 
flesh and blood individual who will forever remain unknowable to us), this 
‘author-function’ is a necessary part of a text’s make-up in so far as it 
indicates to the reader the discourse domain of the text being read, and hence 
the appropriate range of hermeneutic tools to be applied. For while Foucault 
rightly argues that texts have not always had authors, but that the whole 
notion of authorship came into being at a particular moment in history, and 
may pass out of being at some future moment (198), it is the contention of this 
study that the coming into being of this author figure was necessary as soon 
as the problematic value of language as a means of representation in a world 
of conflicting truths came to be realised.43 The most extreme, but perhaps 
also most exemplary, instances of the fundamental divergence of discursively 
marked hermeneutic approaches to the same text as informed by the 
                                            
43 Foucault, on the other hand, considers this moment to coincide with the transformation of 
discourses from ‘acts’ to products, as a result of which the author figure was created so that 
transgressive discourses could be attributed to owners who could be punished (202). 
Foucault’s argument supports this study’s assertion, however, in so far as he characterises 
the author as “the ideological figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the 
proliferation of meaning” (209). 
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perceived absence or presence of an ‘author figure’ are the texts of the three 
Abrahamic ‘religions of the book.’ Any such ‘holy book’ is determined by 
atheists (or adherents of another religion) to be marked as literature in 
possession of the ‘author-function’, which are to be interpreted connotatively 
and whose truth-value is ambiguous. A religion’s adherents, on the other 
hand, on a rising scale depending on how devout or fundamental they may 
be, consider these works to belong to the semantic and didactic domain of 
recipes and instruction manuals (whose truth-values are considered actual 
and demonstrable), and thus apply an entirely different set of hermeneutic 
tools in understanding them.44  
The intention, of course, is not to argue that Finnegans Wake is one long 
cryptic crossword puzzle, but rather to highlight that language is not only 
interpreted lexically, and that the same series of signs can be assigned a 
number of different significances depending on which domain of discourse the 
reader believes it to be designated to. In fact there is one significant way in 
which the Wake differs from the above cited cryptic crossword clues, as such 
clues have one definitive and testable meaning, thus placing them outside the 
‘author-function’. The ambiguities of the cryptic lines in the Wake, on the other 
hand, do not and cannot be demonstrated to possess any one correct 
meaning, thus placing them firmly within the ‘author-function’. In any case, to 
argue that Finnegans Wake is not English would appear to both seriously 
overestimate the individual importance of the lexicon in the English linguistic 
code – an arbitrary manmade taxonomy born of an a priori assumption of 
separate and separable monoglot languages – and to underestimate the role 







                                            
44 Of course this matter is viewed here only in terms of how the text of such works is 
interpreted; the value of the artefact itself, wherein the defilement of such a book, or even 
non-belief, may be punishable by death, is a separate matter, although the sociological and 
psychological importance of discourse domains is demonstrated. 
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2.6.4 Approaches to Etymology in the Literary Domain  
 
a very fairworded instance of falsemeaning adamelegy. (FW 76.25-26) 
 
Regarding this issue of discourse domains, and their effect upon the 
Wakean text, the most important tension between what might approximately 
be called the Saussurean and Deconstructive semiotic models is the former’s 
insistence on a synchronic analysis of texts, and the permissibility of a 
diachronic approach in the latter. Indeed, it is in these two semiotic 
approaches that we may see not only two opposing theories of signification, 
but also opposite ends of the spectrum of hermeneutic tools available to the 
language user for differently marked discourse domains.  
 For Saussure, intent on analysing language as the reality of the 
knowledge of a community (or speaker therein), a word’s etymology cannot 
play a role in its signification in a given act of communication.45 As the 
historical meanings of a given sign no longer signify in such a manner in the 
langue of the ordinary language-user, Saussure argues, any study of how 
language is actually used shall have to ignore the diachronic elements (such 
as a word’s etymology) and focus solely on the synchronic, which, as 
Saussure stresses, “does not comprise everything which is simultaneous, but 
only the set of facts corresponding to any particular language” (90-1). As Roy 
Harris, one of Saussure’s English translators, argues, 
words, sounds and constructions connected solely by processes of 
historical development over the centuries cannot possibly, according to 
Saussure’s analysis, enter into structural relations with one another, 
any more than Napoleon’s France and Caesar’s Rome can be 
structurally under one and the same political system. (x) 
 
Derrida, the founder of the deconstructive semiotic model, contends the 
Saussurean notion of the inseparable relation between signifier and signified 
with his concept of concept of ‘Différance’ (a play on the French ‘différer’ 
                                            
45 Saussure’s discussion of how, and why, one must distinguish between synchrony and 
diachrony, and the consequences of confusing the two, is, unfortunately, too detailed and 
nuanced to enter into here (see Saussure 79-98). However, the impression should not be that 
Saussure engages with diachronic linguistics merely to dismiss it out of hand; indeed a great 
deal of the Course in General Linguistics is dedicated to a fuller engagement with the 
approach (see Saussure 139-181). Nevertheless, most important for our purposes here is 
that in his endeavour to scientifically study langue, Saussure considered that the history of a 
given word’s various and changing meanings could not play a part in the process of 
signification in a particular act of communication. 
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meaning both ‘to defer’ and ‘to differ’), which posits language as an endless 
chain of differentiated and deferred meaning. This theory both updates and 
upsets de Saussure’s conceptualisation of the relation between signifier and 
signified because for Derrida each signified is also a signifier, and as a 
consequence the process of signification is indefinite. Signs, Derrida argues, 
can never summon forth what they ‘mean’, and as such their ‘meaning’ may 
only be defined through appeal to additional words, from which they differ, 
and as a result meaning is infinitely postponed through an endless chain of 
signifiers. As a result, “through infinite circulation and references, from sign to 
sign and from representer to representer [...] one can no longer dispose of 
meaning; one can no longer stop it, it is carried into an endless movement of 
signification” (Of Grammatology, 233-4). The consequence, Derrida argues, is 
that there is no final or absolute meaning – no ‘transcendental signified’ – to 
any text, and as such “the absence of the transcendental signified extends the 
domain and the play of signification infinitely” (Writing and Difference, 354).  
The ultimate consequence of this separation of signifier and signified is 
that any text bears within it a great number of unintended and contrary 
strands of meaning, and to these ends deconstruction often employs 
etymological analyses in order to demonstrate the contrary significations 
which reside within a text.46 This attestation of the significance of etymology in 
a text has a long tradition. Giambattista Vico, considered by many the primary 
influence of the Wake (see Verene), argues for the legitimacy of this approach 
when he points to the etymology of ‘etymology’ as the Greek etymos, or 
etumos, meaning ‘true’, and thus indicates that it is itself the study or science 
of truth, or, in Attridge’s phrasing, “a discourse on true meaning” (Peculiar 
Language, 99; see Vico, New Science, 403). In stark contrast to Saussure’s 
argument for the arbitrariness of the sign, such belief in a word’s etymology as 
its ‘truer’ meaning clearly constitutes a belief in the inherent meaning of the 
sign.  
While the Saussurean and Deconstructive views on etymological 
meaning may appear incompatible, the issue may be somewhat resolved if 
we accept that different texts possess markers of their domain of discourse, 
                                            
46 The most famous, and also most exemplary, instance of the deconstructive employment of 
etymological analysis is J. Hillis Miller’s “The Critic as Host” (see bibliography). 
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and that these markers inform the reader whether the etymological traces 
within the text should be shut out (as with a recipe) or enabled (as with works 
marked with the ‘author-function’, such as with Finnegans Wake). Ulysses, for 
example, uses words which, when applied to context, can only be understood 
etymologically if coherence is to occur. In the second line of the novel we read 
that “a yellow dressinggown, ungirdled, was sustained behind [Buck Mulligan] 
by the morning air” (U.1, emphasis added), where “sustained” must be 
understood in its ‘original’ sense as ‘held up’ (from the Latin sustinere, from 
sub- ‘from below’ and tenere ‘hold’) if the line is to cohere to our schematic 
knowledge of what the wind may do to an ungirdled dressinggown. However, 
while Ulysses allows such etymological readings more easily by virtue of its 
inscription with the author-function, it would appear that the lines between the 
literary and non-literary, and between the diachronic and the synchronic, are 
not fixed. In other words, if the reader cannot make a given text cohere 
semantically and synchronically, he or she has the capacity to move into other 
modes of semantic interpretation, as with the example of the cryptic 
crossword clue. 
Returning to the example of recipes, the etymology of ‘basil’ is clearly 
irrelevant for following a recipe correctly. Indeed, if one were to interpret a 
recipe for basil chicken as communicating the cowardliness (a connotation of 
‘chicken’) of royalty or kingship (the etymology of ‘basil’ deriving from the 
Greek basilikos, ‘royal’, or basileus, ‘king’) it may be said that in a meaningful 
sense a failure to pragmatically ‘understand’ the message being relayed has 
occurred. The word’s etymology, however, may have semantic force in a line 
such as “Basil and the two other men from King’s Avenance” (FW 374.31-32), 
wherein, in an endeavour to make the line cohere collocationally (by virtue of 
its lexical chains of signification), the royal or kingly connotations of the word’s 
etymology could be seen to bear relevance on the line’s other regal 
vocabulary. As Tigges argues, in wordplay “the requirement is that the 
meanings of the word played upon are etymologically linked” (Tigges, 60), 
however it should be added that such etymological linking is enabled (or not, 
as the case may be) on the hermeneutic side, and not the creative side, of 
language meaning. 
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In its concept of an absent signification which can only be 
hermeneutically negotiated, Derrida’s deconstructive method would appear to 
coalesce with this study’s assertion of the unavoidable plurality of signification 
and the inerasability of equivocality. However, given our conclusions about 
context, schemata and discourse domains, deconstruction may be 
summarised as an investigation of how signs would signify, how language 
would mean, if such factors as schematic knowledge, pragmatic competence, 
context, co-textual cohesion, and even syntax, did not exist as limiting (though 
not determining) factors on signification. The fact that such factors do exist, 
and help limit (though not fix or define) meaning does not undermine 
deconstruction’s ultimate points of the impossibility of definitive meaning and 
the problematic nature (whether impossible or inaccessible) of authorial 
intention; however it does bring into question its notion that all texts (whether 
a recipe or Heart of Darkness) exist within one domain of discourse in which 
one hermeneutic method is equally applicable. Similarly, Saussurean 
linguistics could be summarised as an investigation into how signs would 
signify, how language would mean, if such factors as homophonic punning, 
etymology, and portmanteaux did not problematise the relation of the signifier 
to the signified, and engender the hermeneutics to be used for different 
genres of text.  
The deficiency inherent to the two approaches to signification is that 
both propose the application of a single hermeneutic method for a variety of 
texts positioned in discrete discourse domains. How then shall it be 
maintained that both recipes and poetry should be read either to infer their 
‘message’ or their implicature, in view of the fact that the hermeneutic 
competences required to successfully engage with these texts are clearly 
contrastive. The apparent conclusion to be drawn is that both Saussurean 
linguistics and Derridean deconstruction are too rigid in their understanding of 
the process of signification in so far as they are closed off to the possibility 
that different hermeneutic codes may be legitimately activated in different 
domains of discourse, and either approach may be a legitimate hermeneutic 
approach depending on the domain of any given text. In the possibility of both 
models legitimately existing simultaneously, and offering plausible, if 
significantly different, interpretations of a single strand of text, the legitimacy 
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of the sheer variety of semiotic processes in Finnegans Wake, and of the 
variety of hermeneutic tools available to the reader, is supported.  
2.6.4.1 Etymology in Finnegans Wake 
 
As to the influence of etymological meaning in Finnegans Wake, a 
strange phenomenon is recognisable once the text is viewed in the literary 
discourse domain wherein such interpretative approaches are legitimised. If 
we turn to the book’s opening page with our etymological hats on, it may be 
observed that beyond the associative lexical chain of signification at work, 
there is also a deeply associative etymological chain which connects the 
words. To wit, in the opening paragraph one finds a series of items which are 
superficially distinct, but etymologically related. For example we learn that “a 
commodius vicus of recirculation” brings us “back to Howth Castle and 
Environs” (FW 3.1-3, emphasis added). “Environs” actually relates to 
“recirculation” in so far as it stems from the Old French environer, which is 
comprised of en (“in”) + viron (“circuit”). When interpreted etymologically, 
then, the line could be afforded the pragmatic significance of indicating that 
the “recirculation” present at the manifest level of the text, is bringing us back 
to more circulations. Similarly, within the reference to “the scraggy isthmus” 
(FW 3.5-6) we may discover that scrag is an alteration of Scots and northern 
English ‘crag’ meaning ‘neck’, and “isthmus” – a lexical English word meaning 
‘a narrow strip of land with sea on either side forming a link between two 
larger areas of land’ – is derived etymologically from the Greek isthmos, also 
meaning ‘neck’. The pattern continues with the revelation that “the great fall 
[…] entailed […] the pftjschute of Finnegan” (FW 3.18-19, emphasis added) 
with ‘chute’ from “pftjschute” originating from the Old French ‘cheoit’ (“to fall”), 
constituting another recirculation in which we learn that the “great fall” entailed 
a fall. This circular fall, we are told, may send “an unquiring one well to the 
west in quest of his tumptytumtoes” (FW 3.21, emphasis added). Once more 
the signs are etymologically linked, as ‘inquire’ (rendered as “unquire” in the 
Wakean text) derives from the Old French enquerre, which is in turn based on 
quaerere, the same etymological root of “quest”. Finally, to fully flog the horse, 
in the mirroring words “humptyhillhead” and “tumptytumtoes” (FW 3.21-22, 
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emphasis added), we find that the first morpheme of both words have the 
same referent – with ‘hump’ meaning ‘a rounded raised mass of earth or land’ 
and ‘tump’ a ‘small, rounded hill or mound’ – and are  etymologically related. 
As a consequence, Burrell’s assertion that in Finnegans Wake the 
neologisms “are based on the same etymological principles as standard 
English” (2) may be considered correct but deficient, in so far as it neglects 
the subtextual etymological collocations which associatively link its non-lexical 
items, as it appears that words in Finnegans Wake influence each other in a 
subtextual mode of etymological linear modification. What significance or 
implicature may result from this subtextual etymological chain is open to 
interpretation, but it may be posited that in this particular case the technique is 
employed to underline the notion of recirculation that pervades the work’s 
opening page. 
If non-synchronic means of signification such as etymology can be 
enabled within the literary domain, the result will undoubtedly be an increase 
in ambiguity due to the suspension of the usual synchronic delimiting of 
signifying potential. Through such an enablement of diachronic signification, 
the ambiguity and polysemy of puns, portmanteaux and baragouin – features 
not only of texts operating within the domain of the ‘author-function’, but of all 
English language use – is considerably expanded in Joyce’s text. Indeed, 
Joyce’s etymological punning “while drawing attention to historical linearity, 
exploits the felt gap” between the synchronic and the diachronic, thus making 
more apparent the disjunctive synthesis prevalent in all modes of language 
(Bell 51). 
 
2.7 Summary of Findings 
 
 
Having come this far, let us now summarise how signification occurs in 
both Finnegans Wake and language in general. As to whether the text of 
Finnegans Wake constitutes a non-language, a new language, a polyglot 
hybrid of languages or an exaggerated exemplification of the English linguistic 
code, the findings thus far support significantly the stance that the Wakean 
text “does not invent in a vacuum, but by imitating and exploiting rules” of the 
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English linguistic code, and that “what is chiefly imitated is the regular 
derivation of words from existing suffixes or prefixes, the borrowing of foreign 
words, or the conversion of a word from its habitual part of speech to another” 
(Lecercle, Philosophy of Language, 40).47 In other words, rather than being 
“nat language at any sinse of the world” (FW 83.12)” the Wake is language in 
every sense of the word, and a creative and highly exaggerated form of the 
English language at that. 
If the fact that the text of the Wake presents a plurality of meaning which 
cannot be reduced to a single ‘message’ or ultimate signified is considered 
antithetical to the workings of the English language system, it is has been 
demonstrated that the text serves not to pervert representation, but to 
highlight the inherent disconnect between signifier and signified, between the 
processes of encoding and decoding messages, and to stress the reader’s 
role, as well as the role of extratextual factors such as context, schemata and 
discourse domains, in the creation of meaning.  
Thus, on the basis of the evidence thus far investigated, the important 
conclusion to be drawn is that the language of Finnegans Wake undermines 
two myths about the process of semiosis, namely that words themselves 
transport unambiguous and univocal meanings in and of themselves, and that 
meaning can only occur by non-deviant reference to the rules of grammar and 
the lexicon. Consequently, the major submission of this chapter is that when 
Robert McAlmon contends that to Joyce “language does not mean the English 
language, it means a medium capable of suggestion, implication, and 
evocation; a medium as free as any medium should be” (in Deming, 408) he 
fails to appreciate that the English language, rather than a strictly grammatical 
and semantic codification of stable univocal meaning, is endlessly capable of 
such suggestion, implication, evocation and play, and it is these very 
characteristics of the code itself that Finnegans Wake explores.  
 
                                            
47 Lecercle’s conclusions pertain to the process at work in Carroll’s Jabberwocky, but it is 




3 Deviance and Implicature in Finnegans Wake 
 
 
3.1 “Improbable Possibles”: Confronting Unfeasibility in the Wakean 
Text 
 
we are in for a sequentiality of improbable possibles (FW 110.15). 
 
Having substantiated the claim that the language of Finnegans Wake 
signifies by undergoing, in a comically exaggerated manner, the same 
semiotic processes as those of all English texts, one substantial objection 
remains. Despite the significant gains to be made from reading the book in 
terms of how it engages with the English linguistic code, the reader is still 
confronted with such a degree of structural ambiguity and linguistic 
unfeasibility that such conformity cannot erase the text’s inherent opacity. This 
obstruction to assigning pragmatic significance to the Wake goes beyond the 
mere equivocality of the text – as demonstrated, no piece of text can lay claim 
to a ‘meaning’ in the monosemantic or univocal sense of the word. Rather it 
speaks to the linguistic unfeasibility encoded into the Wakean text, an 
unfeasibility which obstructs the reader’s ability to discern context, to parse 
sentences and to assign grammatical categories to words. In other words, 
there remain features of the text which serve to impede the process of 
signification, as a disparity remains between the text’s grammatical adherence 
and its understandability. To these ends, this part of the study will investigate 
the problems these wilful deviations from the code raise for the reader and for 
our working theory of signification in the work. This will be approached 
through a systematic analysis of the text’s unfeasible language use, 
morphemic and syntactic ambiguities, and the repercussions of the book’s 
narrative digressions for contextual certainty. 
When asked what exactly makes Finnegans Wake so difficult, Fritz Senn 
replied, “if we knew some of the causes, the difficulties might go away” (Fritz 
Senn and FW). Addressing this contention that a more comprehensive 
knowledge of the causes of difficulty may help to dissipate it, the present 
 92 
chapter shall shift focus towards a greater consideration of the variety of 
discourse at play within the text, and an investigation of how – and more 
ultimately why – difficulty is created in the Wakean text. As shall be seen, by 
virtue of such linguistic unfeasibility and violation of the English linguistic code 
an interesting dual semiotic process occurs in which ambiguity is amplified 
and meaning is created. To these ends it shall be necessary to introduce the 
ideas of linguists Del Hymes and Paul Grice, who argue that grammatical 
correctness is not synonymous with meaningful language use, and who 
explore the ways in which meaning is forged not only by coherence to 
linguistic rules (as, for example, Noam Chomsky argues), but also by the very 
act of breaking with them. 
 
3.1.1 Possibility and Feasibility in the Linguistic Code 
 
Del Hymes introduced the notion of ‘communicative competence’, which 
states that “there are rules of use without which the rules of grammar would 
be useless” (278). This assertion constitutes a reversal of Noam Chomsky’s 
‘theory of competence’, the assertion that ‘linguistic competence’ of the rules 
underlying a piece of text plays a more substantial role in meaning than the 
performance of that text.48 In Hymes’ view, the linguistic rules prioritised by 
Chomsky are subservient to social rules, wherein the language user needs to 
know when, how and to whom to employ the rules of language in order to 
forge less problematic pragmatic significance. In other words, not only can 
meaning result from violating the English linguistic code, but in some 
circumstances such violation is the most appropriate course. Indeed, as 
Hymes highlights, “some occasions call for being appropriately 
ungrammatical” (277).  
Hymes identifies the four distinct aspects of communicative competence 
as the possible (what can be encoded in a language), the feasible (the extent 
to which a piece of text can be readily processed), the appropriate (the extent 
to which the text is relevant to context), and the performed (the extent to 
which the text is an example of actually occurring language use) (Hymes 
                                            
48 As Hymes highlights, what Chomsky dubs ‘linguistic performance’ is roughly synonymous 
with “the process often termed encoding and decoding”, as it has been referred to throughout 
this study (Hymes 55). 
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63).49 In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that linguistic and lexical 
probability within the linguistic code is not the exclusive ground upon which 
meaning occurs, as unattested or improbable language use may still be 
semantically predictable if it is possible within the code. An important 
expansion of this theory resulting from Hymes’ rules of communicative 
competence is that a text may be linguistically possible yet at the same time 
unfeasible. In other words, a text might be a grammatically and lexically 
correct encoding in respect to the language code, yet remain difficult to 
decipher or understand. Widdowson offers the example of “this is the corn the 
rat the cat the dog chased killed ate” as an example of a grammatically 
correct (or, in Hymes’ terms, ‘possible’) sentence which is rendered practically 
incoherent by its lack of feasibility (Discourse Analysis, 14). While some 
degree of scrutiny could eventually parse the sentence into more meaningful 
separate clauses (‘this is the corn the rat ate,’ ‘this is the rat the cat killed,’ 
‘this is the cat the dog chased’), its phrasing is ultimately an impediment to 
meaning, regardless of its grammatical correctness. That these simultaneous 
qualities of possibility and unfeasibility are everywhere evident throughout 
Finnegans Wake means that access to the work’s “tenuous narratives,” as 
David Hayman calls them, can only be obtained “through the dense weave of 
a language designed as much to shield as to reveal them” (42).  
 
3.1.2 Variety of Discourse in Finnegans Wake 
 
 
In order to position Finnegans Wake in the realm of English literature 
(linguistically speaking) it has been both necessary and desirable to view such 
works as existing on a ‘spectrum of possibility and feasibility’ on which all 
works signify by virtue of their relations to the English code. As the previous 
chapter endeavoured to demonstrate, Finnegans Wake exists at one extreme 
                                            
49 As is often the case when different theoretical approaches are applied, a problem of 
terminology arises here. In the previous section of this study a distinction was made between 
‘probable’ and ‘possible’ formulations, where unattested and improbable language use may 
still signify if it exploits what is phonotactically and morphotactically possible within the 
English linguistic code. For Hymes, ‘possibility’, when concerned with language, is roughly 
synonymous with “grammaticality”, or the category of words and rules, but in the larger sense 
he argues that “something possible within a formal system is grammatical, cultural, or, on 
occasion, communicative” (Hymes 65-66). The notion of ‘probable’ language as employed in 
this study is equivalent to Hymes’ question as to whether a piece of language is actually 
performed. 
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end of this spectrum, rather than in a unique linguistic sphere. Once, for 
example, the modes of signification applied to 19th century realist fiction are 
seen to be homologous with works of varying degrees of linguistic 
experimentation – from the non-lexical writings of Dr. Seuss and Lewis 
Carroll, to Anthony Burgess’ creation of ‘nadsat’ in his A Clockwork Orange, to 
Russell Hoban’s imaginative projection of the linguistic code in a future state 
in Riddley Walker – then the Wake’s method would seem an attempt to 
dissolve, rather than to relocate, the arbitrary cut-off point a which a text may 
be considered to belong to the English language. Under Hymes’ terms, we 
may expand on these findings to observe that the works mentioned are all 
largely ‘possible’, but vary significantly in the feasibility of their language use. 
Two further points should be stressed here. The first is that, on a macro-level, 
the Wakean text generally may be considered possible, unfeasible and not 
performed (whether it may be considered appropriate to purpose and context 
shall be addressed later in this chapter). Secondly, if Finnegans Wake is to be 
found on a ‘spectrum of possibility and feasibility’ within the English code, it 
should be stressed that one of the great myths concerning the work is that its 
language is uniform throughout – be that a belief that it is uniformly ‘Wakese’, 
uniformly ‘nonsense’, or uniform in its modes of possible and feasible 
discourse. Beyond the abstract entity of Finnegans Wake existing at the 
extreme end of a spectrum of texts which adhere to the English linguistic code 
to variously exaggerated or conservative degrees, on a micro-level analysis 
sentences may be observed within the work which operate to varying degrees 
of possibility and feasibility, and which employ language which may be 
considered probable or improbable (‘performed’ or not ‘performed’). As 
Ronald Symond argues, although the work is “invested everywhere with 
double and treble meanings or suggestions, there is no characteristically 
‘Joycean’ style,” as “the gamut of [Joyce’s] effects range from jagged staccato 
to the smoothest and most delicate rhythms” (in Deming 607). As such, 
entirely possible and feasible sentences may be observed throughout. Thus 
the narrator’s rather straightforward assertion that “a baser meaning has been 
read into these characters the literal sense of which decency can safely 
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scarcely hint” (FW 33.14-15),50 may co-exist with lyrically archaic but 
linguistically compliant sentences such as “and low stole o’er the stillness the 
heartbeats of sleep” (FW 403.5). At the far end of the Wakean spectrum, one 
may observe seemingly non-linguistic gallimaufries (by degrees impossible 
and unfeasible) such as “As we there are where are we are we there from 
tomtittot to teetootomtotalitarian. Tea tea too oo” (FW 260.1-3); or entirely 
non-grammatical, non-lexical nonce-utterances (which may or may not be 
onomatopoetic in design or reception) such as “Brékkek Kékkek Kékkek 
Kékkek! Kóax Kóax Kóax! Ualu Ualu Ualu! Quaouauh!” (FW 4.2-3). By the 
same token, despite the Wake’s neologisms being overwhelmingly 
phonotactically compliant, one may still observe lines such as “Prszss Orel 
Orel the King of Orlbrdsz” (FW 105.10-11). Add to these samples the 
digressive and hypotactic sentences already addressed, and one still has only 
scratched the surface of the myriad varieties of language employed within the 
work. Even on the basis of these few sample quotes we may concur with Fritz 
Senn’s assertion that “as a linguist Joyce pulls all traditional registers, often in 
parody, and adds a few of his own” (Came Bearing, 233). In the face of this 
evidence of the multifaceted nature of the Wake’s engagement with the 
linguistic code, this chapter’s analysis of the creation of ‘difficulty’ through 
unfeasible language use shall be expanded to incorporate a more 
representative sampling of Wakean passages, in order to analyse in greater 
detail the work’s by turns possible and impossible, feasible and unfeasible 
language use, as it manifestly defies the grammar, syntax and lexicon of the 








                                            
50 The irony should be pointed out, that the Wakean sentence which most manifestly 
conforms to the lexicon – i.e. the one within which convergence of meaning occurs closes to 
its surface level – refers to the possibilities of reading “baser” or deeper meanings into 
graphological characters on a page. 
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3.2 Morphemic Ambiguity in Finnegans Wake 
 
Nomomorphemy for me! (FW 599.19). 
 
While it was demonstrated in the previous chapter that the morphemic, 
metalinguistic elements of the Wakean text take predominantly non-deviant 
lexical forms, a broader view of the Wake’s various modes of discourse 
reveals there are, in fact, instances when this divide between the 
metalinguistic and the referential breaks down. Although this confusion as to 
whether words should be assigned metalinguistic or referential force rarely 
occurs in Book I (hence the general belief that it contains many of the book’s 
most ‘readable’ passages), it is observable in a sentence preceding the key 
passage analysed in the previous chapter: “He addle liddle phifie Annie ugged 
the little craythur” (FW 4.28-29, emphasis added). If the sentence conforms to 
English syntactic norms, as is suggested here, we must assume that “addle”, 
following as it does the non-problematic pronominal subject “he”, must 
constitute a verb, and “liddle phifie” an adjective-noun phrase comprising the 
sentence’s object. Here, however, the syntax of the sentence breaks down, as 
a new subject, the third-person proper noun “Annie” (who apparently “ugged 
the little craythur”) is introduced without punctuation or a conjunction. If one is 
to assume that punctuation is absent, then the problem remains of where to 
insert this latent comma or full stop. If one assumes the sentence to comprise 
two separate statements, concerning two separate subjects, the line needs to 
be re-punctuated with a full stop, such as “He addle liddle phifie[.] Annie 
ugged the little craythur.” If, on the other hand, one assumes the sentence to 
constitute a unified statement concerning a stable subject, then it could be re-
punctuated as “He addle liddle phifie Annie [,] ugged the little craythur,” in 
which sense “Annie” would constitute the name of the ‘little wife’ (“liddle 
phifie”) that “he” had, and ‘ugged’ would be categorised as a verb implicitly 
related to the opening pronominal subject “he”. If one decides, however, that 
this latent syntactic interpretation is jarring due to the absence of a 
conjunction, one may decide that “Annie” in fact bears a homophonic 
resemblance to the conjunction-subject phrase ‘and he’, and the sentence 
could be re-encoded as ““He addle liddle phifie [and he] ugged the little 
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craythur.” If the non-deviant ‘and he’ had been used, it might be interpreted 
that the compound sentence comprises two statements about a male third-
person singular, both that ‘he had a little wife’ (“he addle liddle phifie”) and 
that he ‘hugged the little creature’ (“he ugged the little craythur”). Such a 
formulation would have constituted the most desirable surface form which the 
sentence might have taken, due to our schematic expectations that sentences 
be cohesive. Nevertheless, the very problematic issue remains that due to the 
possibility of the sign “Annie” encoding both a referent to a female person ‘out 
there’, and the metalinguistic “and he” (a coordinator intended to join two 
independent clauses into a compound sentence), differentiating the 
sentence’s referential elements from its non-referential elements becomes 
intractably difficult. As it is, the best one might say is that manifestly the 
sentence does not conform to English grammatical standards, and latently it 
provides at least three exclusive possibilities for signification. While the 
distinction between ‘content’ and ‘function words’ breaks down in this 
particular instance, the sentence may still signify, with heightened polysemy, if 
its possibilities for exploiting the English linguistic code are examined. In fact it 
is only through such endeavours that it may signify at all.  
As previously indicated, it may be observed as a general rule of thumb 
that such morphemic confusion is predominantly absent from the largely 
linguistically possible language of Book I, yet is particularly noticeable in the 
infamously opaque Book II. William York Tindall said of Book II's four chapters 
"than this [...] nothing is denser" (153), and Patrick Parrinder has similarly 
described Book II as the "worst and most disorienting quagmire [...] in the 
Wake" (205). It shall be argued presently that the greatest reason for such 
opacity results precisely from the introduction of morphemic confusion into the 
discursive modes at this point of the Wake. Early in chapter II.3, for example, 
at the beginning of the micro-narrative critically known as “The Norwegian 
Captain” we read: 
It was long after once there was a lealand in the luffing ore it was less 
after lives thor a toyler in the town at all ohr it was note before he drew 
out the moddle of Kersse by jerkin his dressing but and or it was not 
before athwartships he buttonhaled the Norweeger’s capstan. (FW 
311.5-9, emphasis added) 
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Once again, the sentence appears at first glance to constitute a grammatical 
farrago. However employment of the analytical methods already outlined may 
help to parse this digressive and hyptotactic sentence and clarify matters to a 
certain extent. Once one scans the line for non-deviant lexical markers, it may 
be observed that the lexical phrase “it was” occurs four times (emphasised in 
bold), suggesting four separate clauses. If the sentence does indeed 
comprise four clauses, then it would necessitate a conjunction directly 
preceding these four empty non-referential ‘it’ subjects. Rereading the 
sentence on the strength of this assumption, we find the conjunction ‘or’ 
treated punningly, with its lexical homophones ‘ore’ and ‘ohr’ treated 
synonymously (emphasised in italics). The crucial complication arising for the 
process of signification at play in the passage is that these conjunctions 
cannot be interpreted as only constituting linguistic markers, denoting the 
initiation of a new clause on a purely metalinguistic level, but also as 
signifying real-world referents. 
Such manifest re-encodings of metalinguistic function words (or) as 
referential content words (ore/ohr) is also reversed in the sentence, as ‘his 
dressing button’ is re-encoded as “his dressing but and” (underlined). As a 
consequence, the referent ‘button’ is manifestly concealed, and the final 
clause can be modified in three oppositional ways to be either ‘but’, ‘and’ or 
‘or’ “not before athwartships he buttonhaled the Norweeger’s capstan,” yet 
again injecting unknowability and unverifiability into the signification process. 
 
3.2.1 Structural Ambiguity in the Wake 
 
 
This possibility of understanding clauses in simultaneously contradictory 
ways brings us to another impediment to the achievement of pragmatic 
significance, namely the work’s prevalent modes of accumulative digressive 
hypotaxis and modification. As a consequence of the surfeit of sub-clauses in 
the average Wakean sentence the cohesive elements become blurred to the 
point that syntactic ambiguity results from the presence of a number of equally 
possible, yet contradictory, ways in which a single line may be parsed. This is 
a phenomenon known technically as structural ambiguity, which refers to 
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sentences which have “more than one phrase structure tree assignable to 
them” (Small, Adriaens, Cottrell and Tanenhaus, 4). 
This is a largely different phenomenon from the homophonic polysemy 
already outlined in the examples of the Falklands headline or the drinkers 
“malltreating” themselves to their “health’s contempt”, in which one line may 
contain two phonetically related deep structures within one surface structure. 
As an example of the nature of ambiguity now being addressed, let us 
consider an example from the opening lines of the particularly perplexing 
chapter II.3: 
That the fright of his light in tribalbalbutience hides aback in the doom 
of the balk of the deaf but that the height of his life from a bride's eye 
stammpunct is when a man that means a mountain barring his distance 
wades a lymph that plays the lazy winning she likes yet that pride that 
bogs the party begs the glory of a Wake while the scheme is like your 
rumba round me garden, allatheses, with perhelps the prop of a prompt 
to them, was now or never in Etheria Deserta, as in Grander 
Suburbia, with Finnfannfawners, ruric or cospolite, for much or moment 
indispute. (FW 309.2-10 emphasis added) 
 
Yet again, the syntactic ambiguity of the sentence arises from the near total 
absence of punctuation, and before the line can be considered its inherently 
contrary potential parsings, non-deviant syntactic markers shall have to be 
identified so that it may be separated it into clauses. By means of linear 
modification, the opening lexical conjunction ‘that’ suggests the presence of 
subordinate clauses, and, indeed, the recurrence of the non-deviant ‘that’ 
would support this supposition (emphasised in bold). However, parsing from 
here is, as in most cases in the Wake, a matter of trial and error (or as already 
outlined, retroactive modification) as one must differentiate the instances of 
‘that’ which can serve in a conjunctional role (as they are followed by a noun 
or pronoun) from those which cannot (those which are, for example, followed 
by a verb). As a result, it may be inferred that the employment of ‘that’ in the 
clause “but that the height of his life [...] is when” (emphasis added) is 
conjunctional. However, in “a lymph that plays the lazy” the word clearly 
constitutes a relative pronoun. Assuming that all instances of ‘that’ followed by 
a noun (and not those followed by a verb) indicate the beginning of a new 
subordinate clause, we can separate the sentence into the following clauses, 
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parsed into their most basic ‘that – noun – verb’ form: (conjunctions in bold, 
subjects underlined, verbs in italics) 
1) That the fright of his light [...] hides aback in the doom of the balk of 
the deaf  
2) but that the height of his life [...] is when a man [...] wades a lymph 
that plays the lazy winning she likes  
3) yet that pride [...] begs the glory of a Wake while the scheme is like 
your rumba round me garden [...]  
4) was now or never [...] for much or moment indispute. (FW 309.2-10, 
emphasis added) 
 
Thus we see the sentence providing three subordinate propositions which 
were “now or never” in dispute. Having come this far, however, there remain 
two syntactic ambiguities that cannot be resolved. 
The first ambiguity results from the fact, as highlighted by John Bishop, 
that the sentence has no subject (274). This occurs, without breaking the 
grammatical rules of English, by reversing the usual ‘main–subordinate 
clause’ order. For example, the act of rephrasing the utterance ‘it was never in 
dispute that he killed her’ as ‘that he killed her, was never in dispute’ moves 
the pleonastic (or dummy) pronoun ‘it’ – and hence the sentence’s empty 
subject – outside of its utterance. The same has been done in this Wakean 
sentence. The second, and much more integral, ambiguity lies in the fact that 
due to its complex structure of a main clause and a series of proposed 
dependent sub-clauses, the sentence possesses two equally legitimate but 
directly contradictory significations. McHugh parses and interprets the line as 
“that man hides from thunder, but that marriage is the height of his life, yet 
that pride kills him, while the scheme is cyclical, was never much in dispute” 
(309). However, the opposite possibility is also encoded within the sentence, 
in so far as the line can be parsed so that the three proposed subordinate 
clauses could be either “now [...] much [...] indispute” or “never [...] for [... a ...] 
moment indispute.” That the syntax allows the sentence to mean both that the 
‘facts’ simultaneously are and are not in dispute creates an ambiguity of 
signification so that meaning is at once created and destabilised through this 
adherence.  
It would seem, then, that the conclusion to be drawn is that such 
instances do not undermine our previous assertion that reading Finnegans 
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Wake in and as English is the only way in which it can signify (in a way that 
attempting to parse this or other Wakean sentences according to the rules of 
French grammar, for example, by and large will not), but that just as the 
previous chapter demonstrated that the language of the Wake is at once both 
semantically predictable and semantically ambiguous, here it may be seen 
that it is equally both syntactically predictable and syntactically ambiguous. 
Consequently, it must be accepted that as with all language use, the Wake’s 
ambiguities cannot be overcome, nor can its heterogeneous, often 
contradictory, meaning be homogenised.  
Yet what shall be said of the narrator’s wilful obscurity as to whether the 
facts of the cited lines are in dispute or not? Surely, in the absence of 
certainty in such matters, the question of whether or not there is a narrative 
being related becomes vexed to the point that the text reverts back to 
nonsense? As a consequence, we shall have to investigate further these 
digressions and their influence on the question of the determinability of 
context in the Wake. 
 
3.3 Difficulties of Wakean Context 
 
The greatest obstacle to signification incurred by the Wake’s almost 
chronic digressions is the resulting difficulty in determining context throughout 
the work. If we concur with Widdowson that the context of an utterance or unit 
of text “cannot simply be the situation in which it occurs but the features of the 
situation that are taken as relevant” (Discourse Analysis, 20) – in other words 
that context is a psychological construct, which is shared and constantly 
updated and re-evaluated by the speakers – then the problem presented by 
the Wake’s text is determining which features are to be considered relevant 
for context. As a result, despite the previous chapter’s demonstrations of the 
ways in which context may influence meaning, a deeper question emerges; 
namely, what exactly do we mean when we speak of a Wakean context? As 
Fritz Senn points out, in Finnegans Wake “we often suffer from context 
amnesia, not for lack of attention, but because of bewilderment. The trees, or 
even leaves, are so diversely distractive that the wood to be lost in is hard to 
notice” (Vexations, 69). In order to test the determinability of a Wakean 
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context, it is thus necessary to ascertain whether the book’s narrative content 
can be discerned from digression, a question which, ultimately, is inseparable 
from a deeper investigation into the syntax of the work’s digressive sentence 
structures. 
 
3.3.1 Syntactic Digression in the Wake 
 
As Attridge correctly points out, "the reader searching for a principle by 
which to distinguish what is central from what is digressive in Joyce's text is 
not given much assistance," and the work’s hugely digressive, though 
syntactically correct, sentences problematise this necessary separation of 
“central core” and “digressive envelope” (Peculiar Language, 212). In order to 
better understand what distinguishing a sentence’s central core from its 
digressive elements means exactly, let us take the example of another rather 
long single sentence, this time from chapter I.3.: 
It was the Lord's own day for damp (to wait for a postponed regatta's 
eventualising is not of Battlecock Shettledore - Juxta - Mare only) and 
the request for a fully armed explanation was put (in Loo of Pat) to the 
porty (a native of the sisterisle — Meathman or Meccan? — by his 
brogue, exrace eyes, lokil calour and lucal odour which are said to 
have been average clownturkish (though the capelist's voiced nasal 
liquids and the way he sneezed at zees haul us back to the craogs and 
bryns of the Silurian Ordovices) who, the lesser pilgrimage 
accomplished, had made, pats' and pigs' older inselt, the southeast 
bluffs of the stranger stepshore, a regifugium persecutorum, hence 
hindquarters) as he paused at evenchime for some or so minutes (hit 
the pipe dannyboy! Time to won, barmon. I'll take ten to win.) amid the 
devil's one duldrum (Apple by her blossom window and Charlotte at her 
toss panomancy his sole admirers, his only tearts in store) for a 
fragrend culubosh during his weekend pastime of executing with Anny 
Oakley deadliness (the consummatory pairs of provocatives, of which 
remained provokingly but two, the ones he fell for, Lili and Tutu, cork 
em!) empties which had not very long before contained Reid's family 
(you ruad that before, soaky, but all the bottles in sodemd histry will not 
soften your bloodathirst!) stout. (FW 51.21 - 52.6) 
 
Using the practices already outlined thus far (identifying lexical markers, the 





the request for a fully armed explanation was put [...] to the porty [...] as 
he paused at evenchime for some or so minutes [...]for a fragrend 
culubosh during his weekend pastime of executing [...] empties which 
had not very long before contained Reid's family [...] stout. 
 
Once again we may say that the sample sentence is possible in the English 
linguistic code, if unfeasible due to its extensive digressive hypotaxis. If we 
wish to give this sentence pragmatic significance, we could say that “the 
porty”, while smoking a pipe and drinking a pint of stout, is asked for an 
explanation, presumably of an incident which has already occurred in the 
narrative, and this pragmatic significance is achievable because of the 
sentence’s possibility within the English linguistic code.  As such, it may be 
argued that Attridge is overstating the matter somewhat when he asserts that 
in the Wake, as a consequence of the work’s proliferation of “dissolves and 
montages, shifts and leaps, condensed phrases and multiple allusions,” it 
becomes  “impossible to draw out any single thread as central - whether it be 
plot, time sequence, character, symbolic structure, mythic framework, voice, 
attitude, dogma, or any other of the threads that run through conventional 
novels” (Peculiar Language, 217). Placed under enough scrutiny, the lines of 
the Wake will generally yield to a parsing that will allow the reader to attribute 
some degree of pragmatic significance. The issues arise, not from an inability 
to unearth the central core of any line or passage, but rather how to reconcile 
this syntactic core with the endless digressions in which it is sheathed. 
Once this central syntactic core has been unearthed the more relevant 
question thus becomes what is to be done with this huge abundance of 
enveloping digressions. Are they to be considered merely noise, creating the 
ambiguity of the Wake's language which it is the reader's task to unpuzzle, 
and which is to be discarded once the central sentence core has been 
uncovered? If this is indeed the case, then there is certainly a great deal of 
superfluous and discardable material in the Wake, most likely the majority of 
its text. If the concept of a central narrative in the work is refuted, then it might 
even be contended that all of Finnegans Wake is digression, as the presence 
of ‘narrative’ constitutes the only grounds upon which ‘digression’ may be 
distinguished and defined. To this point Senn avers that “the Wake itself 
appears to offer almost nothing but trash and refuse, rubbish, odds and ends, 
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middenheaps” (Vexations, 62). The Wake even characterises itself as just 
such a jumble of disparate elements in a number of catalogues of the 
seemingly random elements of its substance, such as 
curtrages and rattlin buttins, nappy spattees and flasks of all nations, 
clavicures and scampulars, maps, keys and woodpiles of haypennies 
and moonled brooches with bloodstaned breeks in em, boaston 
nightgarters and masses of shoesets and nickelly nacks and foder 
allmicheal and a lugly parson of cates and howitzer muchears and 
midgers and maggets, ills and ells with loffs of toffs and pleures of bells 
and the last sigh that come fro the hart (bucklied!) and the fairest sin 
the sunsaw (FW 11-26) 
 
Similarly, chapter I.7 presents a page and a half list of items littered on the 
floor, walls, doorways etc. of Shem’s house (“The Haunted Inkbottle”), from 
“burst loveletters, telltale stories, stickyback snaps [and] doubtful eggshells” to 
“worms of snot, toothsome pickings, cans of Swiss condensed bilk [and] 
highbrow lotions” (FW 183.11 – 184.2). Such digressive lists abound, such as 
the two page list of “abusive names” hurled at HCE by the visitor at the gate 
(FW 71.10 – 72.16), the three page list of 111 presents delivered by ALP to 
her children (FW 210.6 – 212.19), the four pages of potential titles for ALP’s 
Letter (FW 103.5 – 107.7), or the mammoth fourteen page list of the attributes 
of “Finn Mc Cool” in the Quiz chapter (FW 125.10 – 139.14). These lists are 
surely digression in its purest form, prolonged catalogues which advance no 
plot or action; intransitive verbs in comparison to the transitive verbs of 
narrative. 
It may be argued, however, that these catalogues are different from the 
narrative “events” peppered throughout the work – for example, the 
Prankquean episode, or the HCE chapters I.2 to I.4 – in so far as these 
events relate, in the broadest sense possible, some sort of character 
performing some sort of action with some sort of (often highly abstract) 
consequences. The same claim cannot be made of the catalogues. The issue 
of connecting these smaller opaque narratives, however, is relatively 
impossible on the evidence of the text itself, and as such, narrative cohesion 
remains largely absent from the work as a whole. Consequently it may be 
posited, in very broad terms indeed, that Finnegans Wake is made up not of 
“unilinear plot” but rather of both digressive micro-narratives – which are 
continuously undermined by hypotactic and contradictory digressions on the 
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micro-level of the sentence – and outright non-narratological digressions. In 
other words, such “events” can be discerned and contrasted from “digression” 
of the book’s catalogues, but the distinction is highly problematic in so far as 
these micro-narrative events are related through core sentence structures 
couched in hyper-digressive and often non-cohesive sub-clauses which are in 
themselves also catalogues of a sort.  
To offer a representative example, in chapter I.6 the reader might 
discern a determinate micro-narrative, discrete from its larger context of the 
chapter’s quiz structure, concerning a Mookse and a Gripes (FW 152.15 – 
159.18). This “fable” relates details of the two characters’ appearance and 
geography, and that they converse across a river described as “the most 
unconsciously boggylooking stream he ever locked his eyes with” (FW 153.2-
4). The Gripes is positioned “on the yonder bank” from the Mookse, sitting 
“parched [perched] on a limb” of a tree (FW 153.9-10). Nevertheless, beyond 
such superficial details, the content of their conversation, and the effect it has 
upon the other interlocutor are difficult to infer, and while an ending to the tale 
may be discerned, it is equally difficult to say in what way it is a consequence 
of the events having occurred up to that point. Consequently, a denial of a 
“unilinear plot” in Finnegans Wake is not a denial of the existence these 
micro-narratives, and their differentiation from the instances of pure (and 
almost painfully elongated) digression, but a refutation, rather, of any 
cohesive, non-abstract causality or character stability between them – as well 
as within them – throughout the course of the whole text. As Sailer argues, 
“two opposing directions are nearly always at work simultaneously in any 
passage in Finnegans Wake, a narrative forward movement and a motivic 
recursive movement. Usually one or the other prevails” (197). However, in line 
with our observations concerning the Tale of the Mookse and the Gripes, 
Sailer finds that while “one might expect that in the fables and tales, the 
narrative forward movement would dominate and that in other passages the 
motivic recursive movement would do so, but this is not the general pattern,” 
and while these narrative events contain “much narrative material, long 
subsections of it are so heavily motivic that their narrative content is virtually 
indeterminate” (197). 
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Returning to the highly digressive sentence concerning the “porty,” and 
shifting focus from the central core to the digressive sub-clauses, a further 
complication to the sentence’s processes of signification can be discerned. 
While there is not space for a full explication of the sentence’s sub-clauses 
here, the relative clauses related directly to the “Porty” shall be analysed here 
as representative of the general effect. In the parenthesis modifying the object 
(i.e. the Porty who is asked for an explanation) we read that he is 
a native of the sisterisle — Meathman or Meccan? — by his brogue, 
exrace eyes, lokil calour and lucal odour which are said to have been 
average clownturkish 
 
If the fact that the “Porty” is a native of the “sisterisle” is indicated by his 
“brogue”, then we may infer that he is an Irishman, a brogue being a marked 
accent when speaking English (especially Irish or Scottish), and Ireland being 
the sister island of Britain. It would appear that his local colour and odour (his 
“lokil calour and lucal odour”) would support such an assertion. However, if he 
is an Irishman, it would seem that identifying which part of the island he is 
from is problematic. He could be from the countryside or the West (where the 
accent is described as a “brogue”), or from County Meath (“Meathman”) or 
from different parts of Dublin, perhaps Lucan (“lucal”) or Drumcondra (where 
one finds the Clonturk Park seen in “clownturkish”). However, also encoded in 
the language is the possibility that he is not from Ireland at all, but rather from 
the Middle East, either from Mecca (“Meccan”) or “Turkey” (“clownturkish”). If 
we continue to read in search of further clarification, we find only further 
digression and problematic elements. Next we encounter another hypotactical 
modification, which offers the caveat that “though the capelist's voiced nasal 
liquids and the way he sneezed at zees haul us back to the craogs and bryns 
of the Silurian Ordovices.” Here it would appear that despite his already 
identified “brogue”, the Porty’s accent, and especially his ‘voiced nasals’ and 
‘voiced liquids’ (phonetic sonorants), might hint at another place of origin. 
According to article on “Wales” in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica,  “at the time of the Roman invasion of Britain, 55 B.C., four distinct 
dominant tribes, or families, are enumerated west of the Severn,” which it 
identifies as the Decangi, the Ordovices, the Dimetae, and the Silures (261). 
This would indicate that the Porty’s accent would locate him back at the hills 
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(Welsh bryn) and rocks (Welsh craig) of ancient Celtic tribes in modern-day 
Wales. Such a suggestion would be further supported by the assertion that 
the “Porty” “sneezed at zees” as the Welsh language, Britannica informs us, 
does not contain the letter ‘Z’. In passing it should be noted that once again a 
lexical understanding of “sneezed” would not allow any coherence in 
collocation with letters of the alphabet, however if the phrase is seen as a play 
on the English idiom (and idioms are a perfect example of non-lexical 
language use) “not to be sneezed at”, meaning not to be rejected without 
consideration, the Porty, in his speech (his voiced nasals and liquids) can be 
said to have rejected Z’s. However, as the digressions continue, other options 
for the Porty’s origin are connotatively supported; he may be from Chapelizod 
in East Dublin (“the capelist”) or the Middle East (he has accomplished “the 
lesser pilgrimage”, namely the Muslim journey to Mecca, but not Arafat). How 
then, shall one discern what is central from what is digressive in the complex 
labyrinth of the Wake’s grammar? As we have seen in this chapter, the 
attempt to gut any Wakean sentence of its digressive sub-clauses most often 
will offer up a parsed core sentence, but the integrity of this core as ‘narrative’ 
is undermined by both the ability to parse sentences in different ways – with 
alternative, often contradictory significations – and the irreconcilability of the 
digressive clauses with this core.  
We may surmise, then, that if the purpose of the core sentence is to 
relay a set of proposed narrative facts (such as that the Porty was asked for 
an explanation while smoking a pipe and drinking stout), the digressions are 
intended to undermine and problematise this information. The implicature 
being that despite the desire to relate the details of an ostensible narrative, 
such facts about the sentence’s subject and object are unknowable. As one of 
the narrators at the Wake puts it, “it is a slopperish matter, given the wet and 
low visibility [...] to idendifine the individuone” (FW 51.3-6) due to the fact that 
“the unfacts, did we possess them, are too imprecisely few to warrant our 
certitude” (FW 57.16-17). Thus it may be concluded that the Wakean text 
clearly has both constructive and destructive impulses, and that the 
unfeasibility of the sentence structures throughout the work are intended to 
support this assertion of narratological unknowability by implicature. 
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3.4 Creativity: Creating Implicature by Breaking the Co-operative 
Principle 
 
What is meant by the assertion that by forging an unfeasible text –
through the confusion of morphemes and lexemes and the introduction of 
digressive contradictory sub-clauses – the language of Finnegans Wake is 
creating an implicature? In order to better understand what is meant here, and 
to move towards an understanding of how the Wakean text forges meaning 
through its non-adherence to the norms of the English code, the time has 
come to introduce Paul Grice’s notion of the co-operative principle. 
The philosopher Paul Grice proposed four ‘conversational maxims’ 
based on his cooperative principle which states that a conversational 
contribution should be made “such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which 
you are engaged,” and is so called because listeners and speakers must 
speak cooperatively in order to be understood in a particular way (Grice 26). 
The principle describes how effective communication in conversation is 
achieved in common social situations and is further broken down into the 
Maxims of Quality (only say what you believe to be true, have evidence for), 
Quantity (do not offer more or less information than is required for the 
particular purpose), Relevance (contribute in a manner that is relevant to the 
interlocution) and Manner (avoid ambiguity and prolixity) (Grice, 26-28). 
As will be clear to most language users, however, these maxims are not 
always adhered to, as people clearly do not only speak the truth in ways 
which are informationally appropriate, relevant and concise, but break with 
these rules for all manner of motivations. Such non-adherence to the co-
operative principle is, however, as meaningful as adherence, as “non-
adherence is marked and taken to imply some significance, an extra 
dimension of meaning not directly signalled by what is actually said” 
(Widdowson, Language Creativity, 507). This extra dimension of significance 
is referred to by Grice as an “implicature” (24), and is created by the 
statement of untruths which are signalled as such (such as hyperbole, 
sarcasm, coyness, etc.), the employment of prolix, evasive or discursive 
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language, or a motivated violation of the maxims of the cooperative principle 
by any other means. 
If the creation of such implicatures is considered to be the essential 
quality of ‘creativity’, then it may be said that any work of literature that strictly 
adheres to the four maxims would cease to be creative, and thus cease to be 
literature. It is not through compliant conformity with the rules of the co-
operative principle and of the English linguistic code that gives a text its poetic 
function (such adherence is the domain of recipes and instruction manuals), 
but rather its divergences from these practical modes of signification. 
Metaphors, for example, are a blatant violation of the quality maxim, and their 
meaning is forged not by semantic means, but by the implicature created by 
their very breaking of the co-operative principle. As Lecercle highlights, 
“metaphors are self-destroying because they exaggerate one of the 
characteristics of all metaphors, their blatant falsity” (Philosophy of Nonsense, 
29). In more literary terms, Wolfgang Iser describes texts which adhere to 
these maxims as lacking in creativity and interest for the reader as “the more 
a text [individualises] or confirms an expectation it has initially aroused, the 
more aware we become of its didactic purpose, so that at best we can only 
accept or reject the thesis forced upon us.” Ultimately, for Iser, “the very clarity 
of such texts will make us want to free ourselves from their clutches” (215). 
The issue of the quality manner when related to texts designated to the 
poetic discourse domain (by virtue of their ‘author-function’) is complicated by 
the fact that, insofar as the characters being referenced are non-existent, all 
literature, regardless of its supposed level of 'realism', is non-referential and 
thus breaks the quality maxim. As a consequence of this fact, literary texts 
create implicature, before and beyond any consideration of their content, just 
by virtue of being considered literary texts, as once a text is designated as a 
poem or novel, it is known and expected that it wilfully refers to people and 
events which have no referents in third-person reality. A telling example of this 
feature of literature is the historical novel, which, while set in he midst of “real” 
historical events, always inserts a fictional character as a matter of course, as 
this element is necessary for the quality maxim to be broken and for 
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implicature to be allowed to be created, despite the work’s pretence of 
historicity.51 
As to the matter of the motivated violation of the maxim of manner – 
which dictates that one avoid ambiguity and prolixity – Widdowson argues that  
creativity is best understood as a motivated violation of the manner 
maxim which focuses on the message form factor in the [realisation] of 
speech act conditions in a way that disrupts normal expectations, 
creates implicatures, of one kind or another, and thereby brings about 
[...] a particular perlocutionary effect. (Widdowson, Language 
Creativity, 508) 
 
In other words, if a text violates the Gricean maxims through acts of 
obscurantism, ambiguity or prolixity (as Finnegans Wake clearly does), in 
order for signification to occur the interpreter (be it reader or critic) must not 
focus exclusively on the form “for its own sake” but rather attempt to 
understand what implicature is being created, and for what ultimate pragmatic 
purpose (Language Creativity, 508).  If it may be agreed that the language of 
Finnegans Wake clearly does not adhere to the manner maxim, it may 
simultaneously be concluded that once again such a motivated violation is in 
adherence to the properties of the poetic function in a greatly exaggerated 
form, and that some sort of implicature must be created by the Wake’s 
violations of the co-operative principle.  
The Wake’s violation of the maxim of manner is further complicated, 
however, by the ambiguity that results from employing neologisms instead of 
better-known dictionary terms, a violation which creates further implicatures. 
Returning to the example of Dr. Seuss’s poem The Glunk that got Thunk, in 
which the narrator refers to his sister’s “Thinker-Upper” instead of her ‘mind’ 
or ‘imagination’, it may be argued that the denotative ‘meaning’ (the reference 
to the girl’s ‘imagination’) is essentially the same, yet that by bypassing the 
dictionary term and forging a new signifier, the poem creates an implicature of 
some kind (most likely in the case of Dr Seuss the implicature is for comic 
purposes). By the same token, an author of a book on psychology would not 
refer to a person’s “Thinker-Upper” – even if he or she knew the referent 
                                            
51 Examples of such historical novels which create an implicature in this way include those of 
Walter Scott (Waverly, Rob Roy, Ivanhoe), and Leo Tolstoy (War and Peace). The technique 
finds a more recent resurgence in works from authors such as Pat Baker (Regeneration, The 
Eye in the Door, The Ghost Road) and Sebastian Barry (A Long Long Way). 
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would be perfectly clear – because an unwanted implicature would be 
created. 
 
3.4.1 Representing Unrepresentability 
 
If it may be agreed that an implicature is created by the Wake’s possible 
but unfeasible use of language, how shall we go about interpreting what such 
an implicature might be? Widdowson’s suggestion that ideational 
manipulation of the Gricean maxim of manner could be employed to 
“represent some novel take on conventional reality” (Language Creativity, 
508) would appear most relevant to Finnegans Wake, and we find due cause 
to introduce the theories of French philosopher and literary theorist Jean-
Francois Lyotard. 
Lyotard posits that ‘modern art’ is the predictable and logical result of 
any historical moment that recognises the intrinsically unrepresentable nature 
of reality (77). Under Lyotard’s conceptualisation, any art may be considered 
‘modern’ which attempts “to present the fact that the unrepresentable exists” 
(78). Such wrestling with the problems of representation have run through and 
underpinned modernist and postmodernist modes of artistic expression 
prevalent since the early 20th century, as well as contemporaneous literary 
theories, to the point that Roland Barthes could claim in 1967, with some 
degree of self-assuredness, that “writing can no longer designate an operation 
of recording notation, representation, ‘depiction’” (170) and thus proclaim the 
death of the author. The Wake’s presentation of a series of ‘narrative events’ 
and lengthy digressive passages, both sharing the digressive quality of 
focussing on formal texture rather than referential or mimetic concerns, 
correlates with Lyotard’s contention that integral to the presentation of the 
unrepresentable nature of reality is an overriding 'incredulity towards meta-
narratives,' manifested in an undermining of the legitimacy of grand, large-
scale theories and philosophies of the world, such as the progress of history, 
the knowability of everything by science, and the possibility of absolute 
freedom (7). Lyotard argues that such grand-narratives can no longer be 
considered adequate for representing the difference, diversity and 
incompatibility of modern beliefs and desires, and consequently 
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postmodernity is characterised by the abundance of ‘micro-narratives’. 
Lyotard’s submission of the inadequacy of grand narratives and the problem 
of representation are as ‘anti-theological’ as Barthes’ death of the author, as 
both reveal a concept of written texts as refusing “to assign a ‘secret’, an 
ultimate meaning, to the text (and to the world as text)” (Barthes, 171). 
Equally, both attest to the inherent complications of representing a reality 
created through its perception and defined by its unhomogenisable pluralism. 
As a result of this recognition of the problematic representation of language, 
literary criticism has come to be primarily concerned with deconstructing texts 
in pursuit of meaning, to the ends of demonstrating that representation, as a 
straightforward, unproblematic mode of signification, is in fact irreducibly 
complex, mutable, and perhaps, even, impossible. Fictional texts such as 
Finnegans Wake (or, for that matter, Carroll’s Alice books, Tristram Shandy, 
etc.) that choose to engage in this debate have the even more complex task 
of attempting to represent the intrinsic impossibility of representation itself. As 
Marilyn L. Brownstein argues, “the postmodern, itself a response to 
modernity’s foregrounded and overdetermining forms, copes with reality’s 
unrepresentability by attempting its representation” (79).  
In the above investigation of morphemic confusion in Book II, the 
impediment to signification became discerning which parts of the text are 
referential and which are not. While regarding the subjectless opening 
sentence of II.3, for example, it was found that the sentence means both that 
the ‘facts’ are verifiable and that they are not. Returning to Deleuze’s notion of 
the “strict disjunctive synthesis” inherent to portmanteaux (46), the French 
philosopher further contends that “when the esoteric word functions not only 
to connote or coordinate two heterogeneous series but to introduce 
disjunctions in the series, then the portmanteau word is necessary or 
necessarily founded” (47). Resulting from this accumulation of apparently 
motivated attempts to “introduce disjunctions” into the semiotic processes of 
the Wakean text through neologistic and syntactic ambiguity – as well through 
the narrators’ inability to make the related facts cohere – the unfeasibility of 
the Wake’s excessive language would appear to create an implicature of both 
the desire to relate a narrative, and an admission to the unverifiability of 
details or facts of any such narrative. This extreme non-adherence to the 
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Gricean maxims would appear to signal a realisation of the inadequacy of the 
truth claim of representation, as these motivated violations constitute, by 
implicature, the acknowledgement of the unerasability of equivocality (already 
demonstrated in this paper to be a feature of all language use), the role of the 
individual in actively creating meaning, the anti-theological abandonment of 
meta-narratives (and hence the death of Barthes’ author-God figure), and the 
representation of the intrinsically unrepresentable nature of reality. Indeed it is 
within Finnegans Wake that a space of convergence of Lyotard and Barthes’ 
theories can be found. If Barthes argues that the death of the Author-God is a 
result of the cognisance of the fact that any text “is not a line of words 
releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning (the message of the Author-God) but 
a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings blend and crash” 
(170), Finnegans Wake may be considered the very embodiment of this 
concept, self-reflexively forging itself as “a tissue of quotations drawn from the 
innumerable centres of culture” (Barthes, 170) to the simultaneous and 
congruent ends of deauthorisation and the representation of the 
unrepresentability of reality. 
Finnegans Wake claims of itself that it is “the one place [...] where the 
possible [is] the improbable and the improbable the inevitable” and as a result 
the reader of the book is “in for a sequentiality of improbable possibles [...] for 
utterly impossible as are all these events they are probably as like those 
which may have taken place as any others which never took person at all are 
ever likely to be” (FW 110.9-21). This attempt at representing the 
unrepresentable, of depicting a series of improbable possibilities and probable 
impossibilities, denies the existence of a meaning making Author-God by 
denying the book an ‘ultimate signified’; a single intended meaning to be 
decoded. Herring argues that the book’s plot “is unstable in that there is no 
one plot from beginning to end, but rather many recognizable stories and plot 
types with familiar and unfamiliar twists, told from varying perspectives” (190) 
– however the same claim for the instability and plurality of meaning, and the 
existence of many synchronous meanings, presented with familiar and 
unfamiliar twists, told from varying perspectives, may be made. The work’s 
mutual denial of a meta-narrative and of an ‘ultimate signified’ equally 
constitute a denial of the representability of reality, and of Barthes’ authorial
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‘secret meaning’ to be decoded by intimate knowledge of the book’s creator. 
Ultimately, narrative in Finnegans Wake, just as its signification, remains 
infinitely deferred and unknowable. As the narrator reminds the reader 
searching for any meta-narrative, “the unfacts, did we possess them, are too 
imprecisely few to warrant our certitude” (FW 57.16-17). 
If these contentions are allowed to be true, however it must also be 
admitted that this 'modern moment' of acknowledging the unrepresentable 
nature of reality, and attempting its representation, has been repeatedly re-
occurring in the history of written texts; arguably in the texts which form the 
Abrahamic religions of the book, with their impossibilia (or adynata in Greek) 
and attempts to depict transcendental rather than representational empirical 
truths (these texts present a dual movement in and of themselves, as they 
argue that truth is only obtainable through metaphor, yet assert that there is a 
divine Author behind all things); certainly in the ludic narratives of early novels 
such as Tristram Shandy, in paintings of the sublime, in the nonsense poetry 
of the 17th century (John Hoskyns, et al.), in the writings of Lewis Carroll, and, 
reacting against the Enlightenment, in the Ubu plays, Italian futurism, 
dadaism, modernism, historiographical metafiction, and post-structuralism. In 
such a context we may see Finnegans Wake as continuing within literary 
tradition, rather than breaking from it, but if we are to say what differentiates it 
from these other texts (and Finnegans Wake is clearly different from most 
other texts) how shall we understand its own particular mode of representing 
the unrepresentable?  
In moving from the (im)possibility and (un)feasibility of various instances 
of Wakean text to the implicatures created by these modes, we have clearly 
progressed from a linguistic line of analysis to a literary one; from the study of 
means to ends. In order to finally address the unique ways in which means 
and ends coalesce in the Wake, and to highlight the text’s unique 
confrontation with the issue of representing the unrepresentable, the final 
section of this study shall investigate the Wake’s most peculiar and individual 








4.1 The Cyclical Structure of Finnegans Wake 
 
Perhaps the most widely circulated “fact” concerning Finnegans Wake –  
beyond the immediate difficulty presented by its extensive employment of 
word coinage and hypotaxis thus far analysed – is that it is “the book of 
Doublends Jined” (FW 20.15-16), a book of ‘double-ends joined’52 in which 
the opening sentence fragment (“riverrun, past Eve and Adam's, from swerve 
of shore to bend of bay, brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back 
to Howth Castle and Environs” FW 3.1-3) constitutes a continuation from its 
unfinished closing line (“A way a lone a last a loved a long the”; FW 628.15-
16) to forge an ostensibly never-ending cycle. Conventionally, the prevalent 
approach to the Wake’s cyclical method of perpetually changing essences 
and accidents is to treat the book as a work of cyclical history, drawing on the 
ideas in Vico’s La Scienza Nuova (“The New Science”). According to this 
belief, the Wake employs such a cyclical structure in order to elicit, as Ovid 
had done before, repeated physical metamorphoses as representative of a 
universal principle which reflects the cyclical, regenerative nature of the world: 
winter gives way to spring, generations die and are replaced; Troy falls, Rome 
rises, nothing is permanent.53 
However – given the line of investigation being undertaken here – rather 
than offer another allegorical interpretation of the thematic implications of the 
work’s cyclical and metamorphic devices, what shall be explored in the 
remaining pages is the process by which the work’s cyclical structure creates 
a metamorphosis of meaning, as the opposition of prolepsis and anagnosis 
creates and alters content, and signification thereof. Bernard Benstock alludes 
to this essential form of cyclical metamorphosis in Finnegans Wake with the 
                                            
52 As well as a book of ‘Dublin’s giant’ HCE/Finnegan 
53 This observation is made by Branko Gorjup in The Cambridge Companion to Margaret 
Atwood in comparing Atwood’s poetics of metamorphosis with Ovid’s (Gorjup, 132), although 
the comparison to the Wake here is equally valid and salient. 
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observation that the essence of the work, in its self-defined form as a 
“collideorscape” (FW 143.28), “is not the unit of color but the architectonics of 
change” (Twice-Told Tales, 95). If we are concerned with the processes of 
signification at work in Finnegans Wake, the manner in which the book’s 
cyclical structure serves as a narratological force and engenders previously 
impossible significance shall have to be confronted, and to these ends the 
focus shall move to the means by which the complex relation between 
proleptic and anagnostic transferrals results in the cyclical modification of 




In his paper “Anagnostic Probes” Senn demonstrates how signification in 
Ulysses often functions proleptically, eliciting a delayed recognition from the 
reader, which results in a postponed clarification or confirmation; a retroactive 
modification, which Senn dubs ‘anagnosis’, from the Greek ‘to know again’ 
(Inductive Scrutinies, 83). A well-known example is Bloom’s comment to 
Bantom Lyons that he was just about to “throw away” his paper, which is later 
anagnostically clarified as having been understood as a tip on the horse 
Throwaway. 
– I was just going to throw it away, Mr Bloom said. 
Bantam Lyons raised his eyes suddenly and leered weakly. 
– What's that? his sharp voice said. 
– I say you can keep it, Mr Bloom answered. I was going to throw it 
away that moment. 
Bantam Lyons doubted an instant, leering: then thrust the outspread 
sheets back on Mr Bloom's arms. 
– I'll risk it, he said. Here, thanks. (U. 106) 
 
In this instance, ‘throw away’ signifies, to both Bloom and the first-time reader, 
the phrasal verb’s lexical entry, as they cannot access, as Bantam Lyons can, 
the phrase as an obscure homophone signifying a racehorse competing in the 
1904 Ascot Gold Cup. Later context allows the reader to anagnostically 
discern the referential gulf between the characters, and it may be observed 
that as a result of this anagnostic realignment the signification of Bloom and 
Lyon’s conversation remains stable, but the significance has been modified. In 
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other words, there are signifieds present in the text which are, for all practical 
purposes, impossible to infer until later context opens up these channels of 
signification.  
Through its considerable expansion of this anagnostic principle, 
Finnegans Wake creates a state of constant semantic flux, as signification is 
perpetually deferred and then altered by continual contextual repositioning of 
its text through as reader’s familiarity with the book’s infrastructural nodes 
increases. As the narrator says at one point of the “besieged” (FW 75.5) 
Earwicker: “it may be, we moest ons hasten selves te declareer it, that he 
reglimmed? presaw?” (FW 75.8-10). This question of pre-seeing and re-
seeing highlights the fundamental issue of the effect of the cyclical structure 
on the process of meaning making in the text. In contrast with the book’s 
farsighted, if forgetful, narrators, the most pertinent question to be asked of 
the reader at any given stage in the cycle is whether or not, in reading a 
particular line, he or she is ‘reglimming’ or ‘preseeing.’ In other words, the 
extent to which the reader is re-reading a passage with anagnostic insight, or 
pre-seeing prognostically unobtainable information yet to be unveiled in the 
book’s narrative cycle, appreciably alters the possible signification of a given 
word or line. The process at work is a significant expansion of the already 
outlined mode of retroactive semantic re-evaluation, as the text’s cyclical 
process regenerates “the seim anew” (FW 215.23) by transforming ‘the same’ 
lexical items into ‘the new’ through the postponement of possible significance 
and referents in the book’s signifiers. This process in Finnegans Wake shall 
be referred to here, from Fritz Senn’s coinage, as anagnosis. 
In order to demonstrate how such anagnostic processes are at play from 
the book’s opening pages, let us take a closer look at the book’s opening 
sentence fragment: 
riverrun, past Eve and Adam's, from swerve of shore to bend of bay, 
brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle 
and Environs. (FW 3.1-3) 
 
Jacque Aubert calls attention to the fact that the first-time reader cannot know 
if the book’s opening word “riverrun” is a verb or proper noun. If the word is a 
verb, then the absence of a subject is problematic, and if the word is a noun 
the matter is ambiguated by the double absence of both a determiner (‘a’ or 
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‘the’ riverrun) and a capitalised first letter (Riverrun) that would categorise the 
word as a proper noun (69). As Aubert concludes, “if ‘riverrun’ remains 
unreadable, it is because it remains undifferentiated” (69).  As a result, the 
linguistic elements which allow grammatical categorisation – that have been 
so essential for our assertion of the Wake’s English encoding – are absent 
from the line. Only anagnostically, on subsequent readings, can the reader 
have a better idea of its function. On a micro-level reading, the reader must 
wait thirteen words for the verb “brings” to retroactively assign the word proper 
noun status, and, on a macro-level, 625 pages until awareness of its status as 
a sentence fragment once more anagnostically modifies its significance. 
Such anagnostic processes can be seen to be at work in the line’s 
reference to “Howth Castle and Environs.” Later in the book, the ideal first-
time reader will encounter a character called “Harold or Humphrey Chimpden” 
Earwicker (FW 30.2-3), and learn that “all holographs so far exhumed initialled 
by Haromphrey bear the sigla H.C.E.” (FW 32.13-14). Once this knowledge 
has been gained, the reader may anagnostically infer that the phrase “Howth 
Castle and Environs” refers to this character acrostically. The important issue 
to be underlined here is the impossibility of the reader prognostically intuiting 
that a reference to a Dublin castle and its surrounding area might imply the 
presence of a character, let alone a character obliquely named Chimpden 
Earwicker, whether Harold or Humphrey. This trend continues, and the first-
time reader will continue to encounter many acrostic allusions to this HCE 
character,54 as well as loose homophonic approximations of the name 
Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker,55 well before he or she has encountered 
such a character in the text, or has been even afforded the possibility of 
recognising the presence of a character in these encodings at all. 
                                            
54 Such as “hod, cement and edifices” (FW 4.26-27), “Haroun Childeric Eggeberth” (FW 4.32), 
“he calmly extensolies” (FW 6.35), “Hic cubat edilis” (FW 7.22-23), “How Copenhagen ended” 
(FW 10.21-22), “happinest childher everwere” (FW 11.15-16), “Hush! Caution ! Echoland! 
How charmingly exquisite!” (FW 13.5-6), “heathersmoke and cloudweed Eire's” (FW 13.22-
23), “Hither, craching eastuards [...] hence, cool at ebb” (FW 17.25-26), “hatch, a celt, an 
earshare” (FW 18.30-31), “Hark, the corne entreats!” (FW 21.3), “homerigh, castle and 
earthenhouse” (FW 21.13), “hive, comb and earwax” (FW 25.6), “Humme the Cheapner, Esc” 
(FW 29.18-19), “humile, commune and ensectuous” (FW 29.30), and “hubbub caused in 
Edenborough” (FW 29.35-36). 
55 Such as “Unfru-Chikda-Uru-Wukru” (FW 24.7) 
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These opening indicators of the impossibility of prognostic knowledge in 
this cyclical text – in which such significations can only be anagnostically 
enabled (and then only depending on the degree of the reader’s memory and 
observance) – set up a standard of delayed signification which permeates the 
book. Consider, for example, one of the proposed titles for ALP’s “mamafesta” 
in chapter I.5: “How the Buckling Shut at Rush in January” (FW 105.21-22). 
Annotators, such as McHugh, emphasise a latent, cataphoric reference to 
“How Buckley Shot the Russian General”, a textual event occurring over two 
hundred pages later (in chapter II.3). Be that as it may, lexical items that 
allude to future textual events, no matter how opaque they may be, must not 
necessarily be assigned a status of “not-yet-meaning”. This example’s 
manifest form is a non-deviant encoding and may, as one tentative example, 
be understood by an ideal first-time reader, in and of itself, as: “how the belt 
was quickly fastened at the start of the year.” While it may be agreed that the 
line contains such a homophonically activated proleptic echo, there is nothing 
in the language encoding which references “Generals”, Russian or otherwise. 
Only an ideal re-reader of the sentence, encountering it on subsequent 
reading cycles with deepened prospective and retrospective vision, will have 
potential access to the prognostic awareness of this later textual event.  
     Similarly, the reader is informed at one point that it  
canbe in some future we shall presently here amid those zouave 
players of Inkermann the mime mumming the mick and his nick miming 
their maggies (FW 48.9-11).  
 
This oblique reference to actors (“players”) engaged in a play (“mime”) occurs 
a full six chapters before a play ostensibly called “The Mime of Mick, Nick and 
the Maggies” (FW 219.18-19) takes place. The shadowy narrators of this 
cyclical text would seem to possess an in-built prescient ‘memory’ of future 
textual events in a given ‘present’ passage, which the reader, as yet 
inconversant with them, may only access anagnostically. As the quote 
demonstrates, “in some future” re-reading of this present passage - here - it 
can be that we will hear the proleptic echo. The Wake, in one of its most 
metatextual moments, refers to the influence of such proleptic/anagnostic 
processes on its modes of signification as “Today's truth, tomorrow's trend” 
(FW 614.21). In any given unit of Wakean text we may take “Today's truth” as 
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the present signification (or, the presently possible signification), with the 
address to the reader outlining how “tomorrow's trend” (‘trend’ as an indicator 
of the general direction in which something is developing or changing), or a 
future re-reading, will bring a future modification in latent semantic potential. It 
is through this tension that the book creates “Teems of times and happy 
returns. The seim anew” (FW 215.22-23); “happy returns” to lines and “times” 
manifestly ‘the same’, but teeming with anagnostically renewed and altered 
potential latent significance. 
It should be becoming explicit at this stage that what is being argued 
here is that the text’s meaning cannot be disentangled from this cyclically 
informed anagnostic/proleptic process of signification, as the text signifies in 
markedly different ways to the first-time reader than it does to the re-reader, to 
the point that some form of understanding can only come through “steal[ing] 
our historic presents from the past postpropheticals” (FW 11.30-31). Thus it 
may be seen that in order to create a truly cyclical text, merely merging the 
Wake’s closing and opening sentence fragments would not have sufficed. The 
work, rather, needed to be written in a language that allowed for cyclical 
semantic regeneration. The work’s non-lexical coinages, by further opening 
up possibilities of signification, serve this function as the book’s “variously 
inflected, differently pronounced, otherwise spelled, changeably meaning 
vocable scriptsigns” (FW 118.26-28). 
 
4.1.2 “One's upon a thyme”: Failed Narrative Markers in Finnegans 
Wake 
 
This issue of cyclicity, and its inherent voiding of notions of beginnings 
and endings, raises the issue of narrative markers, literary encodings which 
clearly indicate the initiation and termination of narratives. The Wake, true to 
the complexities arising from its cyclical structure, employs such narrative 
markers, but in significantly non-standard ways. “Once upon a time,” perhaps 
the most common narrative marker in the tradition of Western letters and oral 
traditions, makes a number of appearances in the book. This stock storytelling 
device constitutes a schematic genre marker which indicates the beginning of 
a narrative set in the past. A number of related implications arise, such as the 
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presence of a third-person narrator and the assurance of a resolution by 
indicating to the reader (or listener) that, at some point or other, they will be 
offered the closure of “and they all lived happily ever after, the end.” In 
Finnegans Wake we find a number of variants of the phrase, such as “One's 
upon a thyme” (FW 20. 23-25), “once upon a wall and a hooghoog wall a was 
and such a wallhole did exist” (FW 69. 7-8), “Eins within a space and a 
wearywide space it wast ere wohned a Mookse” (FW 152.18-19), “once upon 
a spray what a queer and queasy spree it was” (FW 319.14-15), “ones upon a 
topers” (FW 327.27), “Once upon a drunk and a fairly good drunk it was” (FW 
453.20), “Once upon a grass and a hopping high grass it was” (FW 516.01), 
“once upon awhile” (FW 561.05), “One's apurr apuss a story” (FW 597.16), 
“oats upon a trencher” (FW 602.36). Despite the employment of such 
markers, however, the narrative does not usually unfold in schematically 
expected ways. The full context of the first cited instance is exemplary to this 
effect:  
The movibles are scrawling in motions, marching, all of them ago, in 
pitpat and zingzang for every busy eerie whig's a bit of a torytale to tell. 
One's upon a thyme and two's behind their lettice leap and three's 
among the strubbely beds. [...] You can ask your ass if he believes it.  
(FW 20.21-26) 
 
It may be observed that the narrator is addressing the text itself (its scrawls 
and movable type), and its assertion that everybody has a story (or a ‘tall 
tale’) to tell. This approximation of the ‘once upon a time' formula would 
appear to be an example of how one of these many narratives would begin, 
and not the actual initiation of such a narrative. As McCarthy points out, “for 
the most part the motif echoes a traditional narrative formula without 
functioning as one” (Attempts at Narration). The question, once more, 
becomes not what this narrative might be, but rather whether or not it may be 
believed. 
Returning to the book’s opening line, this tension born of the distance 
between the desire to relate a story and the ability to do so is inherent from its 
opening words; “riverrun, past Eve and Adam's, from swerve of shore to bend 
of bay, brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle 
and Environs” (FW 3.1-3, emphasis added). As McCarthy points out, while the 
subject of this opening sentence may be difficult to discern, it has a clear 
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object, namely “us”, presumably both the narrator and narratee. As a result, 
the focus is shifted from “an ongoing narrative about to be retold” to “the 
process through which we as readers are about to see and hear things once 
more” (Attempts at Narration). The narratological devices in Finnegans Wake 
may be seen to serve as a distancing device, as the problems of the 
verifiability of the book’s narrative obstruct any clear knowledge of, or insight 
into, the events which its narrators have ostensibly been put in place to relate. 
The result is a narrative in which “we find both a desire to narrate and a 
steady retreat from narrative, or at least a tendency to turn it into a subject for 
discussion instead of a means of conveying a story” (McCarthy, Attempts at 
Narration). 
 
4.1.3 Cyclical Narrative and Re-Signification 
 
Teems of times and happy returns. The seim anew. (FW 215.22-23) 
 
Despite the inconsequential nature of such narratological markers in the 
Wake, their very presence would appear to indicate “an attempt at narration or 
at least an unconscious desire for a story” (McCarthy, Genetic Studies). This 
desire is most commonly derailed, however, by the narrator’s awareness that 
he or she is relating a second-hand narrative, usually inherited from a source 
so often retold and reshaped as to be no longer verifiable. In his preamble to 
“The Mookse and the Gripes”, for example, the tale’s narrator – referred to as 
“Professor Jones”56 – highlights that the story he is about to unfold is his own 
“easyfree translation of the old fabulist’s parable” (FW 152.12-13). This 
indicates that “the story has been transformed from a pre-existing text that we 
will never see” (Benstock, Twice-Told Tales, 98). Equally, the opening of I.2 
presents a list of “theories from older sources” (FW 30.5); historicising texts 
claiming to provide an authoritative genesis of HCE’s agnomen, each of which 
is ultimately discarded for “the best authenticated version, the Dumlat” (FW 
30.10), which itself will be ultimately invalidated by the existence of myriad 
                                            
56 The tale occurs within the answer question eleven of I.6, the “Quiz” chapter. The 
problematic nature of the Wake’s narrators is exemplified in this instance, as the Jones 
character, a Shaun cipher, is initially a character in an ostensible dialogue who then 
‘assumes’ the role of narrator for the duration of the tale. The resulting mise-en-abyme 
positions Jones as both the narrator of a tale and a character within a dialogue which itself is 
being ‘narrated’. 
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counter-myths presenting other versions and interpretations of the event. 
Once more, the book’s opening page highlights the recycled nature its 
impending narrative, as it is revealed that the story of Finnegan “is retaled 
early in bed and later on life down through all christian minstrelsy” (FW 3.17-
18, emphasis added). As McCarthy observes, the Wake “starts to narrate the 
fall of an ‘oldparr’ but never quite does: instead, it says that the story of the 
fall, whatever it might be, is perpetually retold and that enquirers must go west 
to search for its origins” (Genetic Studies). 
So it is that if determining Shem’s appearance is a process of “putting 
truth and untruth together” (FW 169.8), then the creation of narrative content 
in Finnegans Wake can be seen as a largely similar process. While there may 
be “one thousand and one stories, all told, of the same” (FW 5.28-29) we will 
only ever hear the re-tellings and re-interpretations of an absent originating 
event, as the disjointed narrative is re-pieced back together, like Humpty 
Dumpty, from the ashes of amnesia and fragments of memory. As a 
consequence, the Wake’s cyclical structure and anagnostic principle not only 
defer and alter the modes of signification at work in individual signs, but also 
shapes and reshapes both the creation and reception of the work’s elusive 
micro-narratives. In other words, the manner in which the narrators present 
their ostensible chronicles of the Earwicker family is irretrievably marked by 
the fact that they are narrating not a linear narrative, but a cyclical one based 
on unverifiable and unknowable sources, which has all, to some extent, 
already occurred. It is in the context of this complex process – as the Wake’s 
narrators’ remember and forget the narratives they are relating – that we are 
presented with a moment of prospective and retrospective introspection, in 
the question “What has gone? How it ends?” The narrator’s response is to 
directly instruct the reader to  
Begin to forget it. It will remember itself from every sides, with all 
gestures, in each our word. Today's truth, tomorrow's trend. Forget, 
remember! […] Forget! (FW 614.20-26)  
 
Thus we see the Wakean text serving as the historicising ‘annals’ of its own 
(non)narratives through its self-prescribed “cycloannalism” (FW 254.28); the 
natural process of its ‘cycles’ of prolepsis and analepsis.  
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The ultimate consequence of the Wake’s cyclical structure in regard to 
both the book’s syntactic and semantic ambiguity, is that the work’s semiosis 
is complicated by the tension between a reader who must deal with the 
impossibility of proleptic knowledge (or, on subsequent readings, the 
challenge of anagnostic memory) and the narrators’ simultaneous proleptic 
and anagnostic modes. This process, however, triggers not a passive yielding 
to the unknowability of narrative facts, but rather an active hermeneutic 
process forged by both the narrators’ and the readers’ schematic compulsion 
to apply a linear structure to a cycle which ostensibly lacks any one beginning, 
middle or end. Finn Fordham succinctly summarises the consequences of just 
a dynamic with the assertion that, as a result of the book’s cyclical device,  
paradox would reign forever over interpretations of the Wake, since we 
could never finally disentangle what follows and/or what precedes 
what. Narratological analyses would flounder as they tried to separate 
flashback from anticipation, analepsis from prolepsis. (463)  
 
With this paradox firmly in mind, let us begin tentatively to approach a 
narratological analysis which attempts not to separate analepsis from 
prolepsis, but rather to explore how the tension born of this dichotomy actually 
informs the presentation, and even the creation, of narrative content. 
 
4.1.4 The Metamorphic Influence of Memory and Amnesia in Finnegans 
Wake 
 
          Jacques Mailhos insightfully observes that ALP’s question “You know 
where I am bringing you? You remember?” (FW 622.17) - posed to HCE in 
the book’s closing pages - could just as easily be addressed to the reader, 
who, possessing a strong enough memory, might answer “back to Howth 
Castle and Environs” (FW 3.2-3; Mailhos, 66). Putting aside the issue that 
such a reading assumes the reader to possess the foreknowledge that the 
book is nearing the end of a cycle, and not merely an end, ALP’s question 
also highlights the heightened awareness of the need for memory in the face 
of an oncoming threat of amnesia which permeates the waking process of 
Book IV. In the book’s closing section this conflict between remembrance of 
the dream and the onslaught of amnesia which waking will bring is brought 
into its sharpest focus. As a result, we find ALP’s final pleas for memory 
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peppered with the compulsion against lēthē. The warning “Don’t forget! The 
grand fooneral will now shortly occur. Remember” (617.25-6) testifies to 
forgetting as a permanent threat to future possibilities. This is particularly so in 
the context of ALP’s closing recollection of a walk she once took with HCE, 
which is conjured up by her hope for its future re-occurrence; a hope that “We 
will take our walk before in the timpul they ring the earthly bells” (621.33-34). 
It is this faculty of memory which allows for the possibility of contemplating, 
and even hoping for, a future reoccurrence – without memory of the past, 
there can be no conception of a future. Although at its most heightened at the 
moment of ALP’s “passing out” (FW 627.34), this deep-rooted fear of 
forgetting content and narrative (and the sources of narrative) permeates the 
book. The highest cluster of references to remembering and forgetting are to 
be found in closing chapters; I.8, II.4 and Book IV in particular. II.4, for 
example, contains, by this study’s count, 22 references to remembering, 
forgetting, or warning against forgetting the past, from the assurance that 
“they all four remembored who made the world” to the admission that “then 
after that they used to be so forgetful” (FW 396.35), all the time warning each 
other “dinna forget” (FW 391.5). Even deep in the dream, in chapter II.3, we 
find “an intredipation of our dreams which we foregot at wiking” (FW 338.29-
30); a fear (“intrepidation”) of the onslaught of amnesia that waking, in ending 
the dream, will inevitably bring. And yet, such amnesia is necessary to 
perpetuate the book’s narrative cycles - to return to Finnegan’s “grand 
fooneral” - as it necessitates the memorialisation process that constitutes the 
Wake’s (admittedly uncertain and disjointed) narrative recollection of its own 
content, the ‘interpretation of the dream’ which constitutes the re-tellings of 
the “one thousand and one stories, all told, of the same” (FW 5.28). 
Accordingly, the narrative is structured, on a fundamental level, on the 
recounting of, and reference to, written accounts of past events, always 
extratextual and unknowable, and the collective amnesia which forces its 
narrators to reinterpret these memorialising artefacts, and thus alter their 
significance.  
Returning once more to the final and opening fragments from this 
perspective, this overriding urge against forgetting can be observed in ALP’s 
final plea to “mememormee!” (‘memory’ or ‘remember me’; FW 628.14). This 
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appeal to remember her – and the book’s content – leads the reader back to a 
generative, or re-generative, invocation of memory in the book’s closing and 
opening words, “the / riverrun”, which evoke the German ‘Erinnerung’ 
(‘memory’). This memorialising river returns the re-reader “back to Howth 
Castle and Environs”, and to an inventory of textual events enumerated in the 
second paragraph which have not yet occurred, or have not yet re-occurred> 
In other words, the reader is cyclically returned to a forward-looking beginning 
which counterpoises the book’s final acts of remembrance. This 
“riverrun”/”Erinnerung” results, then, in a marked bifurcation between readers 
on first and subsequent entrances into the Wake’s cycle. To the first-time 
reader, this inventory of future textual events creates a tangible tension born 
of unattainable prognostication, as the text’s prescient awareness of its future 
events stands in stark contrast with, and even defiance of, the reader’s 
ignorance. To the re-reader, the inventory potentially invokes memories of 
these future events. It must be added, however, that even retrospectively 
informed re-readings require a powerful memory of the text’s myriad motifs 
and cadences, as “The charges are, you will remember, the chances are, you 
won't”; but regardless of whether the reader can key into these nodal micro-
narratives “we are recurrently meeting em […] in cycloannalism, from space to 
space, time after time, in various phases of scripture” (FW 254.23-28). 
          This tension borne out of reading a cyclical narrative in an (assumedly) 
linear fashion, resulting in the knowable and unknowable coexisting 
simultaneously, raises the question of how we shall best approach a narrative 
which makes such constant reference to its own future, and how such a text 
signifies to a reader who cannot know such a thing. The Wake, considered as 
an entity above and beyond its myriad narrative voices, “remember[s] itself 
from every sides” (FW 614.20), with both forward and backward looking 
capacity. Appropriately, then, the book’s various speakers are prone to 
prescient insight, not only of future events of significant narrative importance, 
but of immediately impending occurrences, as if vaguely remembering having 
experienced them before. Among the myriad examples we may number the 
washerwoman’s prescient query “Fieluhr? […] what age is at?” (FW 213.14), 
uttered moments before the church bells ring out the hour, and the Ass’s 
similar demonstration of foreknowledge when his belief that he has seen an 
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apparition of Shaun directly precedes the Postman’s appearance (FW 403.18-
407.28). Similarly, in the opening chapter the four-headed narrator unit 
‘Mamalujo’ demonstrate prophetic knowledge of ALP’s final monologue when 
they refer to “the night she signs her final tear. Zee End. But that's a world of 
ways away” (FW 28.27-29).  A world of ways away indeed, as the reader must 
struggle through exactly 600 pages of dense Wakean language before 
possibly coming to an awareness of the line’s larger significance, and 
adjusting his or her understanding retrospectively upon re-entering the cycle. 
If the reader has just finished a cycle, however, this “final tear” will be fresh in 
their mind and they will be able to key in to the narrative implications much 
more easily. The key point to be made here is that both possibilities exist 
simultaneously within the line, and as a result the line’s meaning, in its micro- 
and macro-narrative senses, can never be homogenised. That in a cyclically 
structured narrative these narrators will have confronted these events before 
goes some way to explaining their apparent clairvoyance, but does not help 
the reader to key into a cyclical narrative process which is at all times 
unobtainable to them in its entirety.  
 
4.2 Anagnostic and Proleptic Processes in “Anna Livia Plurabelle” 
 
This overall dynamic is best exemplified in the dialogic “Anna Livia 
Plurabelle” episode. Having established the existence, if not the details, of the 
Earwicker narrative and its dissemination throughout Book I, this closing and 
transitional chapter outlines the manner in which this myth continues to be re-
created and perpetuated. Terence Killeen argues that “Neither in terms of 
tone, nor phraseology, is it actually possible to distinguish between the two 
women” (Life, Death, and the Washerwomen). Acknowledging the validity of 
the observation, it may however be contended that they are differentiated 
through their personification of the noted memory/amnesia binary opposition 
in their roles of Questioner and Respondent. It is the Questioner’s amnesia-
bred desire for knowledge, to be told “all about Anna Livia” (FW 196.2-3), 
which initiates the memorialising process and necessitates the narrative’s 
telling and retelling, eliciting narrative content from the memorialist 
Respondent, who appears cognisant of the past and the HCE/ALP myth, and 
 128 
aware of the cyclical retelling in which she is involved. When asked “Do you 
tell me that now?” this Respondent testily answers: “Mezha, didn’t you hear it 
a deluge of times ufer and ufer respund to spond?” (FW 214.5-8). The 
Questioner, antithetically, is marked by a perpetual attestation to her own 
amnesia, with reactions such as “Well, I never now heard the like of that!” (FW 
198.27-28), “Is that a faith?” (FW 199.33), “You don't say […]?” (FW 200.21-
22), and “Are you sarthin suir?” (FW 203.9), to details she has ostensibly 
heard ‘a deluge of times, over and over.’ The teller needs the amnesiac 
questioner to necessitate the story’s telling and retelling, and, contrastingly, 
the questioner is dependent upon the teller to acquire a memory of an 
unexperienced, or unremembered, past.  
          Such a discourse, which creates content and defers meaning out of the 
tension between memory and amnesia, may be paralleled with the 
amnestic/memorial reading process, already outlined, with the Questioner 
embodying the first-time reader, the Respondent reifying the text’s 
simultaneous deferral of significance and cognisance of its own narrative 
future. By extension, the chapter’s discourse could also be posited as a 
hypothetical dialogue between the prognostically deficient Reader on the first 
go round on the Wake’s cycle – played by the amnesiac Questioner – and the 
anagnostically capable re-Reader on subsequent cycles – played by the 
memorial Answerer. So while Colin MacCabe perceptively argues that the 
critical difficulty with Finnegans Wake arises from the text’s refusal “to 
reproduce the relation between reader and text, on which literary criticism is 
predicated” (3), the narrative at hand may be seen as simulating this text’s 
unique reader-relationship through the washerwomen’s representation and 
embodiment of the reader’s struggle to construct meaning in the face of 
impossible prognostication. In this sense the chapter may be seen as a pars 
pro toto of the reading processes any unaided reader of the Wake must 
endure throughout the whole work. 
One more resulting factor ought to be briefly outlined: in order to create 
a non-linear, atemporal and cyclical narrative it is necessary to remove any 
beginning or end from the overall tale, and thus to keep the narrative’s origin 
absent and extratextual. This is achieved in the narrative of Finnegans Wake 
by the crucial absence of a number of key memories, which constitute the 
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book’s central myths; namely the search for knowledge of Earwicker’s secret 
sin and the content and intent of ALP’s letter. Margot Norris argues that “[t]he 
lack of an authentic source, of a “true” version, suggests that the original sin, 
the original trauma, was itself experienced as a fiction or myth at the moment 
of it occurrence” (26).  
Once more, “Anna Livia Plurabelle” is exemplary of such a process, as 
despite the narrators’ best attempts to establish a linear, teleological narrative 
– mirroring the reader’s schematic desire to impose on the text a containing 
linear narrative movement from a beginning to an end – they are confounded 
by the lack of an origin, which necessarily results in an eternal cyclical search. 
“Where did I stop?” one asks only to be answered, “Never stop. 
Continuarration!” (FW 205.13-14), as both reader and narrator are fruitlessly 
searching in a continuous cyclical narration for the absent narratological origin 
of the myth “in the loup of the years” (FW 214.4). “Well, you know or don't you 
kennet or haven't I told you every telling has a taling and that's the he and the 
she of it” (FW 213.11-12, emphasis added) one washerwoman insists, the 
implication being that if every tale has an ending – a ‘tailing’ – then it must 
have had a beginning. When the Respondent opens her recycling of events 
with the seemingly authoritative assertion that “well, you know when the old 
cheb went futt and did what you know” and the Questioner encourages “yes, I 
know, go on” (FW 216.6-7), the reader may infer a common consensus on the 
exact nature of the ‘old chap’s’ crime. He or she may assume the narrators’ 
assertions that “you know” and “I know” what happened to be reliable. Only a 
few lines later, however, we find this certitude undermined with the 
equivocation “or whatever it was they threed to make out he thried to two in 
the Fiendish park” (FW 196.9-11). Once confidence in universal memory of 
the narrative being related - the belief that “Yes, of course, we all know Anna 
Livia” - gives way to such universal amnesia that the pertinent question 
becomes: “What was it he did a tail at all on Animal Sendai? And how long 
was he under loch and neagh?” (FW 196.18-20).  The Questioner knows the 
consequences of HCE’s actions – that he was punished, put under ‘lock and 
key’ – but not the actions themselves, the crime that resulted in his 
incarceration and interment in Lough Neagh. This awareness of a current 
status quo and search for a reason for its so being is a form of genetic study, 
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a search for origins and reasons; for the unknown cause which resulted in the 
known effect.  
The genetic search shifts to ALP’s sexual and reproductive life in which 
we find that amnesia of the narrative being related is not only a condition of 
the two narrators but also of the subjects of their narrative. ALP “can’t 
remember half of the cradlenames she smacked on” her children (FW 201.32-
33), who, represented by the Roman numeral III – “wan bywan bywan” (FW 
201.29-30) – are morphed into 111 offspring as a result of amnesia coming 
into contact with semantic ambiguity. As for ALP’s first sexual partner,  
[s]he sid herself she hardly knows whuon the annals her graveller was 
[…] or what he did or how blyth she played or how when why where 
and who offon he jumpnad her and how it was gave her away. (FW 
202.23-26)  
 
It thus becomes the narrators’ task to paramnestically fill in or ‘remember’ this 
absent content, despite the impossibility of gaining reliable information from 
primary sources. The initial account of ALP’s first sexual encounter, when she 
“was just a young thin pale soft shy slim slip of a thing” and her lover “was a 
heavy trudging lurching lieabroad of a Curraghman” (FW 202.26-29), is 
almost immediately deemed spatially and temporally incorrect, “corribly 
wrong” and “anacheronistic” (FW 202.34-35); too far to the west (hence 
“Corrib”), too recent in time (hence anachronistic). This original sexual 
encounter is modified to “ages behind that” (FW 202.36), not in the flat 
Curragh of Kildare but in the easterly mountainous “county Wickenlow, garden 
of Erin” (FW 203.1), equating the encounter with Eden and the Fall. This 
location is, however, subjected to repeated questioning and relocation, to “the 
dinkel dale of Luggelaw” (FW 203.17), then Kippure on the Dublin border (FW 
204.13); and before that again to Devil’s Glen (FW 204.15); the search for 
origin and an original sin shifting location from Irish flatlands to mountain to 
dale, in a backwards temporal and spatial search for an authoritative narrative 
beginning, ab ovo. The temporarily authoritative account with “local heremite” 
Michael Arklow is immediately undermined by the revelation that “two lads in 
scoutsch breeches went through her before that” (FW 204.5-6), as her 
potential partners are also systematically undermined by a parade of 
predecessors. Once more, alternative origins are offered: “And ere that again 
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[…] she was licked by a hound […]  while poing her pee” (FW 204.11-12), and 
before that again she “wriggled in all the stagnant black pools of rainy under a 
fallow coo and she laughed innocefree with her limbs aloft” (FW 204.17-19). 
That the genetic search mirrors the cyclical route of the Liffey in reverse, from 
its rise in Kippure in the Wicklow mountains through the counties Wicklow, 
Kildare and Dublin into the Irish sea, to be reborn in rain clouds, confirms a 
cyclical movement in which no matter how far back one pursues an origin, a 
precedent is always to be found. While HCE, the book’s ostensible Adam 
figure, is conspicuous by his absence, the presence of the biblical Adam’s first 
wife Lilith in the suggestive presence of Lilith Kinsella’s torn drawers (FW 
205.7-12) highlights that even ALP as Eve has a predecessor.  
The aspiration towards linearity mirrors that of Mr. Deasy’s traditional 
Christian position presented in the second chapter of Ulysses, that “all history 
moves towards one great goal, the manifestation of God” (U.42), placing the 
book’s cyclical structure firmly within a religious discourse. As Northrop Frye 
points out, the Biblical myth, in contrast with earlier cyclical polytheistic myths, 
“stresses a total beginning and end of time and space” (71). However the 
principle of procreation which the washerwomen have been trying to 
overcome in their portrayal of ALP’s sexual history – “the he and the she of it” 
– precludes an originating creational act, given the need for predecessors to 
engender each generation in turn. In the Christian world-view, this problem is 
overcome through virgin birth, which allows an origin to be constructed. This 
underlying attempt to emplot an originating virgin birth into a cyclical narrative 
which will not allow it – already implicit in the narrators’ efforts to equate the 
encounter with Eden and Genesis – are born out in the lines: “Pingpong! 
There's the Belle for Sexaloitez! And Concepta de Send-us-pray! Pang! Wring 
out the clothes! Wring in the dew!” (FW 213.18-20). As the bells ring out, the 
washerwomen observe a prostitute on the banks, a loitering Belle providing 
sex for the people (German ‘Leute’), directly followed by Concepta, a typical 
nun’s name given in reference to the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin 
Mary. The images conflate symbols of productiveless intercourse, 
productiveless virginity, the Immaculate Conception and the “pangs” of 
childbirth; all within the context of the ringing of the six o’clock Angelus bell – 
a Christian memorialising devotion to the Incarnation and Annunciation – and 
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an evocation of its second line 'et concepit de Spiritus Sancto' – ‘and she 
conceived of the Holy Ghost'. However, the implicit devotion to virgin 
conception is undermined by a latent reference to the Swiss fertility ritual of 
Sechseläuten, in which ‘Winter’ is burned in effigy to allow for the passing into 
Spring. This celebration of cyclical regeneration eternally ‘rings out the old, 
and rings in the new’ in circular ‘rings’ (the allusion to Tennyson’s “In 
Memoriam” is appropriate in this context of these memorialising processes) 
subverts this endeavour to place HCE and ALP in the roles of Adam and Eve, 
to position them as “first” in a sequence.  
Such extratextuality of origin and absence of linearity necessitates an 
eternally cyclical hermeneutic search “in the loup of the years,” but while a 
loop is cyclical, a ‘leap year’ breaks the cycle – a representation of the book’s 
3 + 1 structure57 – wherein the cycle does not result in stasis, but rather 
altered states of heterogeneous meaning potential. This structure is ultimately 
born out in the washerwomen’s shift of from their opening plea to “Tell me all 
about Anna Livia” to a finishing call to “Tell me of John or Shaun,” the 
pertinent question being: “Who were Shem and Shaun the living sons or 
daughters of?” (FW 216.1-2). The answer, Anna Livia, demonstrates that 
while we are exiting the chapter on the same focus on which we entered it, we 
have moved cyclically to the next generation. As with ALP’s final monologue, 
where we also exit the text at the point at which we (re)enter it, the creation of 
memorial content, through the filter of the reader’s and narrators’ amnesia, 
has allowed for the perpetual possibility of future anagnostically altered re-
tellings of the tale. 
 
                                            
57 Finnegans Wake is apparently structured on the contention in Vico’s The New Science that 
civilisation develops in a recurring cycle (ricorso) of three ages: the divine, the heroic, and the 
human. Thus the Wake is generally considered to follow this progression, with the fourth and 






This study has endeavoured to prove, by alternately linguistic and 
literary modes of analysis, that the language of Finnegans Wake is not so 
much muddy as translucent, as it forges, through meaningful engagements 
with – and violations of – the English linguistic code, an intractable plurality of 
meaning that exemplifies the inherent gulf between signifier and signified, 
between the processes of encoding and decoding text, and the ambiguities 
that arise from the reader’s role in the creation of meaning. As John Paul 
Riquelme argues, the language of the Wake “forces us to collaborate with 
Joyce by rewriting his text as we read it through our actively re-creative 
response” (3-4), yet this hermeneutic circle represents not the idiosyncrasies 
of Joyce’s writings, but rather an exemplification of all semiotic processes, 
and of man’s inherent desire to discover meaning in the stimuli of the world 
around him. The Wake, by virtue of its unique engagement with the untold 
and endless ways in which ‘reality’ may continually created and recreated 
through exploitation of the linguistic code, speaks to the very heart of 
‘meaning’ and ‘language’, and to man’s role as homo significans. 
In reaching these conclusions, this study has endeavoured to consider 
the semiotic processes of Finnegans Wake from as many perspectives as 
possible, most markedly the adherent, the deviant and the cyclical. The body 
of evidence collected in the first chapter corroborated the assertion that, 
despite seemingly intuitive notions of the rules which prescribe what may 
constitute ‘words’, the work’s neologistic portmanteaux, conversions, puns, 
translinguistic borrowings and etymological wordplay engage, in a comically 
exaggerated but positive fashion, with the syntactic, phonotactic and 
morphotactic encodings of English linguistic code. Indeed, the Wake’s ability 
to signify has been shown to be a consequence of the ways in which these 
modes of word-formation emulate and take advantage of the rules of the 
English language. Addressing the epistemological question of the 
meaningfulness of ‘meaningless’ words, the resulting evidence for the 
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unavoidable polysemy produced by engaging with the English code strongly 
supports Anthony Burgess’ assertion that “there is as much sense in 
nonsense as there is nonsense in sense” (Nonsense, 21). On an extratextual 
level, the chapter also illustrated that the means by which the reader keys into 
lexical chains, context and schemata to forge an equivocal but identifiable 
convergence of meaning from the discourse trace of the Wakean text also 
adhere to the standard hermeneutic processes for texts inscribed with the 
‘author-function’. 
Addressing the unfeasible language use prevalent in Finnegans Wake 
(specifically its morphemic and structural ambiguity, and the problematic 
effects of polysemy and syntactic digression on determining context) the 
second chapter employed the linguistic theories of Dell Hymes and Paul Grice 
to support the concept of the motivated violations of linguistic and 
communicative norms in Finnegans Wake as homologous with the process of 
‘creativity’ in all literary texts. As a consequence, even the Wake’s violations 
of the linguistic code are demonstrated, yet again, to amplify standard 
processes, in this case of the means by which implicatures of meaning are 
created. Employing Jean-François Lyotard’s conceptualisation of the 
‘postmodern’ as constituting not only an acknowledgement that the 
unrepresentable exists, but an attempt to represent of the unrepresentability 
of reality, it was shown that the implicatures created by the Wake’s motivated 
violations of the Gricean maxims – as well as its hyper-exemplification of the 
inherent polysemy of language and abandonment of ‘meta-narratives’ – 
constitute a realisation of the impossibility of erasing equivocality and 
ambiguity, and of accessing a predetermined meaning in the world, as well as 
a refutation of the truth claim of representation.  
In the study’s final section, the ways in which the tension between the 
book’s cyclically influenced prognostic and anagnostic modes defer and alter 
signification was explored with reference to the work’s most famous chapter 
“Anna Livia Plurabelle”. By extension, the effect of the Wake’s semiotic 
processes upon its narratological modes were addressed, with particular 
reference to the text’s failed narrative markers, and to the cyclical influence of 
both the reader’s and the narrators’ memory and amnesia on the creation of 
narrative content. 
 135 
Having considered the semiotic processes of Finnegans Wake from 
these varying perspectives, the findings of this study support Attridge’s 
summation of the quidditas of the Wake; namely that 
the Wake teaches us [...] that no text can be mastered, that meaning is 
not something solid and unchanging beneath the words, attainable 
once and for all. All reading, the Wake insists, is an endless 
interchange: the reader is affected by the text at the same time as the 
text is affected by the reader, and neither retains a secure identity upon 
which the other can depend. (Reading Joyce, 11) 
 
Thus while the authors of realism give the illusory impression of being both 
the Sphinx and Oedipus, texts such as Finnegans Wake demonstrate that all 
language is sphinx-like in its ambiguity, all readers Oedipal in their struggle to 
interpret, and notions of understanding and interpreting are much more 
synonymous than most commonly acknowledged.  
The overriding motivation behind this thesis was not to supplant previous 
models of investing the Wake’s Delphic language use with coherence, but to 
complement the great pool of work which has deepened our understanding of 
Joyce’s unusual and endlessly fascinating final work. Despite the many 
frustrating aspects of the work – and the frustrations inherent in the intractable 
knowledge that it shall never fully be made to cohere – it has been the 
author’s sincere ambition that this study shall contribute not only towards a 
reconciliation of the work’s ambiguities with its inventive modes of meaning-
making, but towards an appreciation of what Finnegans Wake, as “one of the 
great monuments of twentieth-century experimental letters” (Bishop, 
Introduction, vii), and experimental literature in general may teach us about 
the epistemological possibilities of language itself, and about our potential to 
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Much ink has been spilled over the vexing subject of the seemingly 
inscrutable language of James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake. Expanding on the 
linguistic and stylistic experimentations of his magnum opus Ulysses, Joyce 
composed the Wake almost exclusively in neologisms, resulting in the work’s 
infamy as a work of immeasurable difficulty, and even meaninglessness. 
By interweaving linguistic and literary analyses, this study demonstrates 
that characterisations of the Wake’s language as nonsensical, or as 
constituting a new language of ‘Wakese’, result from the deficit of methodical 
explorations of the book’s processes of signification. In order to correct this 
critical shortfall, this thesis shifts focus from what the text means to how it 
manages to do so, despite the odds. This exploration of the linguistic and 
semiotic processes of Finnegans Wake ultimately results in a surprising, even 
counterintuitive, demonstration that the code which invests the text with 
pragmatic significance is, in fact, the English linguistic code which Joyce, in 
writing his last work, is so often assumed to have abandoned. 
The semiotic processes at play in Finnegans Wake are considered from 
three perspectives, namely the adherent, the deviant and the cyclical. The first 
demonstrates that the work’s neologisms and excessively digressive syntax 
conform, in a comically exaggerated fashion, to the syntactic, phonotactic and 
morphotactic encodings of English linguistic code, and through this deviant 
adherence produce “meaning” and undermine language’s claim to univocal 
meaning. The apparently unique analytical modes necessary to make the 
Wakean text cohere are also found to conform to standard hermeneutic 
processes. In the second chapter, the writings of Dell Hymes and Paul Grice 
are employed to explore ‘creativity’ in the Wake as the standard process of 
forging implicatures of meaning through motivated violations of linguistic and 
communicative norms. In the final section, the ways in which the book’s 
cyclical structure defers and alters signification through the tension between 
prognosis and anagnosis is explored with reference to the work’s most 
famous chapter “Anna Livia Plurabelle”. 
Concomitant with such a line of investigation is an enquiry into the larger 
issue of the ways in which a full analysis of the Wake’s engagement with the 
English linguistic code may help to deepen our understanding and definition of 






Über die scheinbar notorisch unergründliche Sprache von James Joyces 
Finnegans Wake wurde viel geschrieben. Über die linguistischen und 
stilistischen Experimente seines Opus Magnum Ulysses hinausgehend, 
verfasste Joyce „The Wake“ nahezu ausschließlich in Neologismen, was dem 
Werk den Ruf einbrachte, von schier unermesslicher Komplexität oder sogar 
widersinnig zu sein. 
Durch Vernetzung von linguistischer und literarischer Analyse zeigt 
diese Studie, dass die Bewertung der Finnegans Wake-Sprache als unsinnig 
oder als völlig neues Sprachkonstrukt („Wakese“) aus dem Mangel einer 
methodologischen Untersuchung der Bedeutungskonstitution resultiert. Um 
dieses Defizit zu korrigieren, wird in dieser Masterarbeit der Fokus nicht 
darauf gelegt was der Text bedeutet, sondern wie er, allen Schwierigkeiten zu 
Trotz, überhaupt etwas signifiziert. Eine solche Untersuchung der 
linguistischen und semiotischen Prozesse von Finnegans Wake führt zur 
Erkenntnis, dass der Code, welcher den Text mit pragmatischer Bedeutung 
speist, der des „English linguistic code“ ist – also jener Code, von dem so oft 
angenommen wird, Joyce habe ihn beim Schreiben seines letzten Werkes 
verlassen.  
Die semiotischen Prozesse, die Finnegans Wake freisetzt, werden aus 
drei Perspektiven erörtert: der anhaftenden, der abweichenden und der 
zyklischen Perspektive. Erstere zeigt, dass die Neologismen und die 
überbordende Syntax des Werkes in komisch überspitzter Weise den 
syntaktischen, phonotaktischen und morphotaktischen Verschlüsselungen 
des „English linguistic code“ entsprechen und durch diese abweichende 
Adhärenz sowohl „Bedeutung“ erzeugen als auch den Anspruch auf 
sprachliche Eindeutigkeit untergraben. Wie sich zudem herausstellt, folgt das 
scheinbar völlig neue Untersuchungsinventar, welches entwickelt wurde um 
den Wake´schen Text als kohärent erfassen zu können, den gebräuchlichen 
Gesetzen der Hermeneutik.  
Im zweiten Kapitel werden die Arbeiten von Dell Hymes und Paul Grice 
dazu herangezogen, um den Prozeß der „Kreativität“ in Finnegans Wake als 
einen bewußten sprachlichen und kommunikativen Normverstoß zu gestalten. 
Im Schlußabschnitt wird anhand des bekanntesten Kapitels des Werkes, 
„Anna Livia Plurabelle”, untersucht, wie die zyklische Struktur des Buches in 
Spannung von „Prognosis“ und „Anagnosis“ Bedeutung verschiebt und 
verändert. 
Vor dem Hintergrund dieses roten Fadens wird die übergeordnete 
Fragestellung erörtert, inwieweit eine vollständige Analyse der 
Auseinandersetzung des Finnegans Wake mit dem „English linguistic code“ 
zum besseren Verständnis semiotischer Prozesse und zur Erfassung von 
„Sprache“ an sich beitragen kann. 
 
 
